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5ABSTRACT
The benefits of international cooperation in security are well understood. However, they have
proven difficult to achieve as has any unanimously agreed standard or protocol. The purpose
of this research is to establish how standardisation in security could be implemented
internationally. Special attention has been paid to the operational level of the security
apparatus and staff to conceptualise the challenges of implementation in multi-disciplined
policing and security. This thesis also takes a wide-ranging view of the social interaction and
interrelationship between the security apparatus and society; how the changes in the security
environment have focused attention on the need for international standardisation and the
challenges which led to the establishment of some international cooperation and systems,
none of which has received universal acceptance.
The important contribution of this research is in identifying and explaining the challenges
involved in the establishment of an international security standard, and in providing some
solutions and insights based upon the objective experiential reflection of people and
organisations facing the challenges posed by a variety of security risks. The aim of this work
is achieved by addressing two overarching concepts; the first of which addresses the
difficulties involved in establishing an international standard for security acceptable to the
international community such that they would cooperate given their many sovereign interests.
The second of which defines the possibility of such a proposition involving the practicalities
of implementing such a system at an operational level given the inevitable differences
between countries.
This study is based upon a complex body of data and information the gathering of which has
been complicated by the inherent confidentiality in the sector. Infrastructural Information
gathered by desk research and a wide literature review have been enriched by Operational
Information from which three key hypotheses going to the root of the problem statement have
been developed. 30 key issues/areas of focus were derived from these hypotheses and
expanded into a questionnaire of 49 questions. The questionnaire targets objective
information by the reflection of the participants on a wide range of issues, which also
provides the basis of the interview regime. The data and information are analysed within a
by-question discussion protocol and used to test the three key hypotheses from which
conclusions are defined and recommendations identified.
6It was found that limited access to information within the culture of secrecy in the security
sector hinders progress towards standardisation. Whilst there was a low level of resistance
from the police and the security establishment to cooperation, many countries would need
legislation to enable participation, which many would be provisionally willing to enact to
enable cooperation. This in turn would require the sharing and exchange of information
which would be a benefit of coordination and cooperation. The majority of countries would
support working to a standard and would value cooperation. A need for support is indicated
in the areas of management, benchmarking, commonality and improvement of processes.
This is because few countries manage their security to a standard; and the majority want
improvements and common standards to work to. It is clear that success depends upon
commonality and coordination and there is a willingness to coordinate and cooperate by the
majority of countries.
It is recommended that standardisation come under the auspices of a supranational body like
the United Nations because of the development work required in bringing countries together.
A coordinated cooperation within a structured standardised organisation sensitive to various
country needs would appeal to the majority and would most likely succeed.
7Chapter 1: Purpose and Background to the Research
Introduction
Throughout the ascent of man from his interaction with his environment and with one another
there has been a need for an increasing refinement of yardsticks and standards; from the
simplicity of counting through to the development of common weights and measures. Science
and our increasing understanding of the world around us have driven this process into
increasingly complex areas and brought about the need to relate a quantum of measure to that
which it measures such that calculations can be made based on natural phenomena rather than
superficial quantities. For example, a gallon measurement has no real relationship to any
quality to that which it measures other than that it measures e.g. a given volume of water;
whereas a litre of water has a mass (weight) of exactly one kilogram and a metre of length is
related to the wavelength and the speed of light. This high degree of integration between
measurements and the physical world coupled with the decimal system enables
standardisation to be applied by all everywhere and to be calibrated, replicated and applied
across various disciplines.
So given the inescapable relationship of parts of the physical world there is a logical
imperative to standardise all quanta and measures in a coordinated way. Standardisation has
been defined as ‘the process of articulating and implementing technical knowledge’ (Russell,
L 2005) although the process of standardisation ‘politics, business & economics, science &
technology, labour, and culture & ideas are inextricably linked.’ Prior to the French
Revolution there were many different measurement systems in France (Russell, A.T. 2005).
The post-revolutionary government felt that a standard measuring system was an essential
political tool in advancing the liberty and freedom of the people. Moreover, within the culture
of the enlightenment it was felt that a rational system of measurement ‘would herald a new
age of Enlightenment, rationalization, freedom, and equality’ (Russell, A.T. 2005).
Obviously, a standardised system of measurement would also have assisted business and
economics in providing an edge over competing countries.
According to the International Organization for Standardisation (ISO), standardisation has
contributed to the growth of many countries. These countries include the UK, Germany,
Canada, and Switzerland (State-of-the Art Global Solutions for CEOs, 2009). If we think in a
similar way to international business standardisation models, we can see that standardisation
8has offered benefits and made significant contributions to prosperity and growth. One
example of such standardisation is radio regulation, which is standardized through the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and Consultative Committee for Radio
Communications (CCIR). These organizations define various rules and regulations for the
utilization of radio bands, as well as integration and functionality. Among other benefits,
standardisation allows the communication through cellular phones to be global since the same
standards apply all over the world. Another example is networking, which is standardized by
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). This allows all communication to be
integrated and work in a standard way, thus allowing all networks, voice, data, multimedia,
etc. to function using a common standard which is recognized globally.
This research posits that the application and process of standardisation to the field of security
could be implemented and regulated worldwide. The challenge would be how the process
could be started and how it could be structured to form resolutions promulgated and enforced
by the United Nations or other international body. Such would include policy, strategy, and
know-how in a cooperation of experts and organizations. This would require the
incorporation of wide ranging tools and equipment and processes into a totally integrated
global security system. The establishment of international security standards would allow
public and private security entities throughout the world to function together on common
platforms. This would require international agreement on the integration of procedures and
open architectural platforms to be used internationally. Success of such an initiative would
require the definition of common themes utilizing standard applications, the creation of a
management infrastructure and the simplification of the methodology to track wanted persons
worldwide. It would reduce the hassle of often conflicting intelligence agencies, and use the
latest techniques. It should be international in the sense that, for example, the United Nations
would have the responsibility for getting the research, unification, deployment, and
enforcement of these procedures and systems to the international community. All countries
would benefit from such integration and be able to communicate much more effectively.
This research is to establish how standardisation could be implemented on an international
scale. It looks especially at the operational level of the security apparatus and staff to
conceptualise by way of reflection being an experiential review especially aimed at
addressing the challenges in implementation during multi-disciplined policing and security.
9This thesis also takes a wide ranging view of the social interactions and encounters between
the security apparatus and members of the public. Defining how reflection is understood in
the context of these interactions enables this research to identify risk and extremes in attitude
or behaviour. Intervention models can be developed to implement strategies and improve
standards of professional knowledge and professional practice thus protecting the values and
objectives of a security initiative. The importance of the findings from reflective research in
this area cannot be overstated because the weight of importance and behaviour of the main
actors can have far reaching consequences for the image and reputation of the general
security infrastructure.
A dominant problem in research of this nature is to define the strengths and weaknesses of
the status quo in an environment of confidentiality and secrecy essential to the activities of
security operations. As there is often little public knowledge of the strategy behind events and
their impacts it is difficult to define which action produced either an economic or damage
limited outcome or one which exacerbated a problem leading to further instability and risk.
Not all security events need be large and it is recognised in the security sector that even
relatively small events can have both beneficial and detrimentally significant outcomes; and it
is inevitable that different information is available on such events depending on their profile
and impact and different information tends to be available through the security apparatus
hierarchy directly proportional to its impact. Generally this decomposition of authority
through the security apparatus naturally tends to concentrate strategy formulation and
management at the higher level and implementation and application at the lower levels of
officer or field operative, thereby illustrating the importance and relevance of reflection in
this research (Sennewald 2003).
The difficulties caused by the absence of a unanimously adopted international standardisation
of security systems can be found at all levels of operations and have a different impact
through the system hierarchy. Research has shown that whilst the difficulties resulting from a
lack of internationally coordinated action can impact on an overall security / policing
initiative requiring redesign, schedule changes or an acceptance of a measure of risk; the
greatest difficulties are often at the implementation level of the operative where the
application of the tactics can be compromised or minimised in effectiveness owing to a lack
of information or cross border cooperation or common systems (Kaufmann et al 2008). It can
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be seen in this respect that the benefits of standardisation in the security sector are manifold
and multi-dimensional whereas on the one hand total cooperation allows for more ambitious
minimal risk projects; and at the other extreme a lack of information and lack of cooperation
imposes limitations and an acceptance of risks such that the implementer and even the non-
cooperating party both lose as a result.
The changes in the security environment have focused researchers on ten international
challenges. ‘In the last half of the twentieth century, globalization led to ever greater cross-
border flows including trade, investment, resources, information, pollution, diseases, crime,
terrorism, and political instability. The increase in the flow of transnational externalities
raises collective action concerns as nations must work together to ameliorate inefficiencies
stemming from independent national actions. These inefficiencies are especially germane to
the control of transnational terrorism as nations resist losses in autonomy over security
matters’ (Sandler 2005). In response to which sentiments the EU set up the Schengen
Information System which has 26 members from within the EU who benefit by sharing
passport information and common systems (Grabbe 2002). INTERPOL has also encouraged
its member countries to institute MIND/FIND, a technology which facilitates systematic
searches of people, motor vehicles, and documents at international transit points. This
integrated solution assists countries in curbing international crime and terrorism (Enders &
Sandler 2011). Currently, 53 of 188 member countries of INTERPOL use MIND, FIND, or
both. Given that the implementation of MIND/FIND is relatively inexpensive, the puzzle is
why only 28% of INTERPOL’s members have installed this technology.
The main finding of a study by Enders & Sandler (2011) is that a country’s income per
capita, population, and democratic freedoms are the key indicators of which countries
institute MIND/FIND. Despite the fact showing that INTERPOL returned a huge payback to
member countries that used its communication linkages to arrest suspected terrorists. Based
on 12 counterfactual scenarios, these authors estimated that each 2 dollars spent on
INTERPOL counterterrorism arrest efforts returned $200 on average. This rather large return
is consistent with a network externality that has not yet been fully internalised. The efficacy
of INTERPOL-assisted coordination is fostered if member countries connect to the Mobile
INTERPOL Network Database (MIND) or the Fixed INTERPOL Network Database (FIND).
The main finding is that a country’s income per capita, population, and democratic freedoms
are the key determinants of which countries institute MIND/FIND. INTERPOL’s secure
11
communication linkage (I-24/7) arrests can be assisted by member countries and their law
enforcement agents to share information and to access INTERPOL databases and online
resources at any time and this system can augment the capabilities of MIND/FIND and yet
uptake remains sluggish Sandler et al. (2011).
The reasons for such minimal uptake of either of these alternatives may be easy to understand
from the Schengen Information System perspective because it is exclusively European and
doesn’t have worldwide aspirations. It has been said that a parallel Schengen system serving
EU and some associated countries is an impediment to the expansion of MIND/FIND, but
that cannot be the whole cause with the INTERPOL MIND/FIND proposal which is aimed at
total membership but which has only a relatively small uptake and some have signed up but
don’t use it; despite the fact that it permits members to share information and to access
INTERPOL databases and online resources at any time INTERPOL (2010c). An effort to
explain the lack of uptake has been that a country’s income per capita, population, and
democratic freedoms are the key determinants of which countries institute MIND/FIND
(Enders.W & T.Sandler 2011). So could it be a cost issue? This may be the case as a rough
rule of thumb is that MIND/FIND costs about 1 million Euros per site ‘(INTERPOL 2010c)
which may be beyond the reach of some developing countries and it has been said that higher
income will promote participation (Cornes and Sandler 1996).
My reflection on these developments is based on having seen many new initiatives during my
long career which in the early days were often basic structural systems and organisational in
nature at a time when the Abu Dhabi police was being created. As the force developed and
grew both in size and sophistication more complex systems and methods were incorporated
both into the structure and operations and the level of skills and professionalism increased to
international levels. My experience of taking on new working practices and methods has been
that there have been times when the level of complexity of new proposed initiatives was far
beyond our level of development and it was very difficult to incorporate complex
developments at that time. As we look at many of the highly complex systems discussed in
the above section we can see that many of them either failed to attract unanimous uptake or
have been very slow to develop. My belief based on experience is that many countries may
have been in the position the UAE were in some years ago when we were not yet ready to
adapt as quickly as developed countries who were the main proposers of such developments.
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The many new initiatives and recognition for the need of international cooperation in security
is an important area for research. The motivation for this research is to explain the paradox
for the reticence of countries to uptake a common standard and cooperate on a common
system and platform such as e.g. either of INTERPOL’s MIND/FIND including access to
INTERPOL’s highly effective secure communication network, I-24/7 or the EU’s Schengen
Information System. It is accepted that there could be a myriad of reasons for this situation.
These would include cost, level of development - especially for poorer countries - or an
unwillingness to cooperate on security issues. The reticence could even be at the level of the
officer/security operative. It is proposed that the answer to the puzzle could be found within
the security apparatus of member countries. Thus answers are sought at the level of
implementation by way of reflection of the officer/operative where many of the problems
manifest themselves.
I served as a Police Officer for forty years up to my recent retirement. During this time my
responsibilities included numerous disciplines and I reached the rank of Major General. The
life-long experience led me to engage in this research. The impetus for the research came
from a small scale research project I undertook in 2010 during my MSc in Criminal Justice
Studies. This illustrated the lost opportunities involved in the absence of comprehensive
international standardisation of the security sector. However, it is clear from my earlier work,
and that of others (Murphy & Yates 2008), that there is an imperative to expand that work.
This is because of the clear and present need to explain the benefits of standardising security
internationally, and the dangers of not doing so in an increasingly dangerous world.
I took an early lead from reading the paper ‘Stepping Out of the Darkness’ (Wingrave, 2006).
This examined the outcome of 170 allegations of domestic abuse reported to the London
Metropolitan Police Service during June 2005 and evaluated to what extent the police
response met the needs of victims. I noted that the personal interest of a specialist team in
South West London investigating domestic abuse turned to how officers on that team
reflected on the outcome of their investigations. I found this to be a very interesting research
methodology because I know from experience in highly complex situations that it is often
difficult to understand the myriad of competing influences in highly emotional and volatile
situations. I have found that the size of the issue at hand, whether it be a domestic abuse case
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or a serious case of national security, is not the main consideration. This is because there are
many similarities in the interaction of circumstances and we must be just as careful with the
type and weight of our responses. In fact the scale of things does not indicate the level of
complexity. Understanding the lessons learnt is also equally as difficult. Whilst one can read
formulaic situation reports endlessly it is only when reflecting on the events in a case and
further reflecting on that case as compared to others that one can observe patterns. These
patterns provide a yardstick for cause and effect and likely outcomes away from the heat of
the moment and in the light of a many case perspective. In this respect Reflection (Boud,
Keogh, & Walker 1985) and Reflective Learning (Sugarman et al, 2000) are a powerful
research objective fact based methodological tools, not just in the above referenced case but
also in many other learned journal articles and research papers (MacIntosh, P. 2010).
There is a logical underpinning of this research project and a credible rationale of the place of
Reflection and Reflective Learning as a scientific research methodology able to satisfy the
scrutiny of the standard required of senior academic research (Boud et al, 1985). But
Reflection and Reflective Learning should not be unusual at all to any of us. The practice of
recalling experiences by way of tales and lessons is as old as story telling itself e.g. Aesop’s
Fables and even the Bible and the Holy Koran tell stories of warning and foreboding based
upon experiences. Many business research academics have identified the value of experiential
learning. They show how we can derive indicators of likely outcomes by learning from
factual events within organisations (Sugarman et al, 2000) which become presented as stories
recollected i.e. situations reflected upon and conveyed as lessons. Variations on this theme
are discussed by practitioners including Schon (1983) Boud, D., Keogh, R. & Walker, D.
(1985) and Palmer, A. M., Burns, S. & Bulman, C. (1994). Although it is evident from the
literature that whilst Reflection and Reflective Learning are commonplace in all walks of life
the concept of using them as a research and developmental tools is not as prevalent in
policing and the security industry as they should be.
The subject of international security standardisation has been discussed at conferences in
search of a solution for the growing problem of regional instability; I know from my personal
experience that the incompatibility of methods and practices between nations causes many
problems and is a drag on efficiency. Whereas many other fields of industry and government
have internationalised their activities and reaped the benefits, the concept of international
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standardisation of security would allow worldwide security entities to work together to
common norms. This would require procedures and a common platform for use by all
member states and be implemented as a cooperative arrangement. The project should
necessarily comprise a methodology to address the various international security challenges
of terrorism, cross border crime, people trafficking, drug distribution etc. It //would use the
latest technologies.
Standardisation exists in many international arrangements including the UN, the World
Health Organisation, and The World Bank so the basic premise is not altogether
unprecedented. An example can be seen in radio regulation, which has been standardized
under the auspices of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and Consultative
Committee for Radio Communications (CCIR), which has established mutually agreed
regulations for the use of radio bands and also involves the integration and functions of the
radio industry. The standardised system allows communication through cellular phones using
common methods in all countries. Networking has been standardized by the Information and
Communication Technologies agreement (ICT) allowing integrated communication to an
agreed standard for networks, voice and data communications (Blind, 2006). The
International Organization for Standardisation (ISO) has published a proposed standard in the
form of ISO 31000 as has INTERPOL with its I-24/7 initiative and also its MIND/FIND
system all of which have largely failed to achieve unanimity in the world community.
Internationally standardised security methodology simplifying the process of security would
be cost effective and funding could be channelled through a new or an existing international
body. This could be INTERPOL or the UN. This would mean the cost of the implementation
of an international standard for security could be adjusted to enable poorer countries to
benefit from the project. The numerous security challenges facing the world today require an
innovative and new technological approach to the problem of the contemporary high
technologies employed by modern criminal networks today.
Research objectives
There are two extreme positions to the International standardisation of national and
international security processes; one which proposes significant benefits from efficiencies
and economies from the standardisation of processes which lead to added value benefits of
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increased international cooperation which further leads to greater economies and rigour in
research and operations, which further lead to greater security and a safer world.  However,
there are those who object to greater cooperation and standardisation in international security
claiming that the sharing of information inevitably leads to a loss of sovereignty and self
determination with the sharing of information with parties who might one day become
enemies (Watts, D. & C. Pilkington. 2005). They further claim that standardisation would
increase costs, delay detection times, expose the country to risks which would otherwise be
contained and provide safe havens by identifying countries who would exclude themselves
from cooperation. This could enable cross border crime, inability to restrict/stop crimes and
impose penalties, incompatible methods and practices/systems/information etc, different legal
systems, national security considerations, quality of inputs, training and security culture
among staff (Gaunt 2000).
The reality of the situation, however, is that the benefits of international standardisation in the
security arena would greatly outweigh the disadvantages just as they do in other areas of
international cooperation e.g. UNICEF (The United Nations Childrens’ Fund), the European
Union (EU), INTERPOL, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Criminal Court (ICC). The main advantage
drivers of the reasoning behind the benefits of cooperation are commonly proven methods,
exchange of information, increased efficiency, shared and therefore reduced costs, allowing
no safe haven, and a gradual spreading of the rule of law (Davis, T. 2007). Many of the
detractors fail to envision a format which such a cooperation could take and sometimes
perceive that a supra national body would erode control within member nations. In fact there
already exist means for the management of international cooperation: eg. ISO 31000 which is
already designed for Risk Management processes.
Such standardisation of security would need to have levels of quality and achievement built
into it to ensure that it achieves what was intended. There would need to be internationally
agreed Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) set in a variety of areas e.g. the extent of access to
information, an agreement on operational time, the quantum of data provided, the exclusion
of political/organisational interference or bias based upon reflective reported shortfalls.
However, there are bound to be difficulties in creating any international standard in such a
sensitive area with the main resistance anticipated to be political and nationalistic. Such
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difficulties would be closely followed by a series of fears: eg the fear of loss of national
control of one’s own security, the fear of a leak of intelligence, privacy issues (dissemination
of privileged information), and the dilution of self-determination. Therefore, many nations
will always prefer their own standards for socio-cultural reasons e.g. the issue of privacy and
safety such as an individual's likelihood of suffering direct violence leading to a community
being more endangered. (Steele 2009).
Even if such issues of difference between world nations could be agreed there would still be
the overarching consideration to be addressed as to who would police the process; and it is
clear that this would have to be a world body such as the UN or Interpol. There would also
have to be adjustments made to local legislation permitting the sharing of information (as was
done in establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) and International Council of
Human Rights (ICHR) European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and other UN bodies).
Whilst the benefits are clear to see the likely impediments would revolve around the mundane
elements of the project. These are not least in the development of common software which
would maintain so many disparate databases and also manage the gathering of further
information and control the use of it in ways which would likely often lead to disputes. It is
this compliance to common rules I perceive as being the most significant challenge of a
project to establish international standardisation of the security apparatus involving all
countries. The major difficulty, however, would be the common training and practices of staff
which could be evaluated through the methodology of reflection insofar as ‘reflection is
research’ (MacIntosh 2010). This could also provide the additional benefit of identifying the
challenges involved in the establishment of an international standard for security. The
purpose would be to define through reflective study the likely level of international
agreement to the standardisation proposition. This would simultaneously provide indications
on the status quo by way of infrastructural research and statistical analysis of reflective
responses to provide critical indications on the reliability of data and information. The value
of infrastructural research is well understood as being the basis of most research projects
whereas the power of reflection as a vehicle for the gathering of information in a study of this
nature cannot be overstated (MacIntosh, 2010). The detailed information which can be
obtained would be targeted to highlight the likely key sticking points to an international
agreement and in doing so be expanded to define the most likely acceptable solutions to
17
overcome objections.
The problem as always in the formation of such international bodies is who would fund the
operational aspects and the costs involved in the expensive day to day operations. This might
not be a problem for wealthy developed nations but may be a serious burden on poorer
developing nations. Some poorer nations may not have the resources to police the process
adequately and as a result thereby provide an un-policed safe haven for international
criminals and fugitives from other jurisdictions (Ullman 1983 pg 129). Reflection and cross-
cultural research can help identify not only cause and effect but also key contributing factors
which could help in overcoming a variety of objections from possible international
participants and indicate solutions in the areas of training and cross cultural / international
communications (Black & Mendenhall 1990). This is more than just an issue of language
because it involves a wide variety of socio-cultural, politico-structural and economic
influences. It also covers a wide variety of governments from plural democracies through to
totalitarian dictatorships.
This thesis recognises that the issue of standardisation of the world security apparatus both
internal and external to nations is bound to be dominated by multinational alliances.
International special interests are often beyond the issues within the existing supranational
politico / socio-economic infrastructure of eg. UN EU or trading blocs like ASEAN
(Association of South East Asian Nations), APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation),
NAFTA (North America Free Trade Area), LAFTA (Latin American Free Trade Area). In
this respect the main issue as to whether the standardisation of a common security system is
possible will depend upon a great many variables. This would probably require an all-nations
approach and a UN resolution because the ideal solution would be a universal system having
some of the features of some current arrangements with a rationale on how to reconcile the
predominant security concerns underlying anti-terror measures with the cohesion of the
international legal system (Bianchi 2006 page 885). The main thrust and important
contribution of this thesis, therefore, is to identify, quantify and explain the challenges
involved in the establishment of an international security system and to provide some
solutions and insights based upon reflective learning from people and organisations facing
daily challenges posed by a variety of security risks.
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The purpose of this work is fulfilled by answering two questions; the first addresses
difficulties involved in establishing an international standard for security which would be
acceptable to the international community such that they would cooperate given their many
sovereign interests. The second involves the practicalities involved in implementing such a
system at an operational level given the inherent differences and national interests between
the members to such an arrangement. This applies to both large and small countries, eg Abu
Dhabi.
The Abu Dhabi Perspective
Upon reflection I can see that our willingness in Abu Dhabi to cooperate with other countries
had brought huge benefits to the Abu Dhabi Police both in the advancement of our methods
and also in the training of our people and the assistance we received from other countries in
our operational challenges. It is probably too simplistic to say that we learned from others by
working with them because we also learned how to work and adapted much of the
operational culture of our partners into our organisation. I recall that the very process of
cooperating with other countries also had the effect of internationalising the outlook of our
staff. Previously they had an inwardly looking perspective at a time when Abu Dhabi was
becoming a figure on the world stage and we were exchanging information and operations
with other countries. As our country continued to develop and engage with other nations we
came to realise the value of international cooperation and standardisation and I can see from
my experience that those who do embrace these advances very quickly come to realise the
benefits from them.
The need for security standardisation
Being prepared to deal with emergencies and security threats is said to be the definition of a
mature society which holds the welfare of its citizens as a principal concern (Axworthy 2001
page 19). All national and international agencies should be involved in the protection of the
population from the dangers of terrorism, cross border crime, drugs, people trafficking and
other international illegal activities. It is not possible for the individual to provide security for
himself in the face of some of the illegal excesses of the international criminality. The state
has to bear that responsibility (Axworthy 2001). Numerous efforts have been made by
international bodies such as the WHO (World Health Organisation), The Red Cross (ICRC)
and the UN (The United Nations) to avoid and relieve suffering from major incidents both
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natural and man-made. However, both international criminals and terrorists are becoming
increasingly innovative whilst embracing new technologies and ever larger targets. A lot of
work has been done by individual states and also by some cooperating together like the USA
and Colombia in attacking the activities of the Colombian Drug Cartels (Bagley, 1988 page
70). Some nations not involved in that immediate illicit trade have assisted with information
and access from within their own countries as Mexico did in not providing a safe haven for
the leaders of the cartels (Yuval-Davis, Anthias & Kofman 2005).
This research project seeks to investigate the feasibility and possibility of creating an
international standard for security to which nations could work in common ways and
cooperate by pooling their resources and facilities to defeat cross border crime, drugs, people
trafficking, international terrorism in a holistic way. The difficulties envisaged are those of
the intricate specifics of each country and the large permutation of differences between them.
This means that a delicate balance of sensitivity to legal and culture circumstances needs to
be struck. Not doing so is almost not an option because the march towards criminality is
relentless and increasingly so at times of economic pressure when incomes and value are
reducing and peoples all over the world are under pressure (Antonaccio and Tittle 2007).
In the post-World War II years the world sought a time of peace and reconciliation following
the bloodiest period in human history. However, nature delivered upon us a myriad of natural
disasters in quick succession which focused the minds of people on the natural dangers and
highlighted the futility and dangers from within society itself. The period between the 1950s
to the mid-1970s saw the growth of the drug cartels and the worldwide trade in forbidden
substances which fuelled a lot of other criminal activities with greater excesses than the
legendary Mafia crime families of 1920s/1930s USA (O'Neil, S 2009 page 63). Things
gradually worsened with the advent of international terrorism and the indiscriminate attacks
on innocent soft target civilians to highlight an international grievance often political and
sometimes religious and always criminal (O'Neil, S 2009). The events of 11 September 2001
in New York were a landmark low point in the fight against terrorism, as were the Madrid
bombings on the 11th March 2004, the attacks in London on 7th July 2005, and the Mumbai
attacks of 2008 all of which illustrated the global impact of international criminality and the
need for a cooperative effort to address it. (Lagadec, 2005)
The practice of security is an objective condition being both without threat and a
neutralisation of threats, and has a subjective side in making us feel safe (Collins, 2007),
(Zedler, 2003). But security is often misunderstood as being protection from threat whereas
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there are many levels of security and many different expressions of it e.g. we often speak of
military security (avoiding the threat of war), regime security (avoiding a political threat of,
for example, a coup), security of society (protection of ethnic identity), economic security,
and environmental security (physical environment) (Baldwin 1997). Although it must be true
that when we speak of security our first impression is that of the protection from an
immediate physical threat perhaps of violence.
Numerous major terrorist events and not least the attacks of 9/11 had a major impact on the
world of security in heightening the standards expected by society and the authorities and
resulted in the establishment of various international and multi-national initiatives to address
the problem of terrorism e.g. the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in
the USA (Bullock, J. Haddow, G. Coppola , D. Ergin, E. Westerman, L. and Yeletaysi, S.,
2006) (Gregory, 2007). Various nations have addressed the problem in their own unique
ways whereas, for example, France acts in a similar way to other European nations which
involves authority coming from ministerial and senior government level. (Gregory, 2007)
Whereas according to Lagadec (2002) the highly centralized system in France has changed in
responses to crises and become more like the system in Germany in which there are similar
coordinating organizations within the federal government (Gregory, 2007). Things are
handled differently in the United States where preparedness is the responsibility of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is a collection of government agencies with
various responsibilities for emergency management, immigration, border control, and other
functions. Although the DHS is mainly concerned with counter-terrorism it was also at the
forefront of the response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (Bellavita 2010).
The National Emergency and Crisis Management Authority (NECMA) in the UAE is
responsible for responding to major incidents. The lead agency of which is the Abu Dhabi
Police which examined emergency needs of the country in terms of preparedness, prevention,
response and recovery and started the identification of adoptable best practices, assuming
they fit within the social conditions of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (Abu Dhabi Police
2007). The need for international security standardisation is evident from the fact that the
security agreements which do exist, usually bilateral or multi-national do not work very
efficiently and there are many reasons for this (Cowhey 1999). An example relates to
passports whereby national systems are ‘not interfaced to any international database and
biometrically cross referenced which frustrates police cooperation’ (Ors, 2011, p. 110). A
standardised cooperative system would identify forged passports and this would also be
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effective in the search for wanted persons across borders or at borders, thereby addressing
illegal immigration with the opportunity to apply standardisation to other areas of policing
with the added benefit that by establishing a binding standard then the worst could become as
good as the best.
The difficulties in creating an international standard for security
Sovereign states prefer by definition to manage their own affairs in their own way given their
own inherent political and socio-economic characteristics (Moore, 1998 page 617). In many
important respects the differences between nations are characterised by the special
circumstances of their method of government and their security apparatus is often used to
describe the nature of governance and security at home as in the United Kingdom which has
an unarmed police force. But by the same token the British system is highly dependent on
information gathering and analysis which is sometimes described as soft policing, for
example, the wide ranging surveillance activities of GCHQ (Government Communications
Headquarters) and the largest population per capita of CCTV (Closed Circuit Television)
installations in the world. The British could cite their example as being better than others
elsewhere and they would have an understandable preference for the status quo and a
resistance to change (Webster, 2009). Similarly, other nations would claim high levels of
achievement for their own security infrastructure e.g. the United States of America would
claim much of the efficiency of their highly integrated Homeland Security initiative (Chen,
H. (2004 pages 329-341).
Given that the dominant concept of homeland protection is at the heart of any national
security infrastructure then it is clear that a variety of resistances to the sharing or worse, as is
bound to be viewed by some in the absence of some clarification, the dilution of security
assets is bound to be a disadvantage. Nation states often believe that what they are doing is
the right thing for them and their systems of security have been evolved to suit their special
circumstances (Moore, 1998). Any proposition requiring nations to have unfettered
cooperation with others would raise a variety of issues not least of course as to who would
police the process to ensure fair play and compliance to common rules between all and in
benefit to all. This would require a set of rules to govern the interaction between the parties
and as is typical in so many areas of international cooperation there would be various levels
of cooperation and commitment between the parties and much of this would derive from the
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willingness of nations to provide information on their own nationals. Even if nations were
prepared to commit to cooperation on international security systems and operations there
would inevitably be questions as to the quality in terms of the reliability of data and
information leading to questions as to who could be trusted. Moreover, if there was a lack of
equal dedication leading to conflict on the value of the process this would eventually lead to
disputes on the balance of contributions to the costs involved. Similar situations currently
exist in the United Nations which is participated by all for the benefit of all and yet the largest
single contributor is the United States which gains no greater benefit than any other member
country (Laurenti, J. 2009).
A dominant structural consideration, however, might be the worldwide adjustments required
to local legislation given the varied bases upon which national legislations are founded. For
example, those nations having their legislature based upon the rule of law may find it difficult
to enact legislation allowing them to share information and to prosecute cases at home which
are based upon intelligence and evidence obtained from other uncontrolled foreign sources
and jurisdictions (Ribaux et al 2010). The opposite situation could also pose a problem in the
event of a member providing information and data to others in contravention of national laws;
e.g. some countries in the EU have privacy legislation in place and others have plans to
follow suit (Poullet, Y. 2006), with the additional risk of liability for damages which could be
claimed by a citizen or foreign national in the event of erroneous information having been
provided by a fellow member state of an international security organisation. This latter
consideration also extends into the area of other international bodies to which nations have
other commitments which could affect their ability to cooperate internationally on security.
Notable examples of existing international organisations which could have an influence are
the International Criminal Court (ICC), INTERPOL, International Council of Human Rights
(ICHR), European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and other UN bodies)
Upon reflection I recall that there were early difficulties for us in the UAE in embracing some
modernisations and international standards in many areas of life even though we are a
forward looking society. Thankfully, we were led throughout our formative years in Abu
Dhabi by a great visionary leader of our country and former President of the UAE who
realised that we had to modernise and improve the lives of our people. HH Sheikh Zayed bin
Sultan Al Nahyan steered a careful course between our cultural traditions including those
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related to privacy, and the import of foreign norms and practices such that we embraced some
of both without eroding our own cultural values, but one of the hardest adjustments in this
regard was creating a legal system to suit and in doing so the UAE has also participated in
many international cooperation agreements. My experience has been that participating in
international institutions such as INTERPOL and the UN has been a formative process
enabling us to overcome many difficulties and from which we now appreciate the value of
cooperating with other nations. However, I know that looking back at our early days as an
emerging economy that it was difficult to envisage the value of embracing other cultures and
this may deter some developing countries from participating in the subject proposition.
Difficulties in operating an international standard for security
Aside from the willingness or otherwise of member nations to contribute data and
information to an international security system and irrespective of whether this would be
driven by constitutional or legal considerations, there remains the issue of how member
nations would gather such data and information.  For example, would they do it in the same
way with the same level of rigour and observation of people’s legal and human rights given
that there is significant difference between nations in this regard? It is important in this
respect to note that it is not necessarily the most free nations which would perform better in
this respect in fact in history we can see that some of the most repressive and dictatorial
regimes have been more focused on information on their citizens and for example we could
compare the repressive regime which existed in the former East Germany whereby the secret
police known as the Stazi kept copious files on citizens whereas as the UK does not even
have a system of ID cards (Lyon 2005). Although in this latter respect it is known that the
UK police hold significant information on citizens gathered from a variety of interactional
means in everyday life (Haining & Law 2007) and in this respect the former East German
system has been described as hard policing and the current UK system as softer policing
(Innes 2005).
Gathering the Data
It is clear to see, therefore, that different nations have different systems in place according to
their basic political and security infrastructure and this may be an impediment to some
commonality or processes and the quality of data and information provided by member
nations to a standardised international security organisation. The world already has an
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international cooperation on policing in the form of INTERPOL to which many countries
belong and also an increasingly active International Criminal Court (ICC) but it is known that
these organisations frequently suffer from the variability and reliability of data and
information described above (Schöndorf-Haubold, 2008). Therefore, the main hypothesis at
the root of this thesis is whether a standard form of agreement for cooperation would be
feasible and workable to endure commonality between members given the many variables
involved. Data and information which are at the heart of security operations also have legal
and cultural implications as to their validity given the various cultural and legal systems
involved in the sense that it may be seen to be fair to gather information on the person in
more developed cultures and less so in some more closed societies, and an example of this
might be of information on women in Islamic cultures (Baden, 1992). So a dominant
consideration in the process must be the methods and systems by which data is gathered and
the standards of quality in terms e.g. of anonymous reports and hearsay evidence which could
colour decision making on security activities beyond the information gathering. But it is clear
that police authorities in various countries have their own methods and standards within their
own legal systems which dictate how they operate their security apparatus and it is this
dominant consideration which might be the most difficult to overcome insofar as it would ask
members to place such an importance on mutual cooperation as to be prepared to make root
and branch changes often at the level of their own constitutions (Davis, K.C. 1973).
In the modern age of information technology most countries have some measure of data
collection and management of security information (Haining & Law 2007). Typically though
they use different systems and management practices and often require a different burden of
proof which some countries might view with concern when their own citizens might be
involved. Penalties also vary between nations and for example various nations in South East
Asia notably Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore have draconian penalties for drug crimes
(Lines, 2008) and there have been several high profile cases recently when the home nations
of those accused have tried to appeal for clemency, most often unsuccessfully, because their
nationals could be subjected to the death penalty for drug offences which is a penalty tariff
often not applied in the accused person’s home country (Lines, 2008). In this respect and
others the quality of information and the means by which it is obtained, including where
torture has been used in cases of terrorism, is paramount in the operability of an international
standardised security system (Redo, 2000). In many cases the method of gathering data and
information predisposes its value and usability, for example, hearsay and information
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gathered under duress but these generally fall into two categories; information which is
gathered covertly and that which is provided voluntarily (Redo, 2000). Information gathered
voluntarily which includes the paradox that some is gathered compulsorily as in, for example,
a census or in various declarations to the authorities and applications are not seen as offensive
or against a person’s liberty. Whereas, information gathered covertly is seen as having been
done purposefully for the benefit of the authorities in totalitarian states and often seen as an
invasion of privacy and against the rule of law and illegal in many countries (Taeuber, 1967).
It is known by all of us living in the UAE - a proud and private society - that the issue of
privacy and confidentiality had been a major concern. This was largely overcome with the
discovery of oil and the need to allow many foreigners to come to work in our country. The
labour force in Abu Dhabi was estimated to be over 1.4 million in 2011, out of which
132,000 or 9.1% were UAE nationals and 1,311,800 non-nationals. At this proportion of
nearly 10 to 1 it is easy to see how other cultures become noticed and selectively assimilated
(Abu Dhabi Ministry of Economy, 2011): this has been important in opening the minds of
people to other lifestyles, laws and cultures. This societal epiphany in the UAE as compared
to other traditional Arab countries can be seen in that we allow ladies to drive cars, whereas a
restriction remains in Saudi Arabia, and it is important to say here as a further example of
liberalisation that this restriction is being discussed in Saudi Arabia.
Communications, security activities and data access
Communication between cooperating members in an international standardised system of
security is at the heart of its success, but if there is to be an element of cooperation between
signatories as with other international standards then communication must be unrestricted,
free and unfettered by vested interests (Buzan & Wæver 2003). As discussed earlier this may
be difficult to apply across the board given the national interests and the different legal
systems involved and not least the political corruption which exists in some countries. Put
simply the ideal must be that one nation’s security intelligence and information should be as
reliable and available as each other’s the challenge of the achievement of which is the subject
of this thesis. The issue of communication and access to data and information and security
practices between signatories to a common standard is pivotal because there would be no
point in standardising security systems if the outputs were not usable by others. It follows,
therefore, that the extreme ideal would be standardised worldwide practices in security but
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the world has rarely reached such an unencumbered level of cooperation and this would
likely be a distant ambition, but an agreement to exchange information already partly exists
between many countries and may be possible to standardise but it would only be valuable if
the information exchanged and the security activities were conducted in a common and
standard way i.e. in compliance with a common standard otherwise its value would be
significantly reduced. The issue of communications to a common standard is also important
because a standardised system of security without communication between parties to such a
standard of security practices would only achieve change / improvement in some countries
but would not benefit all and would likely regress to a localised system without common
quality demands of one upon another derived from communication between signatories
interacting with one another.
Language and mutual implementation practices
Many national and cultural differences and preferences would need to be taken into
consideration in the formulation of an international standard for security. However, this is
bound to be complicated by the large number of permutations of influences which would
either need to be addressed in the member country or somehow written into the standardised
system, the latter of which would likely be the most complicated given that some local
cultural and traditional issues would have cross impacts elsewhere. Beyond these inevitable
cross member influences there would need to be an agreement on commonality of language
and terminology and a commitment to mutual standardised implementation practices and
legal framework. The most common language within the security apparatus around the world
tends to follow the trend in business and commerce in using English with terminology and
compliance to systems in use in the English speaking world and most importantly as applied
to a variety of security and database software applications, the common language of which is
also often English (von Ahn et al 2008). The issue of a selecting a language to govern an
international standardisation of security may not be difficult but in doing so nations may
create operational and implementation problems internally which may influence the outputs
of their work, for example, the gathering of information on women in Islamic countries or the
implementation of security in countries with dissident minorities. Therefore, it must be a
prerequisite of any system of international standardisation of security that common systems
and methods in all things must be achieved such that security information and practices can
be understood and implemented in a similar way by all participants (von Ahn et al 2008).
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Maintaining the currency of information databases and management of practices
The purpose of creating a standardised system of security in operations and information
would have no point if data and information were not at its root and if that information was
not of a common quality and provenance, and if it was not exchanged freely and the actions
taken on that basis were not enacted in a similar and standardised way. So. whilst any
security activity is dependent at its root on data and information there is a high degree of
interdependence between each of these facets of a standardised system such that any
standardised system must be viewed from a holistic point of view with the intention being to
produce security information usable by others (Schöndorf-Haubold, 2008). Therefore, data
and information whilst being at the heart of security practices are only valuable if they are
credible and current and this requires a proactive attitude from signatories to an international
standard to work to a common level of quality and to maintain standards in the gathering and
maintaining of data (Schöndorf-Haubold, 2008). Data and information and the
implementation of security practices go hand in hand; with the data and information
indicating the activities required and the implementation of security activities being measured
and appropriate to those indications. The efficiency of security implementation is, therefore,
dependent upon the currency and standardised quality of the information available which in
turn requires proactive management practices to maintain databases (Ahmed & Vrbsky
2002). The security apparatus responsible for such work could borrow from the engineering
world which also operates data and information dependent integrity projects in plants and
which have database and IT systems which require regular updating and levels of
achievement as Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) to benchmark compliance to standards
and levels of achievement (Ahmed & Vrbsky 2002). Such a systemised approach typically
requires bespoke software to manage the acquisition and retention of data and information
and also for the processing of such to produce output indicators for actions required. The
application and use of such systems would depend heavily on many of the challenges
outlined above in the creation of an international standardised system for security such as
local legal, cultural, socio-political, linguistic issues;  country internal limitations; corruption
and mismanagement; system decay (Cartier–Bresson, 1997).
The issue of language was a limitation to us in Abu Dhabi in the early days because we speak
Arabic which whilst it is widely spoken throughout the Islamic world it is not a major world
28
language like English. So we needed to learn English - now widely taught in our schools -
which has become the common language of commerce and technology in our country. As we
mastered the English language we were able not only to communicate widely with foreigners
but also able to use modern technology products to manage, among other things security
operations, and this in turn brought world entertainment and other things to us which enabled
us to embrace world standards for many things. The ability to communicate and understand
other cultures opened our minds to what is available to improve in many areas including
security and to be able to participate in international cooperation.
Training and operations
If a system such as an international standardised system for security operations is to work in a
common and efficient way then it would be highly dependent on the officers and staff
working on it (Bishop, 2003). It follows that if an international system for security is to be
standardised then all elements including staff involved should also operate to a standard
method which in turn would require standard specific training to ensure commonality in
operations and compliance to the standard levels laid out in the system . All such
international agreements are ultimately dependent on the people who apply them and training
must, therefore, be at the heart of the project (Knight, J. 2004 pages 5-31). It may seem a
paradox that a universal commitment as between nations requiring the dedication of often
sensitive state resources and even the adjustment of laws and perhaps even at the level of the
Constitution should be dependent upon the involvement of the individual, but we can see
examples of this being the case in other international agreements.
The activities of the UN, for example, can be seen as effective or otherwise at the level of the
individual, whether that is the intervention of the Secretary General in brokering a peace deal
or in a negative way at the level of peacekeepers acting inappropriately in Haiti and the
Congo (Hansen, 2013). We can also see the importance of the individual in standards
organisations, for example, as in the Oil & Gas industry with the standards laid down by the
American Petroleum Institute (API) which has established engineering standards followed by
many in the industry around the world. Operatives within organisations applying such
standards become trained in specific standards related to their jobs, whether it is in pipelines,
pressure vessels, welding etc and they apply the rigour of the standard to their design and
operations of plants ensuring safety and continuing productivity as with the American Society
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of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) or the American Petroleum Institute (API). However, such
standards do not have a policing element i.e. there is no permanent external presence to check
that the standards are being applied correctly or rigorously enough so the dedication and
conscientious application of the individual is paramount in the operation and success of such
standardised agreements. But there is another example in this regard which further shows the
value of the trained and dedicated individual insofar as many of such industrial standards are
voluntary and could easily be avoided or circumvented for reasons of expediency and yet
they succeed owing to the professional dedication and training of the individual.
The training to be provided to the staff involved must be wide ranging considering the variety
of cultural backgrounds and legal and security infrastructure and should include the standard
requirements as levels of achievement and the operation of security within the cooperation
agreement between nations i.e. the method and interaction involved in implementing the
standard and in cooperating with one another. There should also be a strict organisational and
management hierarchy underpinning such efforts to ensure that the rules are applied
rigorously and equally by all members the failure of which would seriously undermine the
existence of a standard as it would cease to have equal value. A system of certification could
be implemented to evidence who has been trained and who could sign off on certain activities
performed in accordance with the standardised system. So it follows that the trained
individual would be essential to the establishment and operation of an international standard
of security and international cooperation under its auspices.
It also follows, therefore, that whilst there would be many difficulties as discussed above in
reaching an international agreement for the establishment of such a standard model, there
would also be many difficulties in reaching a cooperation agreement for the exchange of
information and sharing of facilities etc. Even if such agreement were achieved
internationally the continuity and effectiveness would as discussed be determined by the
commitment of the human resources involved. Therefore, the data and information required
to evaluate the challenge of establishing standardisation of data and information and the
operability of a system of cooperation in line with such standardisation which is at the heart
of this thesis would be most valuably drawn from the officers and staff involved in security
operations by way of reflection (Paul McIntosh, 2010). However, in the absence of a
comparable precedent it is proposed that the most valuable sources of information would be
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both infrastructure and situational and also experiential by way of the reflection of officers
and staff on the status quo and the challenges involved (Schon, 1983, p. 276).
Ethical considerations
I come from a culture in which modesty, respect and observing the privacy of others is very
important so I am well used to maintaining confidentiality not just in my job but also in my
personal and cultural life. This respect for the confidentiality of others has been a major
consideration in every part of this work and I know that if I was to break the confidence of
those contributing to this research then I would lose more than I would gain by completing
the course. I have known several examples of breaches of confidentiality during my long
career and I have seen the negative outcome on all concerned. Detailed considerations of the
ethical aspects of this research can be found in Appendix C.
Areas of Focus.....
The areas for focus of such information and reflection should be those outlined in the
foregoing essential components and rationale of the challenge. Specifically as enumerated
above expressed as questions as follows: -
1. Do proposed subscribers to international standardisation of security use any existing
standards e.g. ISO 31000?
2. Do proposed signatories have internal levels of quality and achievement?
3. Are Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) used to measure performance / compliance to
standards?
4. What is the extent of access to information? Is there a Freedom of Information Act or
conversely a culture of secrecy in the proposed signatory?
5. Socio cultural impediments i.e. is it a closed society in which dealing in formation would
be prohibited?
6. Is there an issue of privacy in the gathering of information, either covertly or overtly?
7. Who would police the process i.e. do the subject nation’s police and security operations
governed by the rule of law or are they dictated to by politicians?
8. Is there local legislation prohibiting the sharing of information on other states or
individuals?
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9. Is the development of a common software and its uptake likely to be a drag on
development at the national level?
10. Does the subject nation already have other formal or informal international agreements on
security the experience of which would indicate the likely level of international
agreement?
11. An indication of willingness to compliance agreements and the attitude towards the
operational aspects and the costs involved
12. If it is thought that wealthy developed nations would be more likely to support
standardisation then they would likely be liberally funding security initiatives.
13. Would poorer and developing nations be less likely to support such an initiative?
14. Are socio-cultural, politico-structural and economic influences likely to be impediments
to cooperation at the subject nation level?
15. What would be the difficulties involved in establishing such standardisation in the
experience of the officer / staff?
16. Does the subject nation have a professional security / police force?
17. Would the practicalities involved in operating and complying with such a system be an
impediment?
18. Is policing in the subject nation proactive or reactive i.e. soft / hard policing?
19. Would there be the resistance to the sharing of information?
20. Does the subject nation have other international cooperation agreements i.e. would the
interaction between the parties be an impediment to uptake?
21. Would compliance to international standardisation require changes to local legislation?
22. What is the culture in the subject country to the rigorous observation of people’s legal and
human rights?
23. Would standardisation of security and cooperation be feasible and workable?
24. Is there a local legal distinction made as between information which is gathered covertly
and that which is provided voluntarily?
25. Is a second major foreign language commonly spoken / taught in schools?
26. What is the subject nation’s history in compliance to international agreements /
standards?
27. Does the subject nation provide peacekeepers to the UN?
28. Does the subject nation use international units of weights, measure and standard
international (SI) units?
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29. Is training liberally provided and valued in the subject organisation?
30. Does your nation have friction with another possible signatory / contributor to such an
arrangement with whom it would not cooperate?
As a rationalisation of the above the research objectives of this thesis are met by 3 pivotal
hypothetical propositions the testing and analysis of which would be answered by the above
key questions which would in turn be derived from both infrastructure and situational
information and also from experiential reflection by officers and staff: -
H1) The establishment of an international standard for security would not be supported by
the majority of nations owing to internal socio-economic, legal and political considerations.
H2) The likelihood of failure or decay over time would be very high owing to a lack of
dedication of staff and management to compliance owing to an inability to maintain quality,
cooperation, skills and organisational culture.
H3) The establishment of the international standardisation of security data, information and
operations would succeed at establishing standardised levels of compliance but would likely
fail in the area of cooperation in the exchange of information and in providing data access to
other members.
So, as the basis of this research is to evaluate the viability and likelihood of being able to
establish an international standard for security and also for cooperative operations between
signatories the data and information required for analysis to explain the impediments is
drawn from two complementary sources; the first being the basic infrastructure of the
security apparatus in proposed member states and the second being information drawn from
the grass roots level of policing and security operatives on the basis of reflection i.e. not
opinion as their experiential knowledge of such a proposition. This is an important melange
of information because neither could stand alone as a basis for this research because neither
could provide a complete answer with the exclusion of the other. In fulfilling the basis of the
questionnaire attendant to this work and the research requirements data and information are
drawn from both sources in line with the above 30 Areas of Focus questions, which are
formulated to address the 3 critical hypothetical propositions which go to the root of this
work.
33
The 30 Areas of Focus expressed as questions above which form part of the basis of the
questionnaire are tactically designed to provide wide ranging information in areas where
information can be drawn from both sources i.e. both from the infrastructural situation of the
subject proposed member nation and also by reflection from operatives attached to the
security apparatus within it. The questions are aimed at accessing information in the wide
ranging areas of the 3 hypothetical propositions to provide an insight into the basic problem
statement i.e. the benefits, likelihood, and impediments to the establishment of an
international standardisation of security.
The purpose of this thesis is fulfilled by addressing these three research questions; i.e. would
national/internal considerations be an impediment? Would compliance, management and
organisational culture likely cause failure and decay over time? Would the standardised
system established be limited to data and information standards without wide cooperation
between the signatories? These questions are structured around the common characteristics of
partial failure / partial success of many international agreements ranging from UN resolutions
through to IMF and the Eurozone inasmuch as the levels of success or failure tend to be
characterised by median outcomes owing to the national interests leading to a varying level of
commitment of the parties. The proposition subject of this research has an additional
complexity because of the role that officers and staff play in the compliance and
implementation and this is the reason for a heavy reliance on information gathered from
organisational and reflective learning of such actors.
Other important considerations relevant to the success or failure of such an international
agreement are the extent to which the co-ordinating institution, UN or more policing/security
based, would exert influence on signatories to a security standard. Would it, for example
work through a series of guidelines, key recommendations: levels of standardisation: and a
timetable for implementation? Would it have some mechanism for imposing sanctions on
signatories who did not maintain the required standards? Would it distinguish between
countries that failed to come up to the correct levels through shortage of resources and those
who, perhaps because of their isolation or their desire for expansion, refused to co-operate
because of political considerations?
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Conclusion
This chapter has provided an outline of the research on the basis of motive and methodology
and explained many of the pitfalls being avoided in targeting the problem question
underpinning the entire project. I have used many of the basic rules of case building in
formulating the above questionnaire and the pivotal hypotheses upon which this research
relies. But I have always acted in an ethical and responsible way in the use of data and
information. This is both important in the interest of the participants who provided the data
and also in the indications that are derived from the analysis, because as I have seen many
times in my career that any conclusion can have an impact far beyond the immediate case at
hand. The above outline plan of the research includes many components of the research
methodology and explains some of the relationships in the information. The high degree of
integration involving all the components of this research and the rationale of the research
methodology is discussed in depth in Chapter 2.
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Chapter 2: Research Methodology
A primary objective of this chapter is to establish and explain the appropriate methodologies
which address the 3 research hypotheses at the centre of this work. At a high level of the
research framework there are two main thrusts; the first being Infrastructural Information
which further decomposes into 3 categories i.e. (a) international standardisation as a workable
option in general; (b) existing security cooperation agreements between nations; and (c) legal
socio-cultural-political barriers to standardisation. The second main thrust of this work
encompasses considerations at the operational and implementation levels i.e. the practicalities
of standardisation and much of this information is derived at the level of the officer/operative
by a process of reflection because it is clear that if such a proposition is found to be possible
within infrastructural considerations it could fail at the level of the hands on officer/operative
for reasons of practicality. This second main thrust also decomposes into 3 categories; (a)
practical limitations; (b) feasibility issues and (c) systemic incompatibilities.
Figure 2.1 Infrastructural Information / Operations and Implementation
The above research data and information basis is designed to provide the wide ranging data




















Infrastructural and Operations and Implementation information. Furthermore, each
hypothesis is structured to benefit incrementally from the decomposed points in the above
chart, for example, H1 could appear to benefit only from the Infrastructural Information (II)
side of the research basis. However, whilst H1 could be supported or negated by any of the
issues in II it could also be supported or declined by any of the issues in the Operations and
Implementation (OI) side of the research in perhaps being found to be limited, unfeasible or
incompatible and of course vice-versa. Similarly, the information sought by the questionnaire
is targeted to provide the information required for the testing of these key hypotheses.
The problem with basing this research on infrastructural information alone is that it can be an
endless task pulling together vast amounts of information which is continually changing and
thereby making analysis difficult and the findings being both ephemeral and historical.
Incorporating an element of operational and implementation considerations drawn from the
experiences of officers/operatives by way of reflection enables this research to produce actual
findings based upon real circumstances against which to test the hypothetical propositions.
The aim being to test the hypotheses firstly on the basis of what is possible given prevailing
circumstances and then to test whether such possibilities would be operable in actuality.
Aside from existential Infrastructural Information (II) which is in the public domain about
individual nations and security arrangements, and socio-cultural-political structure, most of
which is drawn from published research through literature review and extended research, it is
clear that the most valuable information required on the limitations to the core proposition,
for example, the operational information (OI) is available from the people involved. The most
effective way of balloting a sample of security officers/operatives is by way of a wide
ranging questionnaire targeting the key issues involved (Bryman, 1988, p. 94). An important
consideration in the design of which is that the questionnaire should ask the most relevant
questions targeting the critical information of a sample of people who are able to answer the
questions based upon their experience such as by reflection, and that the questionnaire
addresses all random sample members equally. Another key consideration in the design of the
questionnaire is that the questions asked should be based upon the key factors involved in
testing the hypotheses at the core of this research to maximise the relevance and focus of the
testing of the propositions (Cooper & Schindler (2003).
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• Analyse infrastructure data i.e. qualitative / quantitative
• test reliability of data
• Analyse questionnaire responses
TEST HYPOTHESES
• By interaction of findings
CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
• By detailed discussion of findings as addressing each of the 3
key hypothetical propositions
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The logic matrix which underpins this process revolves around the inevitability that all
information influences the findings (Zikmund, Babin, Carr & Griffin 2013 Chapter 8 page
170). However, there is a logical sequence to the analysis despite the fact that some occur
simultaneously. For example, if the infrastructure element of the research reveals that
standardisation or cooperation with other infrastructural (II) and then through to the
operational (OI) nations in the area of security will not be possible in a particular jurisdiction
then this would dominate the information acquired at the operational level even if that were
to show positive indications of feasibility. This logical flow firstly from the infrastructural
(II) and then through to the operational (OI) is based on the likelihood that changes to
infrastructure are unlikely to happen just to facilitate standardisation of security whereas
shortfalls leading to changes at the operational level would likely be possible (Zikmund,
Babin, Carr & Griffin (2013 Chapter 8 p.160). Similarly with the information gathering
process a high degree of interrelationship has been achieved in the design of the 30 key
questions. Thus the questionnaire which expands on these questions provides inputs to the
hypothesis testing process from both sides of the debate, the infrastructural and operational
aspects. There is also a high degree of mutuality between the structure of the questions as
designed into the questionnaire. This is based on the needs of the hypothesis testing strategy
and the various data gathered such that the responses to the questionnaire will have both a
direct input to the 30 Areas of Focus questions/key issues and also to the three hypothetical
propositions to provide a holistic analysis to either confirm or deny them: -
The Data
The methodology of any such research project must have a high degree of integration
(Zikmund, Babin, Carr & Griffin (2013 Chapter 6 page 118). A wide range of information is
brought together to create a solid basis for analysis in testing the key proposition of whether
the world is ready for and able to create standardisation and to engender cooperation between
nations to implement such standards and operations. A large number of variables are involved
in this study which impact the study process in a variety of ways and any of which could
nullify the proposition. Therefore, equal value must be given to each of the data sources and
the information gathered all of which both impacts on the core subject of the research and
also on the other data; with the key enabling information being the least numerous but having
the most impact being at the top of the following illustrative pyramid and the information
being increasingly adaptable and more numerous towards the bottom of the pyramid: -
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Figure 2.3 Data and Information Pyramid
An example of this is that Iran or North Korea would be unlikely to cooperate with the rest of
the world on such an initiative given their current relationship with the rest of the world
(Haggard & Noland 2011). However, the disposition of uncooperative nations involves many
situational and circumstantial influences on the situation at this time and things could change.
If they do then any of the very many negative influences at the grass roots could be adapted
to suit the internationalisation initiative. There is also a hierarchy of criticality running down
the pyramid through this example insofar as whilst the high level Infrastructural Information
may be a single issue it dominates anything which may be more numerous and progressively
less critical and increasingly more adaptable lower down the pyramid.
Beyond the variation in category and hierarchy of the necessary information there also exists
a difference in the nature of the data in that some will be qualitative and some quantitative
and these differences could be in all areas of information (Bryman, 2008 p.366). For
example, infrastructural information (II) could be qualitative in that the legal infrastructure
would not allow cooperation or quantitative in that budgets for security vary between nations
by a given percentage or that staff numbers have been cut by 50%. They could also be a






Grass roots Operational Information (OI)
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security apparatus and operations is 10 years behind that of other nations. Or conversely, that
an Operational Information (OI) item might indicate that the level of training is far behind
other nations or by reflection that the culture in the ranks would indicate that 50% of
officers/operatives would not currently cooperate on some issues for a variety of country
specific reasons.
The foregoing issues inevitably raise concerns over the issue of the reliability of data given
that unreliable information is worse than an absence of information (Cooper & Schindler
2003 Chap 7 p.158), because at least with a known absence we know what to aim at whereas
with an issue of an unknown extent of unreliability we risk corrupting the analysis and the
quality of research outcomes. The issue of reliability also follows the pyramidal structure
discussed earlier in that the reliability and validity of data is likely to decrease from the top to
the bottom of the structure. II information is most likely to be highly reliable and valid
because it is evidently the case being most often the status quo even perhaps legislated and
promulgated as such (Cooper & Schindler 2003 Chap 7 p.158); whereas OI information
especially where this is derived by way of reflection may on the one hand provide wide
ranging information which enriches the research but it can on the other hand also suffer from
exaggeration, elaboration or simply just bad memory (Marsh, E.J. and Barbara Tversky
2004). This logically leads into strategies for overcoming such risk within the research
methodology by way of the overall research design in that the sample selected is done so at
random within a population of appropriate subjects and also that the research questionnaire
design is such that there is a high degree of interrelationship between the questions so that
confirmation of responses is sought from more than one question (Bradburn, Sudman, &
Wansink, 2004). However, a search for reliability in the research methodology goes beyond
this insofar as the information gathered should also be relevant to the study and not be
information for its own sake. An example of the high degree of relevance and the
interrelationship of the focus of the information can  be seen from 2 countervailing questions
taken from the list of 30 areas of focus discussed above: -
4. What is the extent of access to information? Is there a Freedom of Information Act or
conversely a culture of secrecy in the proposed signatory?
8. Is there local legislation prohibiting the sharing of information on other states or
individuals?
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It is clear that the data derived from questions drawn from these points of focus would have a
high degree of correlation whereas on the one hand in question 4 we would ask whether there
is access to information available and on the other hand in question 8 we question whether we
could use such information if it were available. Again we can see a logical sequence and a
high degree of interrelationship in the questioning which is important when planning which
information to seek and how with an eye on reliability and validity to enrich the analysis. It
can also be seen how the information gathered would be relevant in the testing of all three of
the hypothetical propositions central to this work and especially in this case for example: -
H3 The establishment of the international standardisation of security data, information and
operations would succeed at establishing standardised levels of compliance but would likely
fail in the area of cooperation in the exchange of information and in providing data access to
other members.
In this way the methodology integral to this work targets data with both a high degree of
relevance and interrelationship with the benefit of highlighting self-evident contradictions
and shortfalls in terms of reliability and validity.
There is also a wide range of cultural and other sensitivities to take into consideration in the
design of research methodology and these may involve issues of an infrastructural nature
which it may be difficult to circumvent in the establishment of standardisation and
implementation of the project (Steele 2009). The infinite number of permutations and
variability between cultures and national situations would tend to indicate that a unanimous
agreement to international standardisation of security would be unlikely so the thrust of this
research must focus on the majority likelihood to agreement.  Whilst identifying the areas of
difference would be important at all levels of II and OI it would also be important to identify
and quantify negative influences to focus the study on what needs to change and the
magnitude of the challenge to unanimity or effective establishment. The data to support this
kind of analysis needs to be correlational in nature (Bryman, 2008, p. 366) i.e. there must be a
strategy in seeking a response to one question in the questionnaire which is either
proven/disproven or elaborated upon by another. The questionnaire design hereto addresses
this important consideration and an example of this can be seen in the format of questions 12
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and 13:
12. If it is thought that wealthy developed nations would be more likely to support
standardisation then they would likely be liberally funding security initiatives.
13. Would poorer and developing nations be less likely to support such an initiative?
The data sought by these questions is similar but complementary in addressing the issue from
a different perspective which is designed to enable both comparative analysis and allow
analysis from both directions (Bradburn,N.M., Seymour Sudman, Brian Wansink 2004). A
further benefit is that it enables a view to be taken from within the sample in asking what the
poor would think of what either the rich or poor would do and vice versa, which further
avoids any inherent bias arising by the random selection of the sample (Cooper, Schindler &
Sun 2006). This strategy runs throughout the questionnaire to create a knowledge base
worthy of the complexity of the subject and the analysis required to address the complex
propositions.
It is in the nature of a study such as this that the core proposition may not have been
considered by many of the subjects of it i.e. few countries would have asked themselves
whether they would cooperate with a proposal to standardise international security and
whether such would be possible in their country. So a clear positive or negative answer may
not be possible from the traditional desk type research deriving information from that in the
public domain (Cooper, Schindler & Sun, 2006 Chap 6 p.136). But such information is key to
this study because without an understanding of feasibility the outcomes would be based
largely on speculation, so indicator information must be sought from elsewhere in the model
(Cooper, Schindler & Sun 2006 Chap 4 p.85). The issue of feasibility, however, would not be
an issue only known at the infrastructural level; it would be an issue having similar impact
throughout the system and hierarchy and especially at the level of practicality of
implementation i.e. at the grass roots level of the officer/operative. These people would know
if a proposition was practical and possible or not and they would be able to derive such
knowledge from past experience with other initiatives and enrich the information base by
reflection on such similar influences. So within this methodology design coming down the
pyramidal model to a wider knowledge base to find the information also benefits by
comparing such discovered information with that available further up the hierarchy say at the
infrastructural level. If one begins to look for an indication as to a nation’s ability to
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standardise within its circumstances at the top of my pyramidal structure and does not find a
clear indication one can then seek an indication as to the practicality further down the model
and if those indications based upon e.g. the ability to implement or upon reflection of other
initiatives then one can reverse the research logic and analyse that information against the
infrastructural basis higher in the structure. An example of this might be that Iran might not
currently be willing to cooperate with the international community in the area of security
given that it has security issues especially with many of its neighbours. It might be found that
the nature of the security apparatus in the country might indicate that Iran would not be able
to fulfil such responsibilities at the level of implementation and by applying such knowledge
higher up the hierarchy it might be possible to find some common ground. For example, in
the area of the control of drugs trafficking, which is an important consideration for Iran given
that it has the world’s largest producer Afghanistan as a neighbour with whom it has long and
porous borders (Rubin, 2007). So finding some common ground in such circumstances might
be the basis for standardisation and acceptance to cooperate in the implementation.
Structuring the Questionnaire
Any questionnaire must by definition be a purposeful document designed to acquire
information from a sample of respondents on specific issues to fulfil the requirements of a
research project (Cooper, Schindler & Sun 2006 Chap 13 p.318). It differs from the gathering
of public domain background information as is in this project described as infrastructural
information (II) which is gathered selectively insofar as a questionnaire enables the search for
data and information to target and focus on critical areas of interest (Cooper, Schindler & Sun
2006 Chap 4 p.81). So, II is often just selected from what is available and the research based
upon such environmental information with a smattering of serendipity; whereas operational
information (OI) gathered by way of a questionnaire is able to ask questions which
purposefully delve deeper into such information and enrich the II basis of research (Cooper,
Schindler & Sun 2006 Chap 4 p.91). A well-designed questionnaire element in research
enhances the quality of the work. It is logical that the questionnaire design should come after
definition of the research problem statement has been defined such that the questionnaire
serves the research rather than vice versa (Cooper, Schindler & Sun 2006 Chap 6 p.148).
It follows that the drafting of the questions in targeting the data and information required with
some correlation between the questions can in a holistic way produce both a greater insight
44
and also corroboration (Cooper, Schindler & Sun 2006 Chap 5 p.117). These efficiency gains
can be very important both in avoiding an overly interrogative questionnaire whilst at the
same time gathering the most data and also having an internal verification process (Cooper,
Schindler & Sun 2006 Chap 5 p.96). This methodology starts with the definition of the
problem statement being basically whether the internationalisation of security would be
feasible, to what extent and would it also be implementable at the grass roots level. Many
critical factors governing this proposition have then been developed and formulated into 3
key hypothetical propositions as discussed earlier. 30 key test issues related to the hypotheses
had previously been formulated into a series of interrelated questions which form the
questionnaire strategy with the components in each stage increasing in number as illustrated
in the following chart:
Figure 2.4 Questionnaire Hierarchy Pyramid
This model has the effect of drilling down by the increase and expansion of the area of focus
in search of available data and information whilst at the same time maintaining the integrity
of the original problem statement.









retain the internal integrity of this work as is illustrated by the following logic form aligning
the questions with the 30 issues identified as being central in addressing the basic
proposition. In the following analysis the original 30 issues are expanded with the developed
questionnaire questions and a note is added to show the internal relationship between the
questions which provide further insight and corroboration as discussed earlier.
AREAS OF FOCUS / KEY ISSUES QUESTIONNAIRE QUESTIONS
(1) Are you a.....? Police Officer.....etc
1. Do proposed subscribers to
international standardisation of
security use any existing standards
e.g. ISO 31000?
(2) Do you standardise your security
system to ISO 31000 – (Yes/No)
(3) Which of the following areas of
security are most in need of
standardisation? Information
Technology.....etc
2. Do proposed signatories have
internal levels of quality and
achievement?
(4) Do you have internal levels of quality
and achievement? - (Yes/No)
(5) If so do you benchmark these against
other nations? - (Yes/No)
(6) There is a role for developing
integrated government security
strategies in respect of achieving global
security....strongly agree...etc
3. Are Key Performance Indicators
(KPIs) used to measure performance
/ compliance to standards?
(7) Do you measure levels of quality and
achievement as Key Performance
Indicators (KPIs) as compliance to any
standard internal or external? -
(Yes/No)
4. What is the extent of access to
information? Is there a Freedom of
Information Act or conversely a
(8) What degree of free access to
information is there in your country?
LowMedium High
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culture of secrecy in the proposed
signatory?
(9) Is there a Freedom of Information Act
in your country? - (Yes/No)
5. Socio cultural impediments i.e. is it
a closed society in which dealing in
formation would be prohibited?
(10) Are there cultural restrictions
on the gathering and use of information
in your country? - (Yes/No)
(13) Is there a free press in your
country? - (Yes/No)
(11) Research is needed to develop
.....security standardisation
methods.....etc
(12) If governments coordinate their
efforts it would lead to convincing the
international community of the need to
standardise security
solutions.....strongly agree.....etc
(14) The International Organisation
for Standardisation (ISO) 31000 risk
management standards can be used in
the development of international
security standards.....strongly
agree.....etc
(15) I favour and support
internationally recognised integrated
security standards to protect against
forged passports.....strongly
agree.....etc
(16) Do you think that reflective
learning can form a good
understanding for standardisation in
security, human trafficking and human
rights?.....strongly agree.....etc
6. Is there an issue of privacy in the (17) Aside from cultural
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gathering of information, either
covertly or overtly?
considerations is there an issue of
privacy involved in the gathering of
information whether covertly or
overtly? - (Yes/No)
7. Who would police the process i.e.
do the subject nation’s police and
security operations governed by the
rule of law or are they dictated to by
politicians?
(18) Do you have a free to act police
force? - (Yes/No)
(19) Does the government,
politicians or judiciary have influence
over the activities of the police and
security apparatus in your country? -
(Yes/No)
8. Is there local legislation prohibiting
the sharing of information with
other states or individuals?
(20) Is there a legal restriction in
your country to the sharing or
exchanging of information with other
countries? - (Yes/No)
9. Is the development of a common
software and its uptake likely to be a
drag on development at the national
level?
(21) Do you use software to manage
security operations and databases? -
(Yes/No)
(22) Is the application of software
products easily implemented in your
organisation? - (Yes/No)
10. Does the subject nation already have
other formal or informal
international agreements on security
the experience of which would
indicate the likely level of
international agreement?
(23) Do you have cooperation
agreements with other countries in the
area of security involving the exchange
of information and cooperation on
operations? - (Yes/No)
(24) Is the experience of such
arrangements good or bad?
11. An indication of willingness to
compliance agreements and the
attitude towards the operational
aspects and the costs involved
(25) Does your country willingly
cooperate with others in other areas? -
(Yes/No)
(26) Is there an acceptance of the
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value of cooperation in security? -
(Yes/No)
12. If it is thought that wealthy
developed nations would be more
likely to support standardisation
then they would likely be liberally
funding security initiatives.
(27) If you are a relatively wealthy
developed nation would you be likely
to support the cost of international
standardisation of security? - (Yes/No)
13. Would poorer and developing
nations be less likely to support
such an initiative?
(28) If you are a developing country
would you be unable to finance such an
initiative? - (Yes/No)
14. Are socio-cultural, politico-
structural and economic influences
likely to be impediments to
cooperation at the subject nation
level?
(29) Are there socio-cultural,
politico-structural issues which would
impede progress in this initiative in
your country? - (Yes/No)
15. What would be the difficulties
involved in establishing such
standardisation in the experience of
the officer / staff?
(30) What in your experience would
be the difficulties in this project at the
grass roots level of the officer/staff? –
Management Systems Resources

16. Does the subject nation have a
professional security / police force?
(31) Is the police and security force
in your country a professional
organisation with ranking officers and
reporting lines? - (Yes/No)
17. Would the practicalities involved in
operating and complying with such
a system be an impediment?
(32) In your experience would
standardisation and operating such a
system especially in the area of
cooperation with others be an
impediment to this project? - (Yes/No)
18. Is policing in the subject nation
proactive or reactive i.e. soft / hard
policing?
(33) Is policing in your country
based on reacting to events or is it
based on acting on intelligence in
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avoiding events?
19. Would there be resistance to the
sharing of information?
(34) In your experience would there
be resistance in the police and security
in your country to the sharing of
information with other countries? -
(Yes/No)
20. Does the subject nation have other
international cooperation
agreements i.e. would the
interaction between the parties be an
impediment to uptake?
(35) Does your country have
existing cooperation agreements in the
area of security which would preclude
participation in standardisation and
cooperation? - (Yes/No)
21. Would compliance to international
standardisation require changes to
local legislation?
(36) In your experience would
participation in this project require new
legislation? - (Yes/No)
22. What is the culture in the subject
country to the rigorous observation
of people’s legal and human rights?
(37) Aside from the legislative
position what is the culture in your
country to people’s human rights? –
Support Not caring
23. Would standardisation of security
and cooperation be feasible and
workable?
(38) In your experience would
standardisation be feasible and
workable in practical terms? -
(Yes/No)
24. Is there a local legal distinction
made as between information which
is gathered covertly and that which
is provided voluntarily?
(39) Does the law in your country
distinguish between data and
information which is gathered covertly
and that obtained overtly? - (Yes/No)
25. Is a second major foreign language
commonly spoken / taught in
schools?
(40) Is a major foreign language
commonly spoken and taught in
schools? If so which?
English French Spanish Other
26. What is the subject nation’s history
in compliance to international
(41) Does your country have a
successful track record in complying
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agreements / standards? with international agreements /
cooperation / organisations and
standards? - (Yes/No)
27. Does the subject nation provide
peacekeepers to the UN?
(42) Does your country provide
peacekeepers to the UN? - (Yes/No)
28. Does the subject nation use
international units of weights,
measure and standard international
(SI) units?
(43) Is the use of international
standards of units, weights and
measures common in your country? -
(Yes/No)
29. Is training liberally provided and
valued in the subject organisation?
(44) Is training liberally provided in
your organisation? - (Yes/No)
(45) Is the value of training
appreciated in your organisation? -
(Yes/No)
(46) The following aspects of
security provision are most in need of
standardisation.....Procedures.....etc
30. Does your nation have friction with
another possible signatory /
contributor to such an arrangement
with whom it would not cooperate?
(47) Does your country have friction
with another country with which it
would not cooperate in such a project?
- (Yes/No)
(48) Would this still the case if we
exclude e.g. Iran and North Korea and
other frequently non compliant states?
- (Yes/No)
(49) If so would your country be
happy to cooperate instead with a third
part international body if those other
countries were also affiliated? -
(Yes/No)
Table 2.1 Key Issues to Questionnaire Development
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The final questionnaire includes additional multi-/dimensional questions not attributed
directly to any of the 30 key issues/areas of focus listed above to a total of 49 questions to
provide increased detail and corroboration to the above questionnaire design and also to
provide a logical underpinning for the 3 hypotheses at the root of this project.
As discussed earlier there are many interactional relationships within the above development
of the 49 questionnaire questions from the 30 basic premises upon which this research is
based. Some of these relationships are there to confirm the information acquired in answer to
one question as in the example of Q33 and Q35 and other relationships are there to enlarge on
the information to enrich the findings as in the following example of Qs15 & 16, Qs17 & 18
and Q22 whereby the analysis of the findings of such multivariate questions interact with one
another: -
Figure 2.5 Interaction of Key Issues
There is a high degree of interrelationship between the issues involved and the 5 questions
involved in the above figure are selected to provide an incremental insight and corroboration
of the answers provided to each. For example, if the answer to either of Q15 or 16 showed
that there was cooperation which was good then Q17 & 18 seek a value basis of that position
which in turn might also indicate a perceived value and therefore a willingness to cooperate;










implementation from Q22 which further drills down into where impediments might be i.e. in
the areas of management, systems or resources. This latter area of resources, which is thought
to be a possible disincentive to poorer nations, is further investigated in Qs19 & 20 which
take a comparative view from richer and poorer nations.
The questions are also worded such that there is an avoidance of bias or prejudice and this is
best served by deliberate and simple wording requiring a simple answer i.e. Yes or No or a
simple selection of options (Zikmund, Babin, Carr & Griffin 2013 Chapter 4 page 48). The
nature of the subject matter being inherently confidential and often secret imposes certain
limitations on the questionnaire design in seeking information which is minimally harmful to
give being largely situational and circumstantial to enable the maximum responses (Zikmund,
Babin, Carr & Griffin 2013 Chapter 9 page 194). It is also designed to be of an optimal size
to tackle without becoming an imposition and it is thought that a person closely involved with
the police / security apparatus in their country would have such information on the tip of their
tongue without having to delve into files and records, which is known to be a significant
disincentive (Zikmund, Babin, Carr & Griffin 2013 Part 3 page 183). Many of the questions
openly solicit answers on the basis of experience which is where the earlier discussion on the
great value of reflection comes into play (Seibert & Daudelin 1999 p.200); and it is clear
from the contraposition of there being some Infrastructural Information and some Operational
Information that the sample members can provide both the former of which would be used to
confirm the findings of the basic desk research which explains the problem statement at the
heart of this research.
The usual conventions of many questionnaires in terms of confidentiality and anonymity are
particularly important in this case owing to inherent nature of the sector involved and
assurances are provided to the sample members in the explanation of the questionnaire
(Seibert & Daudelin 1999 p.78). Care is also taken in defining the population from which the
sample is drawn to ensure that no outlier information is drawn into the analysis and the
sample itself is drawn at random from a large body of possible participants (Seibert &
Daudelin 1999 p.147). Given that the subject matter is inevitably international involving a
sample, many of who would be answering in a foreign language, care has also been taken in
the formulation of the questions to ensure that they are easy to understand and not requiring
any clarification. This issue has been addressed by giving the questionnaire to a select few
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independent people to comment on its clarity and simplicity to answer and it must be said that
this exercise resulted in several changes to the wording (Dörnyei 2003).
The data and information derived from the questionnaire responses will of course have to be
analysed as this research project progresses. The majority of the questionnaire responses
would appear to be qualitative in terms of providing responses which could be open to a
measure of opinion which the questionnaire design tries to avoid. However, the subject
matter of this study is to research an issue involving all nations and the respondents are drawn
from a large number of them. So the information obtained by the questionnaire has both a
diverse and numerical component i.e. we can count the frequency incidence of responses to
view the indication of likelihood sought by this research (Seibert & Daudelin 1999 p.157).
These can be counted and those frequencies can be interacted statistically to produce
correlated indicator data to support the conclusions and recommendations. However, as many
authors on statistics and data analysis report (Falissard, 2012 p.243), it is essential to have
gathered information which goes to the root of the problem statement if the analysis of data is
to be integrally valid, and care has been taken both in the design of this methodology and the
data sought to ensure that there is a high degree of focus and that the questionnaire and desk
research provides information which is equally uncompromising and clear throughout the
research process.
Questionnaire Design
I tried to make my questionnaire similar to internal documents written by colleagues in the
Abu Dhabi Police. I felt that in so doing I would be on solid ground in that I would be using
methods that had been tried and tested. I have participated in the writing of many internal
questionnaires in the Abu Dhabi Police, particularly with the research division. Moreover, I
had used a questionnaire in my Master’s degree and felt that by using a similar format would
be safer (Al Darmaki, 2009). However, this was before I started putting together the
questionnaire and reviewing the content of it in the context of the focus of this project.
I considered the motive of each question and found an inconsistency insofar as there is no
standard model which can function in all circumstances. Consider, for example, a crime
involving the use of forged passports, such as the murder that occurred in Dubai in early 2010
(Tomlinson, 2010). Could an international standard that connected DNA, face recognition,
and fingerprints directly linked by a chip in passports to an international database assist in
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tracking criminals such as these? Moreover, if this were applied to all passports worldwide,
would it provide a means to verify the identity of the passport holder instantaneously
anywhere in the world? It is clear that this involves many complex issues and topics,
examples of which might be the emergence of security standards in various countries, such as
the United Kingdom (ISO 31000-2009). This would in turn cause research projects being
undertaken by various research institutions e.g. in Europe (Security Research: Security
Research Projects under the 7th Framework Programme for Research towards a more Secure
Society and Increased Industrial Competitiveness, 2009), which could serve as basis for
standardisation in the future. Therefore, to cover the topic sufficiently I would have to
provide the participants with enough background information to answer the questions
adequately but I decided that this would likely be too burdensome for the sample participants
and impact on the basis that their responses should be drawn from reflection of their acquired
knowledge and experience.
I had thought of asking different people to support my research in confessing that there
actually was a gap in international security standardisation. However, this amounted to
putting the cart before the horse. In other words, this would be asking the research subjects to
confirm what I believe from an a priori standpoint which is hardly consistent with the
positivist viewpoint that I had read about in my reading on quantitative methods (Bryman, A.
1984 p.75). I would certainly not be acting as a neutral observer and that in turn could
contaminate the analysis since I could not be able to claim I had sought to “quantify an
objective reality” (Bachman, R., & Schutt, R. K., 2007, p. 20). As a result, I would be validly
criticised for creating biased results.
I realised after test piloting the questionnaire with nine current and former colleagues and
having initial feedback from some of the participants that I needed to think about a better way
to phrase the questions. I discovered that the common feeling among my test/pilot sample of
former colleagues was that their concern was that they should ever be quoted for statements
made that might be construed as a breach of security, although they said that they were happy
to answer written questions which did not require any written statement from them. They also
said that they would prefer a multiple choice and Yes/No format so that they did not have to
give values or numbers or specifics on cases. I understood their reservations and took note
that many had said that if a questionnaire included such questions then they either would not
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answer those questions or refuse to participate as a whole. One former colleague said that if
he did answer any questions in a questionnaire which was later found to include a risky
question which he did not answer then he feared later being asked if he had participated in a
questionnaire which had included it, and so he would refuse the whole.
Another issue I would face once the questionnaire was finished was that I needed to use
better software to aid in analyzing the results. Some of my colleagues used a standard Excel
format, and others were using a variety of other tools. On the university website I found that
Survey Monkey was being used and I decided that because an academic institution was using
it must have been thoroughly evaluated, so I used it initially as a measure of best practice to
promote my questionnaire (Al Darmaki, 2009). Moreover, it had numerous tools to analyse
the data, which I felt would aid in understanding the results, such as statistical analysis and
simplified graphs and charts. However, after further careful research and advice from an
expert PhD British friend who taught me how to use it I discovered Minitab 16® was very
non-expert user-friendly and easy to learn (www.minitab.com).
In finally drafting the questions, I learned that the level of understanding of the researcher’s
aims differ from one participant to another. The researcher mainly looks for a specific
academic method in testing a hypothesis (Cooper & Schindler, 2003 Chap 17), whereas
participants with security backgrounds feel the need from the first reading of a question
towards finding the answer based on the wording of the question. That is to say, the questions
need to be as clear as possible so that the participant is able to give his/her opinion readily. A
poorly worded question will prevent the participant from understanding the question
(Robson, 2002, p. 245). Moreover, upon reflection it appeared to me that if the question is
poorly phrased or confusing, the resultant data will most likely be unreliable at best and
perhaps even worthless. I tested my questionnaire on a friendly focus group of friends firstly
asking them to answer the questions and then asking others among them to decipher the
answers of others. In this way I found which questions were repeatedly answered correctly
and those which produced the most mistaken answers, which therefore required amendment.
As my research progressed I adapted the questionnaire to have a wider reach into critical
issues which had arisen. I have rewritten it several times to focus on key areas more
purposefully, retaining the advice and observations of my supervisor. The final version of the
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questionnaire and the summary responses to it can be found at Appendix A.
In formulating the questions in a proper scientific way with a view to obtaining data in areas I
needed I also applied my wide ranging experience both in imagining how I would address the
questions as I have answered many similar questionnaires in the past, and also how the
sample participants would perceive the questions; were they clear and answerable? do they
offend anybody? do they give what I want in the form I want it? do the linkages between
them provide me with a holistic questionnaire strategy such that I get more answers than
there are questions? Whilst this may appear complex when written out in academic language
and format it is actually a common process in policing where we often ask difficult questions
of ourselves and sometimes of suspects and the system. I recall having attended and delivered
many training sessions over the years where this has been the main topic and it involves skills
acquired over time by experience.
Selecting the data sample
Given that the population of security personnel internationally is not easily accessible
(Raymond, B et al 2005 Chap 3), I had researched contact details of potential candidates in
advance and catalogued their contact details. I applied a protocol which required that my
sample would be a random selection but that the population from which the sample would be
derived would have some appropriate characteristics. Firstly, that they should be truly
international and so I amassed names and contact details of a large number of possible
candidates in most countries; and secondly that they should be in positions which would
provide them with the required information and that they should have some experience upon
which to reflect to enrich the findings of this work.
My initial population from which I would hope to acquire a sufficient sample was 295 people
from 92 countries i.e. 3.2 from each country to allow from some refusals in the hope of
acquiring at least one from each country. I ultimately received 59 responses to the
questionnaire representing input from contributors from 28 countries and I noted that some of
those which did not reply may have been for reasons of language because I had issued the
questionnaire in English only. I conducted interviews with relatively few participants owing
to difficulties in getting people to agree and from only 5 countries (Bryman, 2008, p. 168)
and I conducted these mainly by web-based telephone calls with the main intention being to
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enlarge on their questionnaire responses.
My sample was in line with recommendations for research projects in the social sciences in
phenomenographical studies (Alsop & Tompsett, 2006 p.246) and it is recognised that other
research projects had involved relatively small samples (Hazel, Conrad & Martin 1997 p.217)
which nonetheless produced statistically significant sample sizes given the special
circumstances in the case of this project (Jones & Asensio, 2001, p.315) therefore I decided
on the basis of published research that my sample size was sufficient for this research given
the inherent limitations involved.
An Overview of Qualitative Research
Qualitative research has its origins in the Delphi forecasting system from the 1930s (Rowe &
Wright 1999 p.353). In the Delphi system, several questionnaires followed by controlled
feedback from a group of experts were used to collect and analyze knowledge (Adler &
Ziglio 1996). By the 1960s Ernest Dichter was integrating psychological analysis into
marketing. His methodology used psychoanalytical analysis of consumers and studied
thoughts and emotions instead of a simple recording of their responses (Obrec, 1999). By the
1970s group discussions, or focus groups, were also being used in qualitative research. This
method relies ‘on a group interview on a specific topic it is open-ended group discussion
guided by the researcher’. (Robson, 2002, pp. 284-5). The method has certain advantages in
terms of efficiency, inexpensiveness, and flexibility, among others (Kitzinger & Barbour
1999 p.4). By the 1980s Ethnography semiotics (the study of signs and symbols and their use
and interpretation) began to be used in qualitative research (Herzfeld, 2009). An
ethnographical methodology ‘seeks to capture, interpret and explain how a group,
organization or community live, experience and make sense of their lives and their world’
(Hammersley, 1992). This is done by the researcher becoming almost a member of the group
and acting as a participant observer. A number of these methods, I found out in my further
reading, came largely from the world of business ((Kitzinger & Barbour 1999).
The work of the Chicago school of social anthropology in the pre-World War II period were
heavily influenced by positivism and as qualitative research developed, there was a gradual
separation from positivism (Bryman, 2008, p. 368). An important moment in the
development of qualitative research seems to be Max Weber and his development of a theory
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of social action (Morrison, 2006, p. 273). A key point in Weber’s alteration of social research
methodology was that the ideas in sociological research could not be rendered in simple
pigeonholes of right or wrong, as was envisioned in positivism (Weber, 1968). To me, this
amounted to a significant departure from, if not an inversion of, the philosophy of
quantitative research. Indeed, later work in qualitative research moved beyond this point so
that by the 1980s researchers were claiming that their work was ‘just one way of representing
reality’ (Bryman, 2008, p. 368). From an ontological perspective (Bryman &  Bell 2011
p.383) this seemed to me to be a complete reversal of the position of quantitative research
philosophy; moving from a position where constructs were either correct or incorrect to a
position where there was a myriad of ways of representing reality. Further reading (Alvesson
& Skoldberg 2000) revealed an influence of postmodern thinking in qualitative research.  In
essence, postmodernism posits that there is, in fact, no ultimate right or wrong in research
reporting of outside reality, rather there are research findings of greater or lesser plausibility
((Alvesson & Skoldberg 2000 Chap.6 p.179). From my perspective as a police officer, this
was becoming rather esoteric and odd since in my daily work the issues we work with and the
crimes we try to solve would be very difficult to do if the ontological test was based on
greater or lesser plausibility. Nonetheless, this did help to put qualitative research into
perspective as being very different to quantitative research methodology. Thus, I turned my
attention to how I could best use the methods of qualitative research to gain insight into the
need for international security standardisation.
The first such principle of qualitative research was that the researcher seeks to view the topic
being researched through the subjects' eyes, or, as (Loftland.& Loftland 1995, p.16)
explained ‘participate in the mind of another human being’. For my research, this meant that I
would be able to draw out the participants’ thinking on the various aspects of security
standardisation. This, it seemed to me, represented a chance to gather a richer set of data than
the simple marking of degree of agreement or disagreement that I had used on the
quantitative questionnaire. Another aspect of qualitative research was that it focused on
inductive thinking, rather than the deductive approach found in positivism and quantitative
methodology (Bryman, 2008, p. 366). That is to say that instead of seeking to prove or
disprove an a priori hypothesis by the data I had collected, I would be gathering data first and
seeking to understand and/or explain it later. Upon reflection, I saw that this would allow me
to draw out themes related to international security standardisation from the interviews I
59
planned to do. At the same time, I saw a potential pitfall in this approach. That is, to
accurately trace the development of themes emerging from the interviews, I would have to be
extremely careful not to influence the interviewees’ thinking and thus contaminate the data
(Gerson & Horowitz 2002). Moreover, given that my research topic would be relatively
unknown to the participants, I would have to explain the concepts behind international
security standardisation without influencing the interviewees’ responses before they even had
the chance to voice them. All of this lay in the future at this point since I had to determine the
specific research methodology I would use to gather, encode and analyze the data.
Qualitative Research Methods
Ethnography and participant observation are two major data gathering methods of qualitative
research. In essence, these methods require the researcher to immerse him/herself in the
culture of the group being studied (Bryman, 2008), (Robson, 2002). Most commonly, an
ethnographical study seeks to gain information about a given social group or aspects of that
group's life (Bentz & Shapiro 1998, p.117). These methods trace their origins back to the
Chicago School mentioned above and had produced some very well regarded literature
(Bryman, 2008). However, as I thought about it I realized that ethnography had limited
relevance to my research topic. I was interested in studying the need for international security
standardisation, which, in addition to not presently existing, was not a social group.
Moreover, I was not interested in the social aspects of the experts I would interview rather I
was interested in their thinking. Hence, I decided I could not take my research down that
route since it seemed to me I would rightly be criticized for using an inappropriate
methodology. I felt that an appropriate research methodology would need to reveal an
understanding of the experts’ thinking.
Having rejected ethnography as not appropriate to my research aims, I examined grounded
theory and found a methodology much more suited to what I wanted to research. Grounded
theory grew out of the work of Glaser & Strauss (1967), and is perhaps one of the most
influential works in social science (Bryman, 2008, p. 541). In essence, grounded theory deals
with the development of theory from collected data. Moreover, it allows a feedback loop
between the gathering of data and the analysis of it (Bryman, 2008, p. loc. cit.). This was
immediately attractive, as it would allow me to adjust the questions I was going to ask
depending on the outcomes of previous interviews. The results of the questionnaire had
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suggested that the concepts I was asking the participants about were unfamiliar, and I could
anticipate that the interviews would reveal a similar lack of familiarity. The feedback inherent
in grounded theory meant that I could adjust the need for explanation based on the
familiarity, or lack of familiarity, that previous interviewees had shown with the concepts I
was asking them about so as to get more useful data than I had got in the questionnaire
(Glaser & Strauss 1967). Moreover, the inductive approach of grounded theory, allowing
theory to develop from collected data, was appealing.
It seemed that a key concept in grounded theory was the coding of the data. Unlike in
quantitative methods, coding in grounded theory does not involve numbers (Glaser & Strauss
1967). Rather, it relies on giving names to important parts of the data to ‘label, separate,
compile, and organize’ (Charmaz, 1983, p. 186) the data. There are several levels that the
coding may be processed into, ranging from a relatively simple ‘open coding’ to a more
complex ‘selective coding’ (Strauss, A. and Corbin, J., 1990). Upon reflection, this seemed a
useful way to analyze the data. Since international security standardisation is a relatively new
concept (Murphy & Yates 2008), the grounded coding of the data should reveal categories
and themes that can be explored in greater detail later. Furthermore, I hoped that the coding
would allow me to define areas of the research topic to be further explored from the initial
interviews to subsequent ones. However, there were some very real drawbacks to using
grounded theory. One is that it is very time consuming to transcribe and code data (Corbin &
Holt 2005). This was a significant concern since I had a limited amount of time to conduct
and conclude the research. On the other hand, given that this was a small-scale study, I felt
that it would be manageable. Another serious concern would be my ability to suspend my
judgement about the topic as I coded the responses. That is, would I be able to hear what was
being said rather than interpret it based upon what I already know (Bryman, 2008, p. 549).
Obviously, if I put my interpretation into what was being said, I would be criticized for trying
to influence the outcome of the research. That would have to be avoided. There would be
serious risks in this regard. First, I believe in the need for international security
standardisation and I would have to be very careful not to colour the coding with my
opinions. Second, there might well be some lack of understanding on the interviewee’s
part given the newness of the topic, and I needed to be careful not to misinterpret a lack of
understanding as something else.
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Secondary Sampling
I had initially rejected the idea of asking participants to respond to opinion type questions
because the pilot sample responses had indicated that this would be a disincentive to
responses. Although I had a more important reason for not doing so going to the root of this
research in that it is based upon objective reflection on facts and the subjective opinion of the
person has no real place in it with the questionnaire being entirely based upon situational
facts. It is also surely the case that the process of reflection is necessarily an objective process
recollecting events and not a recollection of subjective opinions. This is especially important
as Cope & Watts (2000) explain that reflection upon opinions held at time can change over
time whereas facts necessarily remain constant (Yu & Hatzivassiloglou 2003). Nevertheless,
I was encouraged by my supervisor upon review of my first draft to do so and also to review
my reasoning, explained elsewhere herein, for not addressing the issue of data and evidence
in the development of policy and security in the questionnaire. So I sent a brief request to
about two-thirds of the sample to solicit qualitative / opinion information in response to a
question on data and evidence, thereby addressing both issues, given that many societies do
not use data and evidence for their normal policy development let alone security.
I received 12 replies 2 of which questioned the validity of the question; one said that the
response would always be affirmative because any answer would always be subjective given
the inability of the participant to comment comparatively; the other respondent made a
similar point in that he could not answer because he said that data and evidence on the status
quo drives policy but he was unable to comment on whether that was right or sufficient.
The question focused on data and evidence in the development of policy and the place of data
and evidence in the operation of security and was divided into two parts as follows: -
1) Please explain whether your country uses data and evidence in the development of
security policy development and your opinion on the effectiveness of this strategy.
2) Please describe the extent to which your country uses data and evidence in the operation
of security and your opinion on the effectiveness of this strategy with particular regard to
the place of evidence in enforcement.
Question 1 above is worded to solicit information whether data and evidence is pivotal to the
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development of security strategy and allows for a subjective response by asking for opinion
on the effectiveness of the strategy. The second question focused on whether data and
evidence is used in operations and again solicited an opinion on effectiveness. Both gave the
participant the opportunity to write an answer and were carefully worded to allow the
respondent some latitude because the pilot had indicated that few would respond to subjective
questions, and warned that there would likely be widely varied opinions.
Only 2 of the 10 valid responses received gave similar answers and then to only one of the
question variants with the rest of the responses addressing the issue differently. The lack of
commonality in these qualitative responses provides little valuable information to the data
and information basis of this work, although it is valuable in indicating that the
developmental process towards standardisation should be based upon a factual objective
situational basis and not on the infinitely varied opinion from which agreement would likely
never emerge.
Quantitative Research
I decided to reverse the order of the assignment and conduct the quantitative section of the
research first. There were two reasons for this; the first reason was that I had used a
questionnaire in my Masters dissertation and felt reasonably comfortable with the
questionnaire format, whereas qualitative research is a relatively new field for me. The
second reason was that I intended to draw the topics for the interviews, i.e. the qualitative
section of the project, from the questionnaire (Gerson & Horowitz 2002). In other words, it
seemed logical for the interview topics to flow directly from issues raised in the
questionnaire. In this way, topic of interest touched upon in the questionnaire could be
expanded in more detail in the interviews. However, before discussing the questionnaire’s
design, implementation, and results I will discuss the quantitative method itself and how I
saw it could relate to my research.
In the social sciences, quantitative methods of research are frequently used when the aim of
the study are to explain, describe, or evaluate (Bachman & Schutt 2007, p.19). In essence,
quantitative methods represent the “classic” scientific outlook of positivism. Positivism in the
social sciences originates in the work of the 19th century French philosopher Auguste Comte.
He felt that the social sciences had to have the amount of certainty that was found in the more
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established sciences (Schacht, 1984, p. 8). For me this meant that the positivist outlook would
rely on ‘hard’ data, such as numbers and statistical methods in an effort to prove or disprove
hypotheses. This is indeed what was revealed by a review of the literature on positivism in
the social sciences (Aune, 1991, pp. 202-204), (Burrell & Morgan 1979, p.4), (Bryman, 2008,
p. 22). The epistemological viewpoint of positivism is deductive; one starts from a hypothesis
and then gathers data to prove or disprove it. That is to say, quantitative methodology
proceeds ‘from the general (e.g., theory, conceptual framework) to the particular (e.g., data
points)’ (Teddlie & Tashakkori 2009, p.23). Hypotheses are then indisputably proven as
either correct or incorrect. Ultimately, confirmed theories can be utilized to construct laws
about the social world (Bryman, 2008, p. 14). From a strict viewpoint, quantitative research’s
ontological stance would be that phenomena and hypotheses are either right or wrong; no
grey area is admissible (Bryman &  Bell 2011). In order to confirm or deny a hypothesis or
theory, the research must confirm to accepted notions of reliability, i.e. how consistent the
measurement is (Bryman, 2008, p. 149), and validity, i.e. the extent to which a measurement
gauges what it purports to measure (Bryman, 2008 p.151), to be considered acceptable.
Another important tenet of quantitative research in the social sciences is that “social
observations should be treated as entities in much the same way that physical scientists treat
physical phenomena. Further, they contend that ‘the observer is separate from the entities that
are subject to observation’ (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 2004 p.14). Reflecting on these
considerations from positivism and applying them to my project, I saw that there would be
certain applications of it to the questionnaire that I would want to take into account.
First, I found the epistemological (Johnson & Duberley 2000) and ontological position of
quantitative research appealing as a police officer. In my experience with the Abu Dhabi
Police proving hypotheses conclusively correct or incorrect is an extremely common way the
business of the police proceeds. Indeed, in a forensic investigation that would seem to be a
basic tenet. In particular, in my work in police telecommunications whenever there was a
communications breakdown I would form a hypothesis about what had caused it. If the
hypothesis proved to be correct through testing, the problem could be solved. If the
hypothesis proved to be incorrect, I would formulate and test another hypothesis, and so on
until the problem was identified and corrected. Hence, applying this sort of reasoning to my
research topic seemed to be both natural and normal.
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Another such application that I learned from the literature was it was essential to have an
exact and clear hypothesis so that the issues being tested in the research could be clearly
delineated (Bachman & Schutt 2007), (Robson, 2008, p. 141). In my police work forming a
clear and precise hypothesis was normally a fairly easy thing to do since I was working with
processes and procedures that I was very well acquainted with. However, with this research
the formulation of an exact and clear hypothesis turned out to be easier said than done since
the topic of international security standardisation is a fairly new one, and I was unable to find
much about it in the literature as there was no existing body of work to build on or refer to.
Reflecting on this difficulty, it made more sense to me to consider the questions on the
questionnaire to be testing a set of hypotheses rather than a single unified one. Furthermore, I
could not conclusively prove or disprove the need for standardisation since the question had
not, so far as I knew, been raised before. Hence, the data would be descriptive in the sense
that it sought to describe the parameters of international security standardisation so that
further refinements could be made in the future. Thus, it would be unrealistic to expect that
the results of my study could be considered conclusive in any sense of the word.
Another application of quantitative research that I would use in my research was that I could
be a neutral observer (Bryman, 1988, p. 94) separate from the questionnaire participants, who
would be free from my own bias and subjectivity (Bloch, 2004, p. 166). As we shall see
below, this was more difficult to achieve in practice than was stated in the literature.
However, at this point all of that lay in the future. At this point, it was my desire that my
questionnaire would produce solid and reliable data which would bridge the gap between
theory and concept (Bryman, 1988, p. 94), or more precisely in this case, between the
conception of a need for standardisation and confirmation that the need exists. The idea of
being a neutral observer was appealing since it would allow the participants to freely express
their opinions without outside interference or bias from me, and so I maintained an objective
view throughout to ensure my neutrality. Moreover, I hoped, as is described in the literature
review, that the quantitative methods employed in the questionnaire would provide me with
results that could be replicated by future researchers (Seale, 2004a, p. 72). I felt that this last
point was of considerable importance. My research topic, the need for international security
standardisation, is one with a paucity of references in the literature. As a result, any insights
into this topic that my research uncovered would need to be duplicated by future studies to
ensure that the issue was as important as I felt it to be. Furthermore, since I could not expect
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my results to be definitive, the possibility of having my findings confirmed by another
researcher in the future would lend some credibility to my findings. The possibility of having
the results disproved would not be disastrous since that would indicate there were problems
in how I was approaching the topic and leave open the possibility of adjusting my approach
in the future to produce better results. It was with these thoughts in mind that I applied myself
to the issue of the questionnaire design.
Critical Observations: Reliability and Validity
As mentioned above, I conducted the questionnaire analysis in Excel for tabulation and
Minitab 16® for the analytical work. Once I had the questionnaire in what was to be its final
form, I sent it to a group of security professionals and asked them to answer the questionnaire
at their leisure. I waited for three weeks, feeling that this would give the participants, who
lived in various parts of the world, ample time to complete the questionnaire. After the three
weeks had expired, I was surprised to find that I had received 59 complete responses from the
295 security experts I had invited to participate, which at 20% is a relatively high rate of
return (Baruch, 1999). I was pleased with this but concerned with what I thought was a small
sample base although it would be possible to claim that my data represented a statistically
significant sample size satisfying the questionnaire’s ‘generalisability or external validity’
(Robson, 2002, p. 231). I had thought to reissue my questionnaire but upon reflection, I
realized that this was not a viable option. For one thing, asking those who had participated in
the three week period of the questionnaire to do it again would have most likely resulted in
different answers since I could not have expected them to remember precisely what their
initial answers had been. I thought about this in terms of reliability, especially stability
(Bryman, 2008, p. 149), I could see no way to determine whether their responses had been
stable from the first period of the questionnaire to a potential second period. With the
reliability of the data in question, the validity of the study would also have been in doubt
since validity presupposes reliability. Indeed, a measure cannot be valid unless it is also
reliable (Robson, 2002, p. 101). Moreover, I felt that asking the participants to repeat the
questionnaire could have led them to question my motives and/or competence. Also redoing
the questionnaire might not have brought in more responses since it was likely that those who
had not participated the first time would also not participate the second time as the security
sector is relatively small in the sample area of my research in any event there was not enough
time to run the questionnaire a second time. I felt that I had no real option than to use the data
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I had gathered from the questionnaire. I wondered whether the sample size would be seen as
a serious limitation to the results but it is clear that the results could also be seen as indicative
of the direction for further research on the topic in the future.
Another point about the sample size that I realized later was that a few of the experts who had
participated in the questionnaire were colleagues of mine from various countries who I have
worked with during my 40 years in the Abu Dhabi Police and I was concerned that it might
be thought that I had influenced the outcome of the survey. In other words, since we had
worked together in the past, the results could be seen as confirming my own bias that
international security standardisation is necessary, as it could well be imagined that I had
discussed the topic with them at some point in the past. The results could then be dismissed
as biased since the participants could have been seen to have been giving me the answers I
wanted to hear. I think this is a fair criticism although one that I was not sure how to avoid. I
felt that the issue of international security standardisation required an international sample to
have any claim to validity. One simply has to start somewhere, and I had no real option other
then asking a few people I knew and after 40 years in service it is inevitable that I knew a lot
of people. However, I was careful to include in my sample a large majority of people who I
didn’t know and upon reflection it transpired that the responses mirrored the proportion in
that a very small part of the responses came from the people I knew in the sample. I found
this to be a very important indication in the responses because it might be assumed that those
known to me would be more likely to respond and less likely to ignore it and I had assumed
at the outset that the balance of known and unknown might balance out to an equal level of
responses whereas in reality that was not the case in that the majority of respondents were
unknown to me.
I was concerned about the level of responses I might get to the questionnaire and sought
research on relatively small sample techniques. I discovered that this issue is a common
concern especially to the market research community whose stock in trade is responses to
questionnaires and who face the credibility debate on the value of research. I discovered one
particular paper which provided a valuable perspective: -
‘At present, the credibility of survey research findings is largely a function of response rate.
Low return rates are presumed to suggest biases in data. This paper demonstrates that when
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surveys are made of homogeneous populations (persons having some strong group identity)
concerning their attitudes, opinions, perspectives, etc., toward issues concerning the group,
significant response-rate bias is probably unlikely. This is because on matters related to the
group, persons having strong identification with the group tend to respond more as members
of the group than as members of some social classification, such as the middle class, those
over 50 years of age or members of the Democratic party. Although at first glance these
survey conditions may seem rather unique, most surveys in the social sciences are probably
precisely of this sort. Most are probably of homogeneous populations on matters obviously
concerning them’ (Leslie 1972).
However, my concern remained that I knew that I had a relatively small homogenous hard to
identify and hard to contact population to work with and I sent out relatively few
questionnaires just 295. So even if I received 100% return I would still have had a relatively
small sample although I followed the advice of researchers and sought as much value in the
questionnaire as I could. I eventually received 59 complete questionnaires and numerous
spoilt or incomplete responses which I excluded on the grounds of reliability and a uniform
and comprehensive database, but the responses I received were very data rich and my
challenge was to get the best out of them. My strategy had been in designing the
questionnaire following test pilot discussions with colleagues was to build in a high degree of
relationship between the questions such that I could correlate them in analysis. The logical
flow of the questionnaire seemed to be very important and would both ease the analytical
phase and also enable the presentation of the findings by way of a discussion (see Appendix
B). Therefore, I recognise that I have a small sample and that may have some limitations
which are somewhat ameliorated by the findings of Leslie (1972) but I endeavoured to get as
much out of the data as possible. Whilst 20% may be a modest return on a questionnaire the
judicious analysis of the data has produced some valuable insights and I recognise that a
shorter questionnaire might have produced a larger return but it would also by implication
have produced less data.
The Interview Procedure
I examined the responses I had got in the questionnaire in the quantitative section and tried to
compare the information content of the answers on selective levels (solid information to no
information) and sought out cases where the responses to some questions were inconsistent.
As I have explained herein my questionnaire design is one where there are numerous
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questions which seek confirmation or enlargement of others and where there is an
inconsistency in the responses then I seek to enlarge and confirm by way of an interview. I
identified such a situation in about half of all the questionnaires although it must be said that
the majority were minor issues but worthy of discussion as recommended by (Robson, 2002,
p. 237). This was a very enriching process as the discussions naturally relate issues and offer
up examples and expand beyond the immediate issues.
The interviews were selected based upon questionnaire responses and 24 participants were
interviewed and the length of the interviews varied according to the reason for this further
contact with participants. The interviews all began with thanking participants once again for
their kind assistance and then targeted the specifics of the interview in a motive driven way
(Gerson & Horowitz 2002) to avoid any risk of imposing any opinion on the interviewee. It
could be said that the need to seek clarification to answers in a structured questionnaire might
indicate some fault in the questionnaire strategy or a fault in the clarity of the questions. This
is not the case in my project because the trigger for the interviews was not a wrong or missing
answer in all cases but rather an inconsistency as between several similar and confirmatory
questions and in this respect it could be said that the questions produced exactly the outcome
they were so designed to do.
I allowed the interviewees to express themselves as they wished without any limitation and it
would be true to say that some were quite passionate about some issues and others on other
issues and that variability is exactly what such a questionnaire is designed to achieve. The
key issues were focused on in the interviews as paramount to the work e.g. the feasibility and
practicality questions related to implementation because these go to the root cause of this
work whereas other issues are on the periphery of the work.
In order to obtain richer information I deviated from the list and went into different areas
according to the answers the interviewees gave during the interview. To clarify what was
being said I encouraged the interviewees to explain unclear statements or to elaborate on
shorter comments. However, I tried to be objective and tried not to influence the
interviewee's statements by asking leading or biased questions see Robson (2002 p.275).
Throughout, I endeavoured not to share my own thinking and judgments so that I would not
bias the answers. The semi-structured interview was mostly a one on one ‘question and
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answer’ meeting, although in some cases it was done in a group. Based on the interviewee's
nationality, the interviews were conducted in either English or Arabic. The most obvious
result of this was that I found many new ideas arose, such as different agencies to assist in
standardisation than I had envisioned (Interpol, Homeland Security, European models, among
others mentioned) and establishing and enhancing security education modules at the level of
police academies to study the applicable solutions to security standardisation. I found that
once the discussion had started, it was really difficult to contain it within the boundaries of
the interview I wanted because it quickly grew out of the scope of the present paper and
expanded into related, but distant, areas of discussion. Such tangents did leave much room for
further research in the future. Furthermore, I wanted to allow for room for the interviewees’
ideas to be expanded in more detail as the security research, especially the European methods
are still in the test phase.
Coding and Analysis
Once I had decided to proceed with the data I had gathered, I coded the data using the tools
available in Minitab 16®. I ran the data through the various tools available and carried out a
variety of calculations of the responses. I aimed at performing sufficient targeted analysis for
the testing of the hypotheses and sought to acquire additional information to enrich the
conclusions of this research, with the added ability to use the data as a means to identify
issues for follow up in the selected interviews.
Whilst I would have hoped for a larger sample than 59 I was heartened by the fact that the
respondents had applied themselves with some dedication in answering because all had
answered all the questions, which I take as an indication as to the quality of the questionnaire
in its simplicity and cultural and otherwise sensitivity. Upon studying and comparing the
responses I also noticed an internal evidence of the dedication of the respondents insofar as
those who had shown a particular emphasis in one area continued in the same vein in other
similar and related questions and an example of this is in the area of culture. Upon reflection I
view this as a positive indication of my questionnaire design and the strategy of having a built
in relationship between the questions as a means of verification.
My fear had been that as my questionnaire was quite long and necessarily complex I
wondered whether some would see it as an imposition and fail to complete it but I had tested
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it on friends and colleagues beforehand and assumed that it could be completed by a
knowledgeable person often in less than 30 minutes which I assumed was a maximum time
that I would have allowed if I were asked to complete it. My strategy of having a large
number of verification node points in the questions i.e. ones that drill down into an earlier
similar question or ones which appear to ask the same question in a different way (Bradburn,
Sudman & Wansink 2004). This strategy was mainly applied to the most critical questions
i.e. ones which go to the root of the research and which I could not afford to have a lack of
response to. I had also structured my questions so that the answers could be codified simply,
with some either being positive or negative answers to questions or others which asked for a
simple selection from a list of options. This enables the entry of the data into the database
spreadsheet in the majority of statistical software packages, for example, Minitab 16®.
It had occurred to me when looking over the results was whether I was being sufficiently
objective in the questions I had put to the participants. On reflection, I wondered if I had let
my own bias enter into the questionnaire design despite my efforts to avoid doing so. This
suspicion came from realising that many of the responses were very similar to the answers I
might have given if I was answering the questions. However, upon careful review I satisfied
myself that there is such a high degree of variability overall in the responses that indicates
that the questionnaire was sufficiently objective and sought and received such a mix of varied
responses that self indicate both the internal and external objectivity of the questionnaire.
I realised that some questions proposed precisely what I personally believe needs to happen
in that there is an imperative for an international standardised system for security. Therefore,
any question which blatantly posits such a proposition as a matter of fact rather than a
hypothetical question could well be considered to be leading the respondent (Robson, 2002,
p. 275). Moreover, if I had stated my beliefs so directly in the questionnaire would lead to me
being accused of bias in the questionnaire. Perhaps a more neutral way of saying the same
thing might be more acceptable but even then one has to be very careful to avoid the
introduction of any prejudice or bias which is very easy to do unwittingly. It is widely agreed
among researchers that a bad question is worse than having no questions and no data because
the impact of bad data can go far beyond the discrete area in which the question is focused
(Bradburn, Sudman & Wansink 2004). This is especially so in the area of complex analysis
of data and information because however one codes dubious data its introduction into an
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analysis with other correct data corrupts the whole process.
It was for the reason of acquiring valid and reliable data and not just for the simplification of
data coding and analysis that I did not allow the respondents very much freedom in
answering the questions to avoid the introduction of variability and opinion and outlier data. I
began to wonder if they were agreeing because of collegial respect for the researcher, or they
did not have a deep understanding theoretically and practically of the need for security
standardisation. This is not intended to sound patronising of the extremely busy and
competent people who took the time to fill out what may have seemed to be a long
questionnaire. My target was to acquire details of the facts irrespective of what was going on
in the participants’ minds or hearts. Indeed, the acid test after encoding and analyzing the
data and reflecting about its potential significance, I could not be positive to what extent the
numbers reflected the participants' opinions and this was the indication of credibility that I
sought.
Taking all of these points into consideration, I was comfortable that I had gathered sufficient
data which could be transposed numerically and be useful for identifying complex
relationships (Marshall & Rossman, 1995, p.97) and this is an important consideration
because security standardisation is a very complex project requiring a rigorous approach to
the analysis of data. In the questionnaire, which was designed to provoke an insight into the
necessity and feasibility of the project, I highlighted most of the key aspects, but the
questionnaire could not cover the breadth of the intricacies involved, e.g. the 95 projects of
the European Security Project (Security Research: Security Research Projects under the 7th
Framework Programme for Research towards a more Secure Society and Increased Industrial
Competitiveness 2009). On the other hand the inability to explain concepts thoroughly, the
questionnaire analysis had allowed me to systematically review the data (Harden, 2005, p.
262) and search for further directions for my research. The importance of this was that the
data provided me with a path, so to speak, towards understanding what these security experts
understood about security standardisation and a direction down this path to gain further
insight into the topic. In other words, the questionnaire process allowed me to gain insight
into how knowledge moved from conception to application and not simply how it is
transmitted between individuals (Heywood, 2002, p. 242). An immediate and direct result of
this was that I was able to identify exact topics and issues from the questionnaire and build
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upon them in the selected interviews which would follow. In the final analysis, I felt the
questionnaire allowed me to design a method to approach a better understanding of the
challenges in achieving security standardisation and integration. Furthermore, the method
used in the questionnaire enabled me to redesign and refine the issues raised in the
questionnaire and utilize them for the interview. Despite the difficulties I faced in the design,
implementation, and analysis of the questionnaire, I realised that the exercise helped me take
the first steps down a road which in the end I hope will pave the way for motivating the idea
of security standardisation by convincing other nations through their governments and
through predefined strategy, which I think is a very active method in approaching the security
standardisation.
Initially I thought of coding the interview data using NVivo (Gibbs, 2002). It seemed to be a
suitable way to code the different interviews because it has numerous features, such as the
ability to create nodes when looking for relationships among data when coding (Bryman,
2008, pp. 569-83). I started by downloading a trial version. However, it did not work, so I
contacted their support centre and eventually discovered that there were some serious
problems with one of the database files, which I could not get to work. The university sent
me SPSS (Coakes & Steed 2009). This software has several valuable features including
viewers for data and variables, such as name, label, and missing; several coding procedures;
and various output options (Bryman, 2008, p. 341). Unfortunately, it was very late in arriving
although I tried several times with the university library to trace the shipment. Eventually the
best answer as to why it could not be traced that it might have been lost due to flight delays
caused by the Iceland volcano. By the time it finally arrived I was not able to understand
enough about the software to use it in the time I had left. I also tried to download Atlas,
which did work on a trial basis. However, I was not satisfied with the functions. At first
glance Minitab 16® seemed to be the quickest and most expeditious way of coding the
questionnaire responses and interview data.
Transcribing Interview Data
As I had expected, transcribing the interviews was a difficult and time-consuming activity
(Gerson & Horowitz 2002). I found that there were many problems in doing the transcription.
At first, I tried to write the answers in my normal way, but interviewees tended to be very fast
due to the demands of their lives and spoke rather rapidly. As a result, I had a hard time
73
keeping up with them. I also seriously suspected that there were vital pieces of information
that I was missing as I tried to keep pace. As an alternative, I looked into using audio
transcription software, such as Speak Q 1.7. This seemed a promising approach that would
allow me to conduct the interview while the computer did the transcription in real time.
However, I soon learned that it would not be that simple, as the software needed time to learn
the voice it was ‘hearing’, which meant that I would have to start with a warm-up so that the
computer could ‘learn’ the voice of the interviewee. On reflection, I decided that would not
work since there was no guarantee the software would do an acceptable transcription, and it
would compromise the spontaneity of the interview. In the end, I did what I could to
summarize the interview from a recording of the interview. This also posed unexpected and
serious problems. For one thing, I had problems with the pronunciation of some of the
interviewees. I did not want to interrupt the interview by stopping and asking the person to
repeat it. Yet another problem I faced in transcribing the interviews was in interpreting what
was said in cases where the interviewee’s speech had been disjointed. It seemed to me that it
wouldn’t do to call the person back later and ask him to explain what he had meant since I
could not expect a person to remember precisely what they had said several days or weeks
earlier. In the future I hope to use voice recognition software, assuming I can find a way to
give the software a little time to ‘learn’ an interviewee’s voice without compromising the
quality of the interview.
There were fewer problems transcribing the interviews I had done in Arabic, given that it is
my native language. However, I had some problems translating the interviews into English.
First, it was very time-consuming. Also it was hard to convert what they said into English
because of the nonstandard Arabic many of them spoke, I had to render it into standard
Arabic and then translate it into English. This posed the problem of losing the nuance, if not
the meaning, by going through two levels of interpretation (Dörnyei, 2003).
In some interviews I used my phone to record the interviews while taking notes of the
conversation, after explaining to the interviewee the purpose and confidentiality of the
interview for ethical purposes. I felt that this would lead to more spontaneous and lively
conversation. In fact, it did. Unfortunately, later when I was synchronizing the phone with the
computer and adding some applications to the phone, I lost the conversations. As a result, I
had to rely on my memory to piece together the interview. The resultant transcript was not
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satisfactory. Because I was relying so much on the phone I was reluctant to make the
handwriting more detailed for fear I would lose the thread of the interview. As a result, I lost
some potentially important data, and I was not sure that the answer had been fully covered
since I was relying so much on the recording.  Furthermore, I had to be very careful that I
was not contaminating the data by interpreting what I thought had been said rather than
transcribing the data exactly.
In reviewing the data gathered it is clear that it is easy to miss an important piece of
information the wider context of the work because important information is sometimes
diluted into a mass of other issues (Gerson & Horowitz 2002 p.208). This is sometimes a
problem of expression in the way that an answer might be given in questionnaire or the way
that an interviewee might address a particular question and it is clear that interpretation of an
interviewee is crucial just as it is in normal police work when seeking information on an
event (Bell, J., & Opie, C., 2002, p.167), (Clark, 1996, p. 12). This problem can sometimes
be a fault of the interviewer in introducing some bias or prejudice into the work
(VanderStaay, 2003, p. 390) but this can be easily avoided by the interviewer taking an
objective view of the process (Landstrom, Rehn, & Frisman, 2009, p.136) and this posture
was uppermost in my mind throughout the interviews and also during the analysis of the
questionnaire responses because contamination of research focus can happen at any stage.
Encoding interview data
One theme that came out of the interviews was there were difficulties with security projects
in terms of duplications which occur from availability of different standards, the lack of
availability in international standardisations and the techniques which is what this study is
aiming to touch on. For example, the interviewees mentioned difficulties in getting certain
newer security systems to integrate with existing systems since once additional modifications,
changes or improvement are developed to upgrade such infrastructure it becomes very
inconvenient if not impossible to continue using the existing systems (Straub & Welke 1998).
These difficulties which were raised during the interviews were actually the same difficulties
I faced during my 40 years in the police. I master planned all future needs and allowed
contractual conditions to fulfil the obligations of open-interface integrity and have it fixed
with its source code so it can be designed for any further upgrades. Example of systems that I
faced this problem with are telecommunication equipment, which was upgraded later
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utilizing TETRA as an open standard; face recognition systems; iris recognition systems;
Oracle database systems; speed violation radar; and computer applications. For most of these
systems it was a challenge to integrate or upgrade them together. However, since I tied up the
vendors with very strict contractual obligations, improving the features of systems became
possible. I must admit that with this experience it was rather difficult not engage in the
discussion with my own experiences. However, doing so would have unnecessarily added my
story into what had to be the interviewee's own, so I resisted the temptation, however,
reflection on my own experiences is also an important contributor to this work.
Interviewees felt that it was essential that all government agencies should share the
serviceability of available techniques and methods. However, they felt this should be done
through steering committees which work through a well-defined strategy and budget
reallocations and implement techniques and methods in a systematic way from start to finish.
Moreover, the interviewees welcomed the idea of security standardisation methods to allow
different countries to be part of a standardised system which would link the international
security community in the most professional system. They hoped such a system would
provide a quick and easy method to pursue criminals and suspects and have accurate
evidence.
Although the emergence of these themes was encouraging and in the direction I was hoping
the research would go, the coding and analysis revealed some further weaknesses in the
interview techniques. In coding the interviews I realized that I had not continued deeply
enough into what the interviewees were telling me. In other words, I consistently took what
the interviewees had said and sometimes did not go beyond it in terms of getting the full
range of responses that might have been available. I had thought that my questions were
sufficiently open-ended. However, upon reflection I realized that I could have got a much
richer range of responses if had I had used follow up questions more effectively. I was
conscious that there is a balance to be struck between imposing on the participant and the
necessary rigour of the research and this differs from person to person and this I have found
is sometimes a limiting factor to a research methodology entirely based upon interview data
and this is why I have only used the interviews to drill down into information for
enhancement.
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Another thing that I noticed upon reflection was that I had to keep the interviews on track
more than I thought would have been necessary. For one thing, the answers from the
interviewees often strayed very far from the focus of the questions. I found that during the
interview I frequently had to correct the interviewees’ understanding about what security
standardisation meant. Gradually some of them realised the issue whereas others wanted
more time to think about it and sometimes when I came back to them they were too busy and
wanted to postpone until later; leaving me with information of questionable relevance. A
possible reason for this was the topic of international security standardisation was very new
and broad for them. It is true that organizations such as ISO have been asked from time to
time to set security standards locally, but the notion that security standards should be used
internationally to avoid complex security situations was very new. As a result, it took
considerable time for me to explain what the concept of international security standardisation
is before it could be fruitfully discussed. Some of the participants were very happy with this
and were thereafter better able to comment on the issues. They seemed to be grateful that
more information had been provided. As I developed my strategy and tried it in subsequent
interviews, the quality of the responses increased. Moreover, since the questions were similar
to the questionnaire it helped with linking the answers to the questions found in the
questionnaire.
Going back to first principles the purpose of this research is to determine the feasibility and
likelihood of the establishment of an international standardisation of security as
conceptualised by officers and operatives in the sector by way of reflection and to then
discuss the implication of those concepts on the operational aspects involved. Essential to this
has been a research methodology able to capture individual concepts of reflection in a way
that could be analysed and valuable conclusions drawn ((Boud, Keogh, & Walker 1985).
There is, therefore, no perfect response from the sample participants and this work is not
designed to trial all possible options, the proposition is condensed into 3 critical hypothetical
propositions the testing of which answers the questions involved. After careful study I
decided that the most appropriate methodology was a mixed qualitative and quantitative
qualitative approach; such that the quantitative outputs would provide the solidity of a known
situation and the qualitative outputs would provide the variable outcomes and in totality this
strategy would capture the essence of reflection as described by the sample participants
(Boud, Keogh, & Walker 1985). However, consideration had to be given to whether pursuing
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such a mixed approach would increase the risk of bias and prejudice influencing the
reliability of the results and to what extent was a very important consideration for me.
Analysis of interview data
I carried out the data gathering in a purposeful manner (O'Leary, 2004 p.184). I also prepared
a methodology for handling the data gathered from the interviews.  Finally I organised all the
information in a variety of MSWord and MSExcel files. Having researched a variety of
statistical packages and I worked with SPSS and Minitab 16® and I the latter to be the most
user-friendly for one not formally trained in statistics, ending up by exporting the
questionnaire and interview data to Minitab 16® and using the tools provided.
I designed the questionnaire so that the data gathered was in a form that could be used in the
different packages. However, all of these products have different user features some of which
are more user friendly than others, although the methodologies and outputs are very similar.
There was a particular difficulty in formulating the questions such that data could be
correlated. An example would be to answer the question how many people who said that
culture was a limitation in answer to one question would also say that cooperation would be a
limitation because of a particular other culture or nationality? Such correlations are a feature
of my work and provide greater insight than would be available from a simple frequency
count.
Analysing the data acquired through interviews is a sequential review process as discussed by
(Dahlgren & Fallsberg 1991 p.152) who suggest a 7 stage process whereby the information is
at first condensed to establish how the interviewees reflect (Wilkinson, 2000, p. 79) (Boyd &
Fales, 1983 p.101). This can be a laborious process owing to the precision in transcription
required and then to interpret and depersonalise the interview as discussed by (Bell & Opie
2002 p.167), (Clark, 1996, p. 12).
The next stage was to group the interviews by common elements and indications. This is an
important feature where interviews are used to enlarge the body of information gathered by
way of a questionnaire. In the case of my research project the project is driven by the quality
and breadth of the data and the interviews were used selectively to enlarge on questionnaire
responses. Not all questionnaire respondents were interviewed. The purpose of the interviews
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was to improve questionnaire responses which may either have been unsatisfactorily
answered or to enlarge on responses which may seem to be outliers and inconsistent with
other responses from the same participant. I then progressed to the next logical stage: to
discriminate between data gathered which was at odds with other data. This is important for
the overall body of information because outlier data like this can have a greater negative
impact than having no data from that participant at all (Romero & Ventura 2007 p.135).
The latter activity forms the fifth stage of the analysis. This allowed the analyst to view the
extremes of the data. The shortfall of this process is that it relies too much on the appearance
of words rather than any analysis of the meaning. It illustrates why I chose a structured
questionnaire approach. This limits the respondent from introducing his own words and
thereby complicating the analysis. Such considerations are important when the person might
not be replying in his own mother tongue. It is realised of course that in such cases he would
also not be reading in his mother tongue either. However, it was thought that he was more
likely to understand a simple written question than to reply clearly in a foreign language.
The next stage focuses on the discrimination as to how participants conceptualise reflection
and how that influenced their responses on the main thrust of this work as related to the
international standardisation of security. The final stage of the process involves drilling down
into the data to identify the extent and the focus participants would have in reflecting on the
subject matter and also indeed on the detailed responses, which is important in enabling
comparison and detailed review which in turn provides further opportunities for analysis. The
above 7 stage process is a logical progression of review but it is cumbersome and too
formulaic for use in all instances in this research project where the interviews are highly
varied and only conducted to support and enhance the questionnaire data.
The analysis of questionnaire data
The methodology of analysis of the data used in this research is dictated by the nature of the
data and information and of the needs of the study in general. The data falls into 2 main
categories; that derived from Infrastructural Information (II) loosely described as desk
research and that obtained by way of a research questionnaire which provides some
qualifying Infrastructural Information II but mainly Operational Information (OI) as the
respondents are mainly officer/operatives who answer the questions from the intricate
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knowledge of the security apparatus in their country and also very importantly by way of
reflection on their experiences in service. These 2 main types of data can then be further
categorised as being either qualitative or quantitative and further as being institutional i.e. the
actual status quo or experiential as derived by reflection.
Owing to the inherent confidential nature of this research sector the data and information
gathered does not seek to acquire secrets from respondents on their country’s security
arrangements. As a consequence actual numbers have deliberately been avoided: it was clear
that if asked how many officers were assigned to a particular function most respondents
would have felt unable to answer and suspected the motive behind the research. Although this
is by no means a limitation to this work because the thrust of this research is to identify the
likelihood and feasibility of the establishment of the international standardisation of security
and cooperation in operations which does not require such invasive data searching.
Furthermore, the research seeks to investigate the subject as applying to the whole global
community and detailed information of existing arrangements are either already known or
easily identified. So, whilst the majority of the data acquired from the questionnaire appears
to be qualitative insofar as it comprises situational and circumstantial questions the incidence
frequency of such responses provides quantitative indications across the whole community of
nations who could incorporate standardisation of security into their systems and who could
cooperate at the level of operations and the exchange of information.
Critical to this process of course is the validation of the data and information gathered much
of which process is assisted by the high degree of relationship, for example, within the
questionnaire which provides confirmation and internal corroboration. The validity of
research data and information, however, often goes to the root provenance of its source and
this research vets the questionnaire sample as far as is possible prior to soliciting responses.
The vetting process consists of verification of position and status and period of service which
indicate the time over which knowledge could have been acquired by the respondent and also
the age and level of seniority which would indicate the level of information that the
respondent would have acquired, which in turn provides an indication of reliability
(Bradburn, Sudman, & Wansink, 2004). Whilst the security sector is a relatively narrow
close-knit community the sample respondents are drawn from a wide area within the industry
and throughout the hierarchy such that a random selection of them provides wide ranging
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information taking into consideration a variety of influences. This is an important
consideration in avoiding bias and prejudice in such work which could easily be affected by
preference or assumption (Bryman, 2008), which further illustrates why the questionnaire
design involves only positive or negative responses and sectoral pointers which avoid the risk
of introducing bias.
The analysis of the data and information starts with the codification of the information
gathered which needs to be converted into a usable format for comparison and analysis. The
data in this research comes in 2 forms; the infrastructural information (II) which is mainly
qualitative and explains the environmental influences on the security apparatus in the sample
countries much of which information is drawn from the questionnaire data which is mainly
dealt with on the basis of frequency of responses to the questions i.e. if 50 respondents report
that cultural issues are an impediment then that would amount to over 80% of the sample and
significantly impact the findings. However, as has been discussed earlier a deliberate high
degree of interrelationship has been built into the questionnaire questions such that a further
level of analysis can be gleaned from the correlation and interaction of the various responses
to questions such that additional indicators can be derived by analysis of interactions and this
process significantly enriches the findings hereto.
So, the codification of the data and information enables several levels of analysis;
firstly there is the infrastructural information which provides the basis for the work
secondly there is the frequency count of the responses to the questionnaire;
thirdly there are the sectoral pointers assigned to some of the questions;
fourthly there are the indicators derived from the correlational analysis of the responses
where there are relationships between the questions as outlined in the following analysis of
interrelationships. This is important because it shows how closely related questions are and
indicates the quality of the research design both in the questionnaire and the hypotheses
insofar as the most frequent interrelationships are those closest to the problems statement. For
example, the most frequent are Standardisation, other countries, cooperation, and
impediments all of which are key constituents of this research. This indicates that the
questionnaire strategy is highly correlated and as these key components touch the majority of
the other questions we can see how closely the questionnaire targets relevant information.
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and finally there is the analysis of the total body of information in testing the hypotheses to
provide the conclusions and recommendations (Sinkovics, R., Penz, E. & Ghauri, P.N.
2008).
So it is key to understand how focused the questionnaire is to the problem statement and
therefore the hypotheses at the core of this work. I have measured the level of focus of the
research by the frequency with which the questionnaire questions correlate with one another.
This provides the opportunity to correlate the data in analysis to extract more information
than would be available from a single answer to a single question. The process of analysis I
have used in measuring the number of interrelationships is a logical relationship whereby, for
example, the ability to afford the cost would clearly impact on the ability to introduce new
technology; or the level of training provided would clearly correlate with the level of
competency and it is important to note that the most frequent interrelationship is
Standardisation which is at the heart of this work. The process of codification of the data is
not just a frequency count of responses because it must recognise that responses to questions
fall into numerous discrete categories of influences which are drawn from the varying focus
of the questions with the number of interrelationships with other questions (Bradburn,
Sudman, & Wansink, 2004) as follows: -
Standardisation (11 interrelationships): Quality (3 interrelationships)
Achievements (4 interrelationships): Benchmark and compare(4 interrelationships)
Compliance (8 interrelationships): Access ( 3 interrelationships)
Information (7 interrelationships): Socio-cultural (5 interrelationships)
Restrictions(6 interrelationships): Freedom (5 Interrelationships)
Privacy (4 interrelationships): Rule of law ( 4 interrelationships)
Other countries(10 interrelationships)
Software and databases(3 interrelationships): Cooperation ( 10 interrelationships)
Experiences(8 interrelationships): Impediments (10 interrelationships)
Operations (5 interrelationships):
So, it can be seen that there are 18 key areas formulated into the 49 questionnaire questions
which have a minimum of 110 interrelationships which illustrates the high degree of validity
of corroboration available from such a strategic questionnaire design i.e. a mean ~2.25
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interrelationships per question in wide ranging areas any of which could impact at the root of
the problem statement. The high degree of focus in the questionnaire can be seen in the
concentration of focus on the problem statement which is illustrated by the fact that issues of
standardisation, compliance, information, other countries, cooperation, experiences and
impediments are less than 40% of the issues but are most frequently related to other questions
accounting for over 50% of all interrelationships within the research questionnaire.
The questionnaire responses are tabulated to provide frequency count indications and also
formulated into charts to provide scale and internal comparison of influence. The issue of
scale is very important because the large number of variable influences must be concentrated
into the key indicators of support or impediments to the problem statement to enable the
development of the conclusions and recommendations derived from the testing of the
hypotheses. The tabulated analytical process is intended to be illustrative of the data and
information responses of the participants to the questionnaire and not as a central statistical
modelling component of this research. The reason for this is that the inherently confidential
nature of the research sector makes it very difficult both to identify a large sample and also to
obtain a high level of response to a questionnaire. This research has, nonetheless, obtained 59
complete responses at random to the questionnaire from a balanced spread of disciplines,
although an almost equal number of partially completed ones were received and discarded as
possibly unreliable and would likely upset the balance of information by the incorporation of
partial responses, despite some efforts having been made to encourage participants to
complete their contributions. It is recognised that the sample is relatively small and whilst
large enough to provide illustrative information of the information obtained, the sample is too
small to allow rigorous statistical processes. The analysis provided in Chapter 4 Discussion
includes many contingency tables in which data from discussion related questionnaire
responses are compared one with another to explain important points; for example how many
of those who say they use software also say they do so easily, or conversely do so with
difficulty? This particular information which is provided in Table B60 provides an important
insight but it does so from a relatively small sample base and the contingency table is made
up of a small number of returns in some areas such that it does not satisfy the technical
requirements of a Chi-square test. It is a requirement that a Chi-square test is made on a
contingency table having an expected frequency count for each cell of at least 5 to fulfil the
requirements to compute a Chi-square value (Everitt 1992). However, owing to the relatively
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small sample size all but 10 of the contingency tables contain some cells with values of 5 or
lower despite which careful selection of the variables interacted in the contingency tables it
has been possible to compute a statistically significant Chi-square statistic in 12 of the tables.
It is also for this reason that the outputs from Minitab are described as illustrating the findings
and also the reason that a variety of charts and figures illustrating the same data are provided
for additional clarity.
The Testing of the Hypotheses
There are 3 hypothetical propositions at the centre of this study which address the key issues
in the problem statement. It would have been possible to create a larger number of hypotheses
for this purpose but it is in the nature of the project that there are certain key make or break
issues which would define the outcome and which fall into 3 main categories: -
Internal – socio-economic, legal and political considerations
Operational compliance - quality, cooperation, skills and organisational culture.
Cooperation – cooperation, exchange of information and data exchange,
These 3 issues are identified as keys to the feasibility of the international standardisation of
security and reflect the general difficulties in many other multinational arrangements. These 3
issues are assumed not to be mutually exclusive as an affirmative response to all 3 would
positively indicate the feasibility of the proposition whereas a negative response to any one of
these would impact the entire proposal. However, these are just 3 of the 18 or so issues which
are the key components of the questionnaire and the difference is judged to be that these 3
issues go to the root of the feasibility of the proposition and have the characteristics of being
inherent to a particular case and not easy to change. Most of the other 15 issues addressed in
the questionnaire are treated as items which could be improved or change if the 3 key issues
positively indicate the feasibility of the project i.e. countries could adapt to comply. The
assumption underpinning this hierarchy of influence is that, for example, internal issues as
outlined above are woven into the fabric of the nation and unlikely to be changed easily or
quickly; similarly operational and compliance issues run deep in the culture of a nation and
are also difficult to change (Bloch, 2004); and an absence of cooperation would easily
scupper the proposition because there would be no point in the proposal without cooperation.
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Therefore, the testing of the 3 key hypotheses developed as going to the root of the problem
statement would positively or negatively indicate feasibility. Each of these is addressed by
several of the questionnaire responses, some of which apply to more than one of the
hypotheses and the focus areas of the questions are listed after each of the following and the
repeat of some issues shows the high degree of relationship between the questionnaire and the
hypotheses and also as between the hypotheses and the overall problem statement of this
study.
H1) The establishment of an international standard for security would not be supported by
the majority of nations owing to internal socio-economic, legal and political considerations.
The subjects contained in the questionnaire which relate to H1 are: Standardisation,
Compliance, Access, Information, Socio-cultural, Restrictions, Freedom, Privacy, Rule of
law, Other countries, Cooperation, Impediments, Operations
H2) The likelihood of failure or decay over time would be very high owing to a lack of
dedication of staff and management to compliance owing to an inability to maintain quality,
cooperation, skills and organisational culture.
The subjects contained in the questionnaire which relate to H2 are: Standardisation, Quality,
Achievements, Benchmark and compare, Compliance, Access, Information, Socio-cultural,
Restrictions, Software and databases, Cooperation, Experiences, Impediments, Operations
H3) The establishment of the international standardisation of security data, information and
operations would succeed at establishing standardised levels of compliance but would likely
fail in the area of cooperation in the exchange of information and in providing data access to
other members.
The subjects contained in the questionnaire which relate to H3 are: Standardisation, Quality,
Achievements, Benchmark and compare, Compliance, Access, Information, Socio-cultural,
Restrictions, Freedom, Other countries, Software and databases, Cooperation, Experiences,
Impediments, Operations
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The incidence of responses on such a broad front enables a deep understanding when testing
the hypotheses and the variability of the indicators enables the research to explain the
findings to varying degrees. For example, in H2 it may be found that the data contraindicates
the feasibility of the project although perhaps it may also show that cooperation would be
high in the majority of potential members and skills and organisational culture would be high
enough to justify proceeding. In this case the research might assume that just a few shortfalls
exist in just a few potential members and these might be overcome with some investment and
training. This would not likely be possible, however, if this was the majority view or if it
involved the majority of issues. So, the strategy of addressing the testing of the hypotheses
across a broad front with many variables having a high degree of interrelatedness not only
enriches the findings but enables the analysis of the hypotheses to seek out solutions to
unclear conclusions. Similarly, where some indications are clear cut but others in the same
analysis are less convincing then the broad strategy enables the research to weight the
influences and conclude on that basis which is most likely to succeed.
The testing of the hypotheses in this study is a process of analysing the indications of the
wide ranging data collection and applying them to the hypothetical propositions to see if they
are supported or declined. Hypothesis testing in research is a powerful way of analysing a
problem statement at the centre of the research and hypothesising an outcome either as a
direct positive statement or as a null hypothesis i.e. one which posits an opposite or negative
position (Cooper & Schindler, 2003). The rigour of this process is borne out by the fact that
the data will dictate the support or declining of the hypothesis and thereby define the solution
to the problem statement. The important element of such work, however, is to ensure that the
research methodology which produces the data is virtuous and accurately targets the data
which relates to the hypotheses such that the analysis produces the correct outcome (Cooper
& Schindler, 2003 Chap.17). Provided that the data is free of any prejudice and bias as
discussed earlier and the produced indications are focused on the hypothetical proposition
then the process is one of logical interaction to define the result (Cooper & Schindler, 2003
Chap.15). For example, if a hypothesis suggests that the majority of people do not eat
breakfast it is relatively easy to ask a sample of people if they do and define from the result
whether the hypothesis is correct or not.
In operationalising the data in hypothesis testing we are basically comparing the proposition
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with the hard facts from the data irrespective of what we might intuitively think could be the
answer and as in the earlier example related to breakfast we might know that most people eat
breakfast, but the testing of a hypothesis in research requires the rigour of the testing process
to prove the point (Cooper & Schindler, 2003 Chap.17). The example of breakfast is a simple
single issue hypothesis whereas those attendant to this research are highly integrated complex
multivariate statements which are to be analysed with a large number of variable responses as
can be seen from the earlier example of the questionnaire contents and the foci of the
hypotheses. So, in this case the testing of the hypotheses must be done by taking the key
components of the hypothetical statement and all the variable responses from the research
data and applying one with another along the same lines of the earlier example.
All of the hypotheses hereto are deliberately formulated as balanced statements because the
reversal of the logic from a null hypothetical proposition with so many variables would make
for relying on complex analysis (Cooper & Schindler, 2003 Chap.17); so the testing of the
hypotheses in this case is largely a case of applying the acquired data to see if the
assumptions in the hypotheses were correct or not. It is often the case that a complex
multivariable hypothesis is tested and found to have different outcomes in different parts
which may seem an unnecessary level of complexity whereas in fact this is a powerful
holistic strategy which enables us to get out more than we put into the analysis (Anderson,
Burnham & Thompson 2000). It can be seen from the complex hypotheses hereto that it is
almost inevitable that the several items of content written into the propositions are bound to
draw different levels of responses which is deliberate because if, for example, the key
problem statement is not supported by the analysis of the hypotheses in part then perhaps the
measure of support in another part of the testing outcome might indicate support in another
area which might compensate and prove the hypotheses (Cooper & Schindler, 2003
Chap.17). So this strategy has the additional benefit of enabling the testing process to test the
overall proposition and then to search for other influences.
The process of hypothesis testing in this case is a stepwise process starting with the basic
infrastructural information identified and further defining the findings through the data and
information gathered by way of the questionnaire and other sources (Cooper & Schindler,
2003 Chap.17). Once the weight of evidence has been applied to the hypothetical
propositions we can see which is supported and which is declined and whether and how some
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may be both supported and declined thus diverting the outcome away from that hypothesised
into a slightly different but inevitably closely related outcome. Once all the acquired data has
been applied to the testing process and the hypotheses have been rigorously tested we can see
how the sum of those findings relate to the global problem statement which in this case
relates to the feasibility of the establishment of an international standard for security and the
implementation of a cooperative apparatus for exchange of information and intelligence
(Wilcox, 2012). We then take the findings and extract from the sum of analysed information
the final conclusions and recommendations and report the findings as a balanced address to
the initial problem statement. This reporting element would inevitably include a discussion
on the logic underpinning the findings leading to the conclusions and recommendations and
also identify areas for future work which could either be directly related to this study or
which has been found to be needed as an outcome of this work.
As a long experienced senior police officer I like positioning an investigation, especially
when there is little information known, upon a series of hypotheses and going out to prove or
disprove them. It is in many respects a virtuous process which places what might be the case
into circumstances which could be possible and in this way we can test any number of
possibilities with the advantage of being able to contain a lot of information and influences
within some relatively simple propositions. My experience in the Police has refined my
ability to do this and I have come to learn the pitfalls of proposing the affirmative hypothesis
whereas it is sometimes more productive to contemplate the null proposition, and I have
trained young officers in these skills. My experience of structuring an investigation on the
basis of numerous hypothetical propositions also simplifies the handling a lot of information
especially in a fast moving dynamic situation where things could be changing all the time and
especially when we don’t know the value balance of all influences, just as in the case of this
research project.
Data and Information Sources
The data and information used as the basis of this research falls into two main categories; the
Infrastructural Information (II) and the Operational Information (OI). II is that which explains
the state and status of security either in a particular nation state or that which exists in the
wider international arena and that which might be described as being in the public domain. OI
on the other hand is information which resides in the knowledge and experience of operatives
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and officers within the security apparatus and this would also include much II given that such
circumstances would impact their everyday activities, for example, in an authoritarian state
the officers would know that they are acting according to their specific brief.
Infrastructural Information is available from a wide variety of sources including the media,
the internet, libraries, research publications, international and various governmental bodies,
pressure groups, for example, Amnesty International, literature, politicians and other
groupings often focused on circumstances in a particular country (Zikmund, Babin, Carr &
Griffin 2013 Chapter 8 page 183); but the most important source of such information would
likely be within the operatives and officers within the security community who would both
know about such circumstances and also be able to comment on the impact on efficiency and
operability with a high degree of professional knowledge. Gathering such information from
published sources may appear to be an easy task of searching publications and other
information sources, but this would be to overly simplify the challenge of obtaining
information within an industry which is inherently confidential in nature (Straub & Welke
1998). However, much is known in the public domain and of course much more is available
within the security community from within which the most valuable part of this data and
information trawl is focused. The main advantages of desk research in gathering II is that a
lot can be gathered quickly and easily with the main disadvantages being that public domain
information is very often deliberately skewed to provide a political or unreal propaganda
message to the world community of what may actually be the situation in, for example, an
oppressive regime such as currently in North Korea or Iran (Silverman, 2011). Another
disadvantage is that the situation can change very quickly and published information can go
out of date and provide an incorrect current state of circumstances. Published sources and
various national and international bodies frequently have their own agendas, for example, left
and right wing political affiliations, pressure groups, government utterances and there is
always a danger of introducing bias into such research by taking such information at face
value when there may be an underlying motive for it, which introduces an important
consideration of data and information validity into research (Bryman, 2008).
Whereas, OI which is gathered at the level of the officer or operative from a large number of
nations both from those nations which may have extreme situations and also from officers
and operatives within nations which interact with such nations can provide a real world and
richer source of information based upon their everyday activities and also from their
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experience and knowledge contributed to this study by way of reflection. The value of
Information gathered by way of reflection is well understood in the research community as a
valuable methodology especially in research projects where information can be confidential
or delicate and not as freely available in detail and extent of impact (Sugarman et al (2000).
However, it is often said of reflection that it can introduce a high degree of variability within
a sample and consequent unreliability in research owing to opinion, received information and
also an element of vested interest (Boud, Keogh, & Walker 1985). So, given that much of the
data and information gathered for this research project is gathered by way of questionnaire
research and much of which is derived from experiential information from reflection, that we
review the value and contribution of information from reflection as a basis for research.
Options for gathering research data
Understanding the information provided on the basis of reflection can be a significant
challenge owing to the characteristic personalisation of the information by the provider
(MacIntosh, 2010). This is a commonly occurring problem in all information gathering and
interrogation from which researchers often design their information gathering strategy and
analysis of their findings sensitively to the circumstances of the respondent (Filmer, Jenks,
Seale, Thoburn & Walsh, 2004, p.36). An example of being sensitive to responses in terms of
the reasoning behind the herd instinct to explain how groups respond and how opinion can
become commonplace has been studied (Hyde, Howlett, Brady, & Drennan, 2005, p. 2588)
as has understanding the meaning of the information provided; as Krokfors, Jyrhama,
Kynaslahti, Toom, Maaranen & Kansanen, (2006, p.30) describe the terms in which answers
are provided. Corbin, & Holt, (2005, p.43) have further elaborated on such work by
demonstrating how data can be used to create a research strategy. Their strategy was to
initiate a direct approach towards the creation of hypothesis based research but others have
suggested that this can introduce ambiguity and bias into the basis of research and the related
findings (Heywood & Stronach, 2005, p.116). (Walsh, 2004, p. 229).
A questionnaire forms a critical part of the data gathering process of this research because it
is widely recognised that such a structured approach produces a high degree of validity and
consistency of data and information which enables the project to target particular areas of
highly complex problems and acquire data and information with a high degree of reliability
(Bryman, 1988, p. 72), (Seale, 2004b, p. 72). The problem of targeting research is often
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criticised for the risk of introducing bias by almost seeking a self-fulfilling outcome by
evaluating achievements in terms of levels of implementation at the heart of this project
which is largely based upon the indications derived from the analysis of information from the
questionnaire. The problem in this is based on interpretation of the data and information
(Maguire, 2002, p. 368) although, it is recognised that further qualitative information could
benefit the research from a less structured approach derived perhaps from focus groups or by
interviews.
So, whilst the main body of the research in this project is undertaken through both desk type
research and a structured questionnaire which focuses the data gathering in such a complex
and wide raging subject area, there is also a high value placed on the collection of qualitative
information. The method for data collection has been selected as being a mix of all three with
the interview component being used as a method to drill down into the information gleaned
from the parts thereby enabling this research to delve deeper into the reasoning behind
responses and enrich the findings both in terms of quality and also to enlarge on interesting
findings and also to avoid confusion (Hammersley, 1992, pp. 124-125).
Given that this research takes a thoroughly international view of the likelihood of
achievement it is inevitable that ethnic predispositions would have some role to play in the
outcome of this project (Baldwin 1997). However, as so many of the core considerations
especially as outlined in the 3 critical hypothetical propositions hereto are narrowly focused it
is thought that ethnography might have less influence, with the indications being dominated
by practical and technical considerations. Although as Sanday (1979, p.527) and Hammersley
(1992, p.124-125) have shown the important place that ethnic and cultural considerations can
have in a project of this nature observations have been made that an over focus on ethnic
considerations may be misplaced and the reality is left to the research to reveal with
significant consideration given to this throughout the research design.
Whereas this research design accepts that it is important to flesh out the desk research and
questionnaire findings with some real world information derived from interviews there
remains the question as to whether sufficient information and adequate weight can be derived
from individual interviews given the wide ranging and international characteristics of this
work. A wider trawling method of achieving similar ends has been considered by way of
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focus groups and (Marshall, & Rossman, 1995, p.84) have discussed the advantages of such
methods highlighted the main advantage being that a broader range of views can be achieved.
But there are inherent problems with this option as related to this work in that firstly the
international nature of this research would require gathering contributors to a single location
to gather in a group and an additional consideration that there is a high degree of
confidentiality which would not likely enable unfettered involvement (Pithouse, 1999, p.
175). It is also important to note that the data gathered from focus groups tends to be
divergent information which requires long and complex analysis often dependent on opinion
and definition on the part of the researcher which can result in bias and sometimes even
prejudice (Marshall, & Rossman, 1995, p.171), (Poso, Honkatukia & Nyqvist, 2008, p.77).
Notwithstanding any of the above options the overriding methodology of this project is to be
open to all information throughout this mixed research methodology with the intention being
to enrich the findings (Robson, 2002, p. 254) and this is especially important in this case
given that much importance is given to data gathered by way of reflection (Oppenheim, 1992,
p. 254). The important issue here being to determine how reflection is perceived in terms of
its reliability and the process of applying perspective to findings from reflection (Ali, 2004, p.
276), (Gidley, 2004, p. 254) which further illustrates the importance of understanding the
conception that is to say the origin and basis for information which is derived by reflection.
The importance being to understand the circumstances in which the subject was involved
with the matter upon which he reflects and it is easily understood that every person’s
recollection of an event or experience could easily be coloured by his particular situation and
involvement at the time and as Lord Denning has said ‘the witnesses are often absolutely
certain they are correct—and may be absolutely certainly wrong.’ (Lord Denning, 1972)
Phenomenography in research
Phenomenography is a means by which we study the world from the perspective of the events
that take place and impact upon us, for example, how we as a group experience phenomena
as they occur (Barnard, McCosker, & Gerber, 1999, p.212) and the world literally means
describing how things appear to be. This work showed that people often took a radically
different view of events and experiences and there were relationships identified which
showed that individual characteristics or situational circumstances played a large part in this
finding. However, whilst it must be clear that an element of reflection could assist in both
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understanding and responding to events such a point was not identified at this stage of the
work on phenomenography development (Jones & Asensio, 2001). Early work in
phenomenography began with research seeking to understand how people experienced events
that occurred (Barnard, McCosker, & Gerber, 1999, p.212), (Marton, 1994, p. 4425). It has
been shown that people will experience events in different ways (Baker, 1997, p. 45) and
studies have been done on groups of people aimed at identifying the varying views people
had of similar phenomena
A commonly made mistake in the understanding of phenomenography as a research tool in
gathering data and in building an information base is perhaps derived from a
misunderstanding of the term phenomenography in that some will perceive it as focusing
only on things phenomenal such as huge or earth shattering events (Richardson, (1999). This
is not a correct assumption as the intention is to take into consideration in research any events
related to the work based upon their relevance and not their size or magnitude of impact
(Donald E Polkinghorne, 1989). It is in the nature of phenomena that they occur occasionally
and not regularly such as retail sales and an example might be that normal sales of a product
might be one packet a day but occasionally a customer comes in and buys one thousand. Such
an example might not feature in the regular statistical profile produced by marketers but it
must be noted as a phenomenon which does occur.
Reflections and Conclusions on research methodology
To conclude this section on the research methodology it is necessary that I pull all the
components together into a coherent model explaining the reasoning behind the design which
requires that I also reflect on the logic that underpins it from my own experiences. The
process of reflection provides an understanding of the experiences of the interviewees from
my over 40 years of experience (Boud, Keogh, & Walker 1985). In a nutshell, this research
methodology addresses the three key perspectives of this work; firstly it considers the
problem statement as to whether it is feasible and possible to create a standard for the
internationalisation of security and whether this could be implemented internationally.
Secondly, the methodology and contribution of gathering data and information by a process
of reflection, the reflexivity and the methodology necessary to manage and analyse such
information as in Manen (1990, pp.77-109), Finlay & Gough (2003), (Dunne, Pryor, & Yates
2005); and thirdly the analysis of the gathered data leading to conclusions and
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recommendations which address the problem statement.
The foregoing outlines the methodology as it relates to the gathering, management and
analysis of data and information but the ultimate motive of this research is to test the 3
critical hypothetical propositions which go to the root of the problem statement as discussed
above. The process of reflection and the main constituents of the problem statement are
discussed in greater detail in the following section on the literature review which correlates
the existing research and published information; not just on each of these in isolation but also
as to how the process and value contribution of reflection has been engaged in the area of
research into the international security situation and the standards which could create a
common method of operation as between nations.
In engaging in the process of gathering data and information in an industry which is
inherently confidential and often on subjects which could be classified one cannot avoid
becoming embroiled in the complexity of the ethical issues involved. Paramount among these
is the situation one puts the contributors to this work in, who by innocently participating in
providing data and information from their professional knowledge and by way of reflection
on their experiences may be unwittingly putting themselves at risk of leaking information. To
avoid such risks I maintained a high level of information security both electronic by way of
firewalls and security protective software and also by anonymising data by encoding such
that the identity of contributors was always separated at all times so much so in fact that the
identities, and even the nationalities, of contributors do not appear anywhere in the databases
and spread sheets associated with this work and not even in my own files after the data has
been entered into the system.
Experiential learning which is called organisational learning in the business world has gained
credibility as a research tool in recent years following the important work of researchers like
Kolb, (1984, pp.21-5) and others who have described various models of experiential learning
which is to all intents and purposes the same as reflective learning insofar as the information
gathered is derived from experiential knowledge (Lewin, 1951, Piaget, 1932, p. 43 and
Dewey, 1933, p. 6). Such information derived by a process reflection is at the heart of this
work and without which process would likely not be possible because the indications derived
from such experiential learning greatly enriches the findings with real world information
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(Bryman, 2001, p. 23) although it is accepted that some people will put their own spin on the
process and the outcomes depending upon their understanding of the methodology (King, &
Liebling, 2008, p.444).
I accept that I have taken a largely quantitative view of largely qualitative inputs i.e. often a
frequency count of information units but this is in the nature of any analysis that looks for
general trend data and the surrounding context. My questionnaire was at the heart of the data-
gathering. I dedicated much of my time to improving the questionnaire. I wanted to ensure I
did not lose an opportunity to obtain accurately information that produced significant
indicators. I enhanced the information from questionnaires with selected interviews to
elaborate on interesting indicators and occasional shortfalls in data. In doing so I kept in my
mind the importance of respecting the importance of validity and reliability of the data so that
the outputs were both clear and believable. Such mixed methods enable the confirmation of
responses and data proving as discussed extensively by (Bryman, 2008, p. 695). I was also
able to address a large number of issues by correlational analysis and simple indicators to
ensure some internal validity to the data – a process often called triangulation (Bryman, 2008,
p. 700, Robson, 2002, pp. 371-2 and Teddlie, C. and Tashakkori, A., 2009, pp. 32-3).
The research methodology as outlined in this chapter is highly integrated and information
dependent with such data and information being derived from a variety of sources including
very importantly from the published literature on the subject. The structure of this
methodology is designed to overlay the available literature as detailed in Appendix D and
summarised in the next Chapter.
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Chapter 3 Literature Review
This research project consist of three main elements; the international standardisation of
security, the process of reflection as a research technique, and the methodology by which the
main problem statement can be addressed.
The last of these was explained in Chapter 2 with literature references and a rationale
presented. Chapter 3 reviews the literature on the related issues of the internationalisation
of a standard for security and the process of reflection in gathering data and information from
security specialists who responded to the questionnaire.
I found only limited literature on the issue of the internationalisation of a standard for
security. However, the subject of reflection as a research tool is very broad and I found a
good deal more literature on it. I also found there had been very little research on the
relationship between the two main issues. I needed, therefore, to identify myself the key
issues drawn from each area which had some relationship to each other. I followed the
recommended methodology for conducting a literature review (Cooper & Schindler 2003
p.654; Bryman, 2012 Chap 5 p.97) to search for and evaluate discovered references whilst
maintaining an open mind; and then to apply the findings to the research design and strategy.
The process of discovering and reviewing the literature
I began my trawl for available literature through the Abu Dhabi police department facilities. I
expanded my search into formal public library facilities and local university libraries. I then
expanded my search to the Universities of Portsmouth, Surrey and the British Library. I also
reviewed peer review journals through providers including Ingenta, Informaworld, ME,
Wiley Interface, EBSCOHost and Blackwell Science. I archived results electronically. I first
took a wide ranging trawl by key word and subject matter through the sources identified
above, which produced a large body of referenced literature which I then proceeded to read
and analyse. I found this process time-consuming but it yielded sufficient material to build a
list of key constituents from which to repeat the search process with different targets. The
further I drilled down into the subject the wider I found the extent of the relationships became
and I needed a rigid focus so as not to deviate from the main thrust of my research.  Once I
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had defined a sufficiently broad literature sector I built a list of key components, noting their
relevance and influence. The key constituents of the literature I isolated are set out below:
TABLE  3.1   REFLECTION THEORY
Subject Matter Literature Reference
Definition (Lyons, 1998, p. 125)
Some methodological problems in
reflection-impulsivity research
(Ruth L Ault et al, 1976)
Relationship of factors in reflection (Newton, 2004, p. 160)
Reflection: a necessary but not sufficient
condition for professional development
(Christopher Day, 1993)
Understanding issues in reflection (Burton, 2000, p. 327)
Phenomenological Research Methods (Donald E Polkinghorne, 1989)
Relevance of reflected information (Whitehead, 2000, p. 93)
Promoting Reflective Practitioners in
Nursing: a review of theoretical models
and research into the use of diaries and
journals to facilitate reflection
(Hazel Platzer et al, 1997)
Information / activity relationship (Gibbons, M., Limoges, C., Nowotny, H.,
Schwartzman, S., Scott, P., & Trow, M.,
1994, p. 19)
Post event / action reflection (Schon, 1983, p. 276)
Reflection: a review of the literature (Sue Atkins, Murphy K, 1993)
Learning from reflection (Shepherd, 2006, p. 336)
Consequence reflection (Gustafsson, C., & Fagerberg, I., 2004, p.
274)
Impact of reflection on actions (Husu, J., Toom, A., & Patrikainen, S., 2008,
p. 47)
Reflection on shared responsibilities (Holgersson, S., & Gottschalk, P., 2008, p.
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369)
Self reflection and vulnerability in action
research
(Simon Bell, 1998)
Ethical considerations (Holgersson, S., & Gottschalk, P., 2008, p.
371)
Alternative responses (Russell, 2005, p. 200)
Action Research (Bruce L Berg, 1989)
Decision making (Pereira, 1999, p. 343)
Situation analysis (Reynolds, 1998, p. 186)
Action Research and Reflective Practice (Paul McIntosh, 2010)
Response to impediments from
reflection
Arcand, I., Durand-Bush, N., & Miall, J
(2007)
Future view from  reflection (Whitehead, 2000)
Ideas from reflection (Loughran, 1996)
Reflecting on reflection (Cushway, D., & Gatherer, A., 2003, p. 7)
Reflexive Methodology – New Vistas
for Qualitative Research
(Mats Alveson & Kaj Skoldberg, 2000)
Experience of reflecting (Fox, M., Green, G., & Martin, P. J., 2007, p.
184)
Maturation effect of reflection (Romano, M., & Gibson, P., 2006)
Success and achievement (Lee, S., Shaw, D. J., Chesterfield, G., &
Woodward, C. 2009)
Personal reflection (Hilsdon, 2005)
Self improvement by reflection (Whitehead 2000)
Systemic learning by reflection (Dreyfus H.L et al 1986)
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TABLE 3.2 SECURITY STANDARDISATION IN THE LITERATURE
Subject Matter Literature Reference
Cryptography, hacking, phone system security (Dan Forsberg et al 2013)
ISO Standards for Healthcare and other sectors (Francois-Andre Allaert et al,
2002)
Information technology standardisation (Kai Rannenberg, 1993)
ENISA European Agency for Information Security
(EESSI is European Electronic Signatures
Standardisation Initiative)
(Andreas Mitrakas, 2006)
Healthcare and public security (Kokolakis et al, 2002)
Data Security Standardisation / Cryptology (Wyn L Price, 1990)
IT in Business & Government Sectors (Aleksandar Klaic 2005)
Cross Border/ Security / Privacy Issues / European E-
Passport
(Jaap-Henk Hoepman et al,
2006)
Attacks / RFID / Countermeasures / Standardisation (Klaus Finkzeller, 2009)
Communications / Biometric passports (C Evans-Pughe, 2005)
Electronic Business Processes / Pan-European ID Card
Standardisation Projects – ISSE
(Ulrich Stutenbaumer &
Gisela Meister, 2003)
Lessons in Corporate Governance / Global Financial
Crisis / Money Laundering
(Leonard Yong, 2009)
Global financial security / Money Laundering (Brian Seymour 2007)
Distributed Event-triggered Knowledge Sharing System (Seema Degwekar et al,
2007)




Security Evaluation of GOST 28147-89 in View of
International Standardisation
(Nicholas T Curtois, 2012)
Security in Supply Chain Security Management (Juha Hintsa et al, 2009)
International Standardisation (Erik Puskar, 2012)
EU – USA Collaboration on Security Standards (Euro Commission’s Joint
Research Centre (JRC) 2010)
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I now go into more detail on each of these areas:
Reflection Theory
There is a robust although relatively small body of literature on the theory which
provides a basis for understanding the place of reflection in research (Atkins, S. &
Murphy K, 1993). This section reviews reflection theory and evaluates the research
evaluating the contribution of information acquired by reflection to improving standards
and the management and process of the security industry. I begin by a review of the
theory underpinning the concept of reflection then discuss the key issues and round off
this review of the literature with an overarching perspective of reflection as applied in
reality (Atkins, S. & Murphy K, 1993). The focus of my review throughout is, of course,
in the subject area of this thesis but I recognise that reflection applies in all walks of life
to a greater or lesser extent and I take into consideration, as others have before me and
not least Wingrave (2011), the published research in other areas of public service such
as education and the health care sectors. My main concern being how the theoretical
application of reflective learning contributes to organisational learning and how the
lessons learned can be transferred to staff and operatives (Dreyfus H.L et al 1986).
An experiential perspective on reflection
(Svensson, 1997, p. 165) more or less states the obvious that we all learn from life by
living life insofar as we learn from our experiences and that learning applies in all things
(Marton, 1981, p. 182). Although other researchers have shown that whilst we can see
what we know we do not necessarily understand the limitations to our knowledge
(Dunning, D., Johnson, K., Ehrlinger, J., & Kruger, J., 2003, p. 83). Some have
theorised that our intellect is shaped experientially (Kolb, 1984, p. 12). Others have
explained that reflection is really a collection of events and incidents which characterise
within us a common sense attitude to all things (Moon, 2004, p. 82). Whereas others
have placed a more contemplative character on the assessment of what we believe
(Dewey, 1933, p. 6) with that being based on a variety of experiential learning at the
levels of our interactions with events and our feelings about them (Knight, 2002, p. 17)
(Dreyfus H.L et al 1986). So it is suggested that we judge situations on the basis of our
experiences and some often subtle nuances and sensory experiences and we evaluate
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such situations on the basis of information we receive which creates our perception of
reflective learning (Lyons, 1998, p. 125), (Shepherd, 2006) and (Reynolds, 1998).
Some people have taken a view of reflection from an ephemeral perspective looking at
learning from current events almost as though one is saving positive or negative
experiences as do’s and don’ts for the future and this it is claimed can convert into
‘intelligent action’ being a worthwhile practice (Dewey, 1933, p. 17) (Bruce L Berg,
1989) (Whitehead, 2000) (McIntosh, 2010) (Fox, M., Green, G., & Martin, P. J., 2007).
Others have translated it into an instinctive reaction to circumstances (De Board, R., &
Grahame, K., 1998, p. 101), (van Manen, 2007, p. 18) whereas others have taken a
wider view (Mezirow, 1981, pp. 12-13) suggesting that reflection is an understanding of
how our experiences are perceived by others. It has also been suggested that reflective
learning is a process of structured thought reflected from a written record of events
(Cooper, 1998, p. 48). Kolb drawing on the work of (Lewin 1951) was an early pioneer
in this area and developed a model of experiential learning which Kolb posits would
develop into a new understanding of how to react differently a second time (Kolb, 1984,
pp. 21-22) and this was further elaborated by Schon, (1983) who produced a model of
event and response which relates to reflection leading to activity (Gibbons, Limoges,
Nowotny, Schwatzman, Scott, Trow, 1994) (Shepherd, 2006).
Taylor 2006) and Gibbs (1998) started the debate in this area with their work but the
discussion has progressed to include Gibbs’ model of cyclic reflection (Gibbs, 1998)
which is similar to (Burton, 2000) and Kolb’s model as follows: -
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Figure 3.1 Kolb’s model of experiential learning Adapted from (Kolb, 1984, p. 21)
(Derived from Wingrave 2011)
It is suggested that acquiring new information builds on the knowledge base we acquire
by reflection (Kalantzis, M., & Cope, B., 2004). This concept is described in the
business world as Organisational Learning (Wang & Ahmed, 2003) and both protective
and prospective models of business can be derived from building an experiential
business base and Kolb (1984) also comments on industrialism and entrepreneurialism.
In building our knowledge base by continually adding to our historic knowledge and
experiences by reflection we are continually improving in all walks of our lives and it is
said that we inevitably make the connection between our work activities and the
knowledge we use in doing our work and our experiences are key to this process (Boyd,
E. M., & Fales, A. W., 1983, p. 99), (Huber, 1991, p. 89) (Whitehead 2000) (Gibbons,
M., Limoges, C., Nowotny, H., Schwartzman, S., Scott, P., & Trow, M., 1994, p. 19).
Encountering major events is said to cause us to reflect on what is going on (Sullivan,
2000, p. 167). It is clear from this that building our knowledge base by adding our
experiences to our body of knowledge which we refer to by reflection is inevitably the
process of learning (Cope, J., & Watts, G., 2000, p. 106) which information we can use
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at the time of encountering an event or we can store up this knowledge as an
opportunity or a risk, for example, we learn not to run with scissors, which is elaborated
in consequence reflection by (Gustafsson, C. & Fagerberg, I. 2004). We could also
describe such acts of acting wisely as mature acts derived from the risks indicated by
experience recollected by reflection (Romano, M., & Gibson, P., 2006)
Almost inconceivably some have claimed that the process of reflection being a cerebral
process was confined to the intelligentsia, a social class of people involved in complex
mental labour (Schon, 1983, p. 5); whereas, we know that the process of learning by a
process of reflection is ubiquitous in all of life and to all people (Lyons, 1998, p. 125).
Nowadays, of course, we recognise that the process of reflection and reflective learning
are an unconscious part of all our lives and are common to people from all disciplines
and (Clegg, S., Tan, J., & Saeidi, S., 2002, p. 131), (Torsvik, M., & Hedlund, M., 2008,
pp. 389-396), social work (Eraut, 1994, p. 3) and education (Vazir, 2006, pp. 445-454)
and included blue collar workers and nurses. In the perspective of this research the
process of reflection has a special resonance because of the inevitable interaction with a
wide variety of situations and the infinite variety in people. Furthermore, the
increasingly complex situations an officer or operative in security could find him/herself
in requires a clarity of thought and experience to apply past knowledge to a situation
and this inevitably involves a process of reflection delving back into our experiences
and knowledge base (Lyons, 1998) (Reynolds, 1998) (Fox, M., Green, G., & Martin, P.
J., 2007) to arrive at a recollected mature solution (Romano, M., & Gibson, P., 2006).
The professional application of knowledge and experiences
Specialisation is key to the professions today and we encounter specialists in all
professions and trades (Evetts, J. 1999). Michael Porter (1998) took the concept of
specialisation into the world of business strategy in time of change and said that ‘in time
of volatility and change success is highly correlated with focus’ in other words when
things are uncertain all around us then stick to what we know best; in other words we
should lean on our past experiences and knowledge base and inevitably so by reflection.
In the last of course trade skills were acquired by practice and people were taught with
in specialist arrangements such as assistant roles and apprenticeships (Eraut, 1994, p.
38), (Leinhardt, G., Young, K. M., & Merriman, J., 1995, p. 401). This process of
103
specialisation has led to some criticising the process as creating narrowly skilled people
as this may be a disadvantage in a social environment (Leinhardt, G., Young, K. M., &
Merriman, J., 1995, p. 402). However, it is thought that the majority of people would be
happier to have their cardiac by-pass operation performed by a surgeon who is highly
specialised and does almost nothing else and is, therefore, highly experienced (Evetts, J.
1999). So much of the early criticism of the narrowness of the specialisation of
knowledge has been overcome by the spread of research and training such that our
universities teach ever narrower subject specialisations in all areas and being a specialist
is currently viewed above being a generalist (Evetts, J. 1999). This was punctuated by
the advance in scientific research which involves narrow specialisations (Yam, 2005, p.
568) and this has proliferated in recent years (Simpson, 2000, p. 169) and become the
norm (Fryer, 2004, p. 175). This kind of learning and specialisation has come to all
walks of life and professions including the security industry (Evetts, J. 1999), and this
thesis itself illustrates how a highly skilled and long experienced security professional
can focus on a narrow area and conduct research which is intended to explain a valuable
concept. This relates to the work or Burton (2000) (Whitehead 2000) in which it is
explained that understanding the issues in reflection is key to using reflection most
effectively (Hazel Platzer et al, 1997) (Schon, 1983) whilst also bearing in mind the
concept of consequence reflection as discussed by (Gustafsson, C. & Fagerberg, I.
2004).
Gergen, (1982, p.74) posits that human behaviour is difficult to explain empirically
whereas it has also been said that explaining practice makes knowledge more relevant
(Eraut, 1994, p. 47) which led to the logical assumption that knowledge must come from
experience (Mitchell, 2007); although others have thought that it is the practical
application of knowledge to situations which develops into professional and reflective
practice (McIntosh, 2010) (Abbott, 1981, p. 826). Naturally, of course, this assumption
does not fit comfortably with all professions and mostly applies where specific
knowledge is used prescriptively in a professional capacity such as, for example, in the
legal profession or medicine and also as assumed herein in the security profession
(Evetts, J. 1999). But this throws up issues with the context in which knowledge is
drawn from past experiences by reflection and then applied to current situations
(Dickson, 2007, p. 13), (Eraut, 1994, p. 33) and this might best be understood from a
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perspective of knowledge which has an indefinite relationship with the issue at hand and
therefore is more difficult to express (Eraut, 1994, p. 42), which also implies that there
are consequence issues as discussed by Gustafsson, C. & Fagerberg, I. (2004). Further
and somewhat related is the work of (Ruth L Ault et al, 1976) which focuses on
reflection impulsivity dealing with the triggers which lead to reflecting on issues at
hand.
Culture in the security industry has been largely driven by social change and by the
conscientious work ethic which has developed in policing and security in general, and it
is now widely recognised that security has a very important place in society although
some clearly disagree (Schon, 1983, p. 4). This creates a dichotomy in that one the one
hand the population can see the dangers posed by extremism and increasing crime, and
on the other hand they occasionally see the excesses and hubris of corruption, racism
and subversion in the security services (Reiner, 2000, p. 81). Some researchers take a
philosophical view in that whilst the security services put forward an image of probity
and credibility (Atherton, 1999, p. 86) they are after all formed of people and are as
varied and flawed as the rest of the population (Parker, K., Moyo, E., Boyd, L., Hewitt,
S., Weltz, S., & Reynolds, S., 2006, p. 93), and this makes the justification of high
standards appear to be more aspirational than actual. However, whilst the subject
receives much attention in the media there doesn’t appear to have been much
illuminating research published to advance the thinking beyond being aspirational and
governments have often fallen back on legislation to set standards and plurality as with
the Police Reform Act (2002).
Reflective learning in the security industry
As mentioned by Wingrave (2011) a search through the an international police journal
revealed that only 0.003% of articles made any reference of reflection or reflective
learning and this search included a wide ranging variation on the theme. Other searches
have shown that research in other disciplines, for example, education, health care and
social care; have embraced reflection and reflective learning more than has the security
industry. Some work has been done showing that there is a perception that reflection
relates to practical and physical experiences such as with equipment or procedures and
not so much in the area of relationships with others with some being situational and
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circumstantial (Lundin, J., & Nulden, U., 2007, p. 237). Although some authors have
discussed, correctly in my view, how reflective learning could valuably become part of,
for example, police training but they found no literature evaluating this (Haberfeld,
2002) and (Leishman, F., Loveday, B., & Savage, S. P., 1996a). Whereas, Copley,
(2011) posits that models of reflective learning could be applied to situations involving
the police but is light on explaining how police apply reflection in practical terms and
analyse them (Reynolds, 1998). On balance as explained by Wingrave (2011) there
appears to be little understanding of reflection or reflective learning in the police and
security industry and certainly less than there appears to be from the literature in the
health and social service environments, although he does suggest that there should be
work done to evaluate the benefits in the security and police environments.
The experience of reflection in other sectors
It has been shown that there are significant benefits derived from reflection and
reflective learning in the health care and education sectors especially as related to
applying past knowledge to solving problems and defining solutions (Roffey-Barentsen,
J., & Malthouse, R., 2009, pp. 16-19) (Hazel Platzer et al, 1997) and has been shown to
be beneficial in other areas (Hoyrup, 2004, p. 443), (Jarvinen, A., & Poikela, E., 2001,
p. 282) and especially in organisational learning Linda Longfellow- Blodgett (1991)
McGloughlin (1976). Reflective learning has also been shown to have applications in
the development of culture and professional practice in various professions which has
also been described as emotionally complex (Kolb, 1984, p. 185) (Shepherd, 2006)
whilst considering the impact of reflection on actions (Husu, J. Toom, A. Patrikainen, S.
2008) (Bruce L Berg, 1989).
A suggestion has also been made that professional knowledge may not be enough and
could be enriched by intuition and reflection (Gustafsson, C., & Fagerberg, I., 2004, p.
272). It is also said that skills alone are insufficient because the practicalities are not
easily taught which argument espouses the value of experience in service (Abbott, 1981,
p. 826) and other research has also found that professional knowledge which is gained
in the work environment is to be most valued (Eraut, 1994, p. 47) (Whitehead 2000).
Similarly, studies have been done on the relationship factors in reflection (Newton,
2004, p. 160) on issues which lead to a need to reflect or which would benefit from
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reflecting on past experiences and these can be both in the social environment and in the
professional domain (Hazel Platzer et al, 1997).
Studies into reflection and reflective learning have also shown in various sectors that
reflection based upon experience improved the judgement of critical decision making
and the results (Frank, C., Asp, M., & Dahlberg, K., 2009, p. 2561) (Pereira, 1999), and
also improved the performance and job satisfaction of the professionals involved
(Baker, 1997, p. 46) (Shepherd, 2006) with additional benefits to the public (Dahl, A.,
Nyberg, H., & Edell-Gustafsson, U., 2003, p. 297). Other researchers have shown that
decision making based upon reflection acted as a training tool (Gustafsson, C., Asp, M.,
& Fagerberg, I., 2009, p. 1460) enabling working in difficult and stressful situations
with reflection having influence on actions (Husu, J. Toom, A. Patrikainen, S. 2008)
(Bruce L Berg, 1989) (Cushway, D., & Gatherer, A., 2003).
Reflective learning can also simplify the process of learning in the academic
environment especially when a teacher is adapting his/her teaching to the different
levels of ability of a varied group of students and it has been said that all teaching must
by implication take some form of reflection (Korthagen, F., Loughran, J., & Russell, T.,
2006, p. 1022), (Lynch, M., 2000, p. 26) and it has been said that reflection is an
‘academic virtue’ and can also be part of the training of teachers themselves (Hatton, N.,
& Smith, D., 1995, p. 33) (Yaffe, 2010, p. 381) (Lyons, 1998) (Whitehead 2000) and
can engender a culture of success and achievement (Lee, S., Shaw, D. J., Chesterfield,
G., & Woodward, C. 2009)
.
The teaching profession is reported to have embraced reflective learning very
effectively providing guidance and advice to practitioners in the value of reflecting upon
their experiences i.e. do what you have seen in the past works best (Fendler, 2003, p.
18) and this has developed to suggest that there are benefits to be had from collaborating
with others and pupils in reflecting upon experiences to improve performance (Baird, J.
R., Fensham, P. J., Gunstone, R. F., & White, R. T., 1991, p. 170) and this has often
become a part of the basic training of educationalists (Loughran, 2002, p. 33), (Valli,
1997, p. 85). This indicates that the practical application of reflection and reflective
learning has become an internal development process improving the process by its
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application and especially where there are shared responsibilities (Holgersson, S.
Gottschalk, P. 2008)
So it is clear that whilst published research often espouses the virtues and benefits of
reflection and reflective learning it is clear that some professions have embraced the
process more than others, for example, heath care and education more so than the wider
security industry including the police. Therefore, it follows that the process of reflection
by the sample subjects from whom the majority of input data and information to this
research project may not be as familiar with the process as they should be and the next
section addresses the benefits that could be derived by incorporating reflection and
reflective learning into the training and development of staff and operatives in the wider
security industry. This is particularly in the case of this research project owing to the
heavy dependence on the credibility of the input information and data derived from the
subject by such means (Cushway, D., & Gatherer, A., 2003).
Reflection in the development and training of security staff and operatives
It has been reported by Wingrave (2011) that there have been changes in the
Metropolitan Police training regime since 1985 and that some measure of training in
reflection and reflective learning has been incorporated. This is common in other places
internationally where security and policing practice has developed significantly in recent
years as in the USA and Australia where the value of reflection has also been
appreciated (Wingrave, 2011) and not least also in the author’s home territory in the
UAE.
The aim of many of these initiatives in embracing reflection and reflective learning into
training of staff and operatives in security has been to achieve accepted standards of
performance. The Metropolitan Police, for example, has adopted 22 National
Occupational Standards developed by Skills for Justice upon which to base training
such that a culture of drawing upon professional knowledge and skills can become
commonplace although the standards themselves only appear to pay lip service to
reflection and reflective learning as they do not feature in the formal course itself.
Reflection has also been shown to contribute significantly to professional development
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(Christopher Day, 1993) by enabling improvement and performance by providing a
knowledge base for decision making (Pereira, 1999) (Shepherd, 2006) whilst bearing in
mind that actions based on reflection can also have consequences (Gustafsson, C. &
Fagerberg, I. 2004) (Bruce L Berg, 1989), all of which it has been said would benefit
from systemic learning (Dreyfus H.L et al 1986).
Security officer and operative training
The majority of jurisdictions around the world classify security staff and operatives as
being in a distinct profession whether, for example, they may be police officers or
immigration or border officials etc. The fact that these operatives must work to a legal
framework and observe some discipline and authority within their own organisation
requires that they be formally trained to do their job (de Waard, J. 1999); although it is
clear from the results in this research project that some countries are more rigorous in
this process than others. In the United Kingdom references to reflection and reflective
learning appear in the official training manual (Wingrave, 2011) for police officers and
other officials and this shows some recognition of the process. Kolb’s model of
experiential learning illustrates the logical process which leads to an understanding of
the place of reflection and reflective learning in the training and development of a
security officer or operative especially, for example, a police officer.
Figure 3.2 Model of professional reflective practice (MPS, 2007, p. 7)
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In addition to which a series of definitions is often related explaining the basic sources
of such reflection: -
Figure 3.3 Experience / Reflection Progression (developed from Bray, J.N. et al, 2000)
1) Experience – past events and outcomes from which one can draw knowledge
2) Reflection – considering the event and the outcome from the basis of cause and effect
to understand how such knowledge could be applied to other situations
3) Practice – considering the experience as it is applied and evaluating the likely
outcome.
4) Action – this final component enables the officer / operative to review and evaluate
the wisdom of the action and reflect upon it (Bruce L Berg, 1989).
In formal training structures in which trainees are encouraged to reflect such as in the
Metropolitan Police as reported by Wingrave (2011), the subject is required to self
reflect along the lines of a SWOT analysis (Strength, Weakness, Opportunity and
Threat) (Ansoff, H.I. 1987) to understand the perspective of the knowledge he/she has
acquired by the process. It is also clear that a search for information and training
opportunities on reflection has been fruitless as none have been found with little more
Experience Reflection Practice Action
110
than an outline overview being available even in the best of the training literature. The
only notable exception is a UK police recommendation on self reflection when
reviewing case evidence and reports of an intelligence nature. An interesting process
suggested by (Clements, P. E., & Jones, J., 2008, p. 123) is the role play of situations
illustrating to students the variability on responses open to them and the value of
reflecting on similar past experiences (Schon, 1983) and thereby reflection can have a
maturation effect on decision making (Romano, M., & Gibson, P., 2006) and produce
self improvement as discussed by (Whitehead 2000).
The United Arab Emirates Police and Security Services have also recognised that the
situations encountered and the available responses open to officers are not only ones of
discussion and response but also often physical engagements (Reynolds, 1998) and
question whether an officer has correctly physically controlled a situation and acted
correctly in terms of the law. The point being as explained by Wingrave (2011) is that
all of these options and variables in which an officer can find him/herself could all
benefit from past experience and, therefore, also some self reflection which can lead to
success and achievement being in itself a motivational tool derived from reflection (Lee,
S., Shaw, D. J., Chesterfield, G., & Woodward, C. 2009) (Whitehead 2000).
Self-reflection
A high priority has been seen to be placed at the recruit training level by the United
Arab Emirates Police and the UAE Security Services on the value and process of self
reflection (Simon Bell, 1998). Self reflection can be read in 2 ways; firstly in the
process of reflecting upon one’s past experiences and, for example, how things have
developed in a particular situation indicating the way things might go in a current one;
and secondly in self reflecting upon one’s previous actions and why and how did the
officer act and what was the outcome (Bruce L Berg, 1989), thereby reflecting on
reflection as also discussed by (Cushway, D., & Gatherer, A., 2003). This kind of
review of one’s experiences or knowledge can be invaluable in decision making and can
alleviate pressure and risk during the normal function of an officer’s work. An example
of some of the benefits of reflecting upon a given situation is for example in taking time
to listen when reflecting upon a previous similar situation where the officer might have
misread a situation by not having sufficient information (Whitehead 2000) (Schon,
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1983) (Simon Bell, 1998) (Reynolds, 1998) (Pereira, 1999).
Training plans have been developed to encourage trainees to reflect and tests have been
devised to examine their ability to analyse situations and respond in the most
appropriate fashion depending upon information they have been given upon which to
reflect (Whitehead, 2000). In reality this seems little different to standard education
curriculum culminating in an examination insofar as students are taught and the tested
on what they had learnt. However there does appear to be a difference in the respect that
the student will almost certainly be confronted with the same or similar circumstances in
real life and will have learnt both the lesson in terms of e.g. the appropriate application
of the law but further and more relevantly in this research the value of reflection on past
experiences i.e. systemic learning (Dreyfus H.L et al 1986). Herein lays the great value
of reflection and the reason for this review of the literature insofar as it can be seen that
reflection allows a person to derive indications from past experiences and to apply them
and this is what this research seeks from the sample of respondents to their experiences
both of and by reflection to the questionnaire and the interview subjects as also
discussed by (Fox, M., Green, G., & Martin, P. J., 2007).
So in a variety of ways training is provided to impress upon trainees the importance to
contemplate one’s actions based upon reflection of one’s past experiences and the
importance of reflective learning as a basis for decision making bearing in mind the
impact of reflection on actions (Husu, J. Toom, A. Patrikainen, S. 2008) and
vulnerability (Simon Bell, 1998) also as discussed by (Bruce L Berg, 1989) on action
research which can result in self-improvement (Whitehead 2000). A particular emphasis
is often also placed upon the importance of critical thinking on the engagement with
others in the process of implementing security or policing a situation and the
organisation of one’s thoughts and in self organisation for recalling them (Hazel Platzer
et al, 1997) (Shepherd, 2006). In which respect Wingrave (2011) suggests that the
Johari window (Figure 3.4), Herzberg’s steps (Error! Reference source not found.3.5)
and Batari’s box (Error! Reference source not found.3.6) all offer a basis for
organising one’s thoughts and understanding the relationship within the process. All 3
of these organisational models are often used in training to create familiarity with how
one can influence one’s own interactions with others in the normal course of work.
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These 3 models are all intended to engender an analytical thought process about how we
perceive one another and how we view our place in a particular situation.
Figure 3.4 Johari Window - Adapted from (Wingrave (2011)
This model example is proposed as a tool to understand the pace of ourselves as related
to others based upon our human awareness and relationship with others as posited by
(Roffey-Barentsen, J., & Malthouse, R., 2009, p. 50). It is proposed that this 4 square
model indicates what we know about others and what they know about us. It has also
been suggested that the model can be made dynamic (Choo, 2002, p. 260) such that the
boxes can be adjusted in size to indicate the relative weighting of the influence each has
upon the others and generally indicating that the larger a box is the more receptive one
is to others. Conversely, it can be read elsewhere in the model with a similar element of
weighting what one is wishing to hide or withhold (Luft, 1969, p. 13). Although it is
suggested that there are weaknesses in the model in that erroneous or exaggerated
information can be entered leading to misleading indications (Johnson, 1997, p. 81).
However, whilst Johari’s window explains how we rationalise our interactions with
others it does not explain how we develop and improve as a result of such
understanding, but Herzberg’s steps does provide a model for understanding such as
progression of improvement as follows: -
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Figure 3.5 Hertzberg’s Steps - Adapted from (Wingrave (2011)
Hertzberg’s Steps posits that competence is developed through 4 stages; with the lowest
being a total lack of knowledge and the highest being fully knowledgeable. It suggests
that where a person knows they not sufficiently competent to perform a task or job
function; and this progresses in the level of competence to a point of being able to act
subconsciously without need to contemplate an action, which is described in the model
as unconsciously competent (Burton, 2000, p. 327) (Bruce L Berg, 1989).
It is proposed that there is an accepted link between Hertzberg’s Steps and the
development of knowledge required in policing (Zhao, J., Thurman, Q., & He, N., 1999,
p. 165) and the concept of how people know they are competent is proposed by Benner,
(2004, p.198), and Burton, (2000, p.327) who suggest that we should know our level of
competence within the process of interaction. The dominant suggestion in this model is
that by performing a function it can become second nature to us and this in itself
illustrates how reflective learning i.e. the knowledge that we store up and call up when
needed can by familiarity become an automatic response (Schon, 1983).
So Johari’s window and Hertzberg’s Steps explain how we see others and how they see
us and how we improve over time to competence, but the question remains as to how
our actions can influence the reactions of others (Bruce L Berg, 1989) and an insight
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into this can be gleaned from Batari’s Box as follows: -
Batari’s box
Figure 3.6 Batari’s Box - Adapted from (Johns, A., Clarke, S., & Stark, M. M., 1997, p.
142) and (Wingrave (2011)
The Batari’s Box model illustrates the impact that the behavioural relationship between
people a have on one another (Johns, A., Clarke, S., & Stark, M. M., 1997, p. 141). Of
course the indications can be used to explain relationships in many fields of human
interaction but Batari’s Box is known to be used in the policing and security industry as
a tool to explain how an attitude taken by an officer or operative in security can escalate
owing to the response that is bound to be created. The lesson taught by using this model
can be coupled along with reflection to indicate how to best manage one’s own attitude
and behaviour to avoid a counter response and the resulting experience can be self
improving (Whitehead 2000).
All three models are frequently used in health care and education training and less so in
a formal training environment in policing and the security sector although it is clear that
the benefits are many (Amery, J., & Lapwood, S., 2004, p. 731), (Ancel, 2006, p. 252),
(Roffey-Barentsen, J., & Malthouse, R., 2009, pp. 48-51). In relation to these three
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models it is reported that the Metropolitan Police Service Foundation Training
Programme, for example, makes reference to reflection along with other models from
which to learn from experience, and these three models are cited as tools which explain
the effect of our attitude and behaviour on what we can gather from reflection and past
experience as having occurred (Wingrave (2011).
How we conceive reflection
Understanding how people at large and also within the security community conceive
reflection is key to this research project because so  much of the input data and
information is derived from staff, practitioners and operatives and much of their
contribution is derived from reflection of their experiences. So how they conceive
reflection and what are the triggers to delving back into their stored knowledge base is
key to understanding the provenance of the data and information upon which this work
is based. So what is reflection?
Studies have shown that many people have difficulty in defining reflection and it has
been described as a concept difficult to grasp (Morrison, 1996, p. 317). The most
common perception of reflection according to Wingrave (2011) is that it is a process of
evaluation, which in many respects must be partly right but reflection is more than just
balancing factors to evaluate them one against another. Neither is it just a process of
analysis or a search for certain factors, for example, weakness nor solely a means of
measuring performance all of which are common misconceptions outlined in the
literature. Reflection was developed as a means by which to draw upon experiential
knowledge and apply the known proven impacts and outcomes to current situations
((Lyons, 1998). In the education sector reflection is viewed from the perspective of self
evaluation as a problem solving process as related to the teacher teaching and the
student learning (Leitch, 2000, p. 182). However this view can lead to a focus on
performance as in the example of the nursing world, where reflection is more prevalent
in training, that it can lead to a focus on the quality of care rather than the methods by
which such was achieved (Gustafsson, C., & Fagerberg, I., 2004, p. 278) and
vulnerability (Simon Bell, 1998).
So the concept of hindsight in deciding on the wisdom of our actions is a sound practice
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(Bruce L Berg, 1989) and in fact it is no more than what we all do in all things from the
cradle to the grave. But there is a qualitative question hanging in all such discussions
based upon our recollection in that memory varies between people, and at different ages
and on different subjects because we all know there are important things we cannot
quite remember well enough when we need to, and (Mackintosh, 1998, p. 556) posits
that we can introduce bias into our thought processes owing to such inability to
remember everything well enough. This is a particularly important consideration in the
context of this research project in that it is heavily dependent on the quality of data and
information gathered from the subjects responding to the questionnaire which is in turn
reliant on their ability to reflect (Jones, 1995, p. 783) (Whitehead 2000).
It logically follows, therefore, that if reflection is a process of recollection and hindsight
then it can also be a process of learning by applying knowledge from our past
experiences and learning from our mistakes which can also contribute to this research in
highlighting pitfalls and errors (Gustafsson, C., Asp, M., & Fagerberg, I., 2009, p.
1464), (Watkins, K. E., & Marsick, V. J., 1992, p. 287) and this can also be self
improving as discussed by (Whitehead 2000). Furthermore, such learning from our
mistakes can also be viewed as a developmental process of improvement in highlighting
alternative solutions to situations (Mamede, S., & Schmidt, H. G., 2004, p. 1302)
(Russell, 2005) (Reynolds, 1998). Such an improvement process can also come from
being able to reflect upon a situation in the round with all the causes and effects such
that alternative solutions can become clear (Jay, J. K., & Johnson, K. L., 2002, p. 77),
which provides an alternative perspective to reflective learning (Russell, 2005).
In Conclusion upon reflection
Several authors have posited that if reflection is a process of hindsight and recollection
of our experiences and past events and outcomes then we are largely looking at
ourselves and this enables an understanding of how we learn (Trigwell, K., & Prosser,
M., 1997, p. 242) which may also be different from one person to another (Clarke, B.,
James, C., & Kelly, J., 1996, p. 177). It is, therefore, appropriate for me to reflect upon
my experiences and my life in the security industry and so by example illustrate the
value of reflection and the benefits that can come from looking at ourselves in a
reflective way (Fox, M., Green, G., & Martin, P. J., 2007) and doing so can lead to
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success and achievement (Lee, S., Shaw, D. J., Chesterfield, G., & Woodward, C.
2009).
Does change lead to learning or does learning lead to change?   This is an academic
question which will be illustrated in ‘my story’ told from a personal viewpoint and then
explored from a more theoretical and reflexive point of view (Mats Alveson & Kaj
Skoldberg, 2000) (Hilsdon, 2005).  There is no doubt that my life experience has been
full of both: personal learning and change, for myself and for the environment, culture,
organization and country that I have learned within. In fact, it can be said that my
learning has occurred in the context of one of the fastest changing environments that can
be found. My country, the UAE, was founded in my lifetime, the government and state
has been created in my lifetime; and I learned, was educated and changed, and
participated in the creation of the UAE.  My story cannot be separated from the context
in which it took place.   I will first tell it and then attempt to examine it reflectively.
My education began before the UAE was a country and before there was any formal
educational system. It was an informal education in the true sense of the word, but it
was an education nevertheless.  The school that I attended in the small town of Al Ain
was run by my father, who was a self-educated man, a doctor and a traveller. He
gathered around 30 boys from the town and we met every day, morning and afternoon,
and were taught reading, writing and sports.  He was the only teacher.  This school
continued until the UAE was founded and with the creation of the country, an
educational system was started and more traditional, formal schooling began.   I
attended the new school, which was more structured, provided study materials, had
exams and offered a variety of subjects.
During this time in a formal school and in the early days of the country, one day an
officer from the Abu Dhabi Police Force came and spoke to a group of boys playing
soccer and talked about the police force and becoming a police officer. At that point, I
made the decision to become a police officer. The reasons that this appealed to me were
that the police force was a very large organization run along military lines, I would be
able to develop myself and have a career, and it was secure. So after this visit by the
police officer, I went to see the Chief General of the organization, who had been a
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student in my father’s school, and asked to sign on.
My request was accepted and I was told that I would eventually become an officer and
receive officer training in Cairo, Egypt. However, before training as an officer, it was
necessary to gain real-world experience as a constable on the street, so I attended the
Police College for six months. After training at the Police College, all the cadets were
‘tracked’ into various specializations such as criminology, traffic, intelligence or
telecommunications.  Since I had an interest in technology from childhood, I selected
this area and as I reflect on this period of my career I am conscious that reflection itself
has an interesting relationship to shared responsibilities as with colleagues and others as
discussed by (Holgersson, S. Gottschalk, P. 2008)
Because the country was still in the early stages of ‘building’ itself, many experts in
various fields were invited to the country to share their expertise and train nationals or
Emiratis. I was fortunate to be paired with a man named Harry Darling from the British
Army who was, along with my father, a very important part of my education. He taught
me all about telecommunications at that time: control rooms, telegraph, Morse code, etc.
In addition to this long-term training with Darling as a mentor and teacher, I attended
short training programs in telecommunications.  Eventually, I was sent to Jordan for
high-level training for technicians in telecommunications. While I was in Jordan,
fighting broke out between the Palestinians and Jordanians, forcing all Emirati officers
training there to return home. I returned to the UAE and continued my training under
Harry Darling. He eventually suggested that I go to Britain to study English, which I
did. After studying English, I worked for 6 months with a British telecommunications
organization to gain valuable practice in the field.  Through these channels of having a
knowledgeable mentor, formal training, and field practice, I gained my early education
in telecommunications.
During this time, Abu Dhabi Police was developing a strategy to develop a modern
telecommunications system.    However, the UAE military had the only existing telecom
infrastructure in the country.  In spite of this, His Highness Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al
Nahyan, the founder of the nation, had given the police force sole responsibility for
securing all his communications, but we lacked the infrastructure and technology
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(HF,UHF, and VHF, for example) to do this. I was appointed Director of Operations
and was challenged and motivated by the opportunity to serve my young country and
highly respected President.  This is probably the point at which my professional career
began in earnest.
We, in Abu Dhabi Police as a whole, and I as the individual directing this project
wanted to use the most up-to-date technology and to parallel international police force
development around the world. This meant becoming independent, not only as a nation,
but technologically, as well.  Harry Darling, who had provided the foundation of my
technical education, had by this time returned to Britain. I had learned from him and
other consultants, from formal training programs and from visits to the British police
force. When I was appointed Director of Telecommunications and Operations, which is
a part of it, I had the technical knowledge that I needed but there was still much that I
had to master. I visited Durham in the UK, where they were installing a new
telecommunication system.   It was at this time that computers were beginning to be
integrated into telecom systems.  Although I had strengths such as my technical
knowledge, there were areas of knowledge that I wished I had known more of,
specifically, command and control, technical troubleshooting, and technical
infrastructure. Still, I learned as I went along. There was no other option. In addition to
technical challenges, I was now a manager of more than 150 people. I had skills and
experience that helped me: the example set by Harry Darling, good people skills and a
clear vision of where the organization needed to go. Even so, there were many
management challenges: getting the budget needed to do the job, administration, follow-
up and staff development.   Staff development was a priority, and it was essential to
send those under me for training to build their skills.
Since our primary objective was to build a secure telecommunications system, we began
to investigate what this complex project would require. The challenges were how to
manage and operate a sophisticated telecom network and whether we had the existing
infrastructure and know-how to do it. I believe that I was instrumental in meeting this
challenge on a technical and organizational level. Basically, my vision was to integrate
and build upon the existing infrastructure and resources of various organizations such as
the Armed Forces, the national oil company, the national telephone company and the
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TV stations in order to achieve our goal. Naturally, this was not easy because of the
tendency of individuals and organizations to think in terms of their own self-interest.
This project, the establishment of a multi-agency telecommunications system, which
was approved and then implemented over a period of many years, was the major
contribution of my career.
It is here that I can begin to evaluate and reflect on what I brought to the project.
Clearly, my education has been primarily informal and non-formal. Non-formal
education as defined by (Coombs, P. H. and Ahmed, M. , 1974, p. 8) is ‘any organized,
systematic, educational activity carried on outside the framework of the formal system
to provide selected types of learning to particular subgroups in the population.’ The
group of boys at my father’s school was the subgroup and the school was not part of any
larger system. The same authors define ‘informal education as ‘ the lifelong process by
which every person acquires and accumulates knowledge, skills, attitudes and insights
from daily experiences and exposure to the environment.’ They add that this learning
accounts for the majority of someone’s education over a lifetime and tie the concept of
informal learning to that of experiential learning.  The smallest part of my education
when I entered a new school system as a young man is comprised of what is termed
formal education, or ‘the highly  institutionalized,  chronologically  graded  and
hierarchically  structured ‘education system’, spanning lower primary school and the
upper reaches of the university’ (Coombs, P. H. and Ahmed, M. , 1974, p. 8). It is
because I did not have the opportunity for a more formal education that I now am
pursuing a professional doctorate and as I reflect on this process I am conscious of the
vulnerabilities involved as (Simon Bell, 1998) has pointed out that there are
vulnerabilities of reflection in action.
As important as formal educational is, personal factors were important to envisioning
and then carrying out this enormous project in cooperation with a number of other large
governmental organization, and my formal and informal education had prepared me for
this challenge.  My personal opinion at the time was: why should we have multiple
telecom systems in the country when one system could serve many stakeholders. This is
both more efficient and cost effective. Therefore, one of my strengths or skills is that I
am practical-minded. Related to that, I often see what is called ‘the big picture’ even
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though my work and profession has a strong need for detail. I think that I am capable of
seeing the forest and the trees - the technical requirements of a project as well as the
larger issues.   Throughout my career, I have been able to learn as I went, and there was
much that I had to learn on the technical level and as the director of such a major
project.
I have always wanted to continue my education and engage in research close to my
specialist area but the pressure of work in building a national telecommunications
system did not allow me to do so.  I have a lifetime of experience and now want to focus
my learning efforts on higher things than experience and venture into theory by formal
research.
The words ‘professional’ and ‘professionalism’ are frequently heard in English appear
to have a number of different meanings that have changed over time according to
context. I want to examine these meanings first. One understood meaning of a
professional is someone who has an academic qualification or license from a university,
such as doctors, engineers, and lawyers (Evetts, J. 1999).   To many, a professional is a
person who needs a high level of formal education and/or training, while for others a
professional is someone with a high degree of expertise or competence in a specific
field. Sometimes it is useful to look at important words such as these in a simple way so
as to understand deeper concepts more clearly. If ‘professional’ refers exclusively to
those with academic qualifications, I would not be a member of the club. If, on the other
hand, it means competence and expertise in a specific field, then I would be able to join.
The literature also agrees that the terms professional and professionalism cannot be
easily defined. In ‘Legitimizing Professionalism,’ a paper presented to the British
Educational Research Association (Bacon, W., Groundwater-Smith, S., Nash, C. and
Sachs, J., 2000, p. 4), the presenters stated: ‘There can be no question that what
constitutes professionalism’, and the multiple meanings which attach to the word, ‘shift
and change over time.’ Thus, any discussion of the word ‘professional,’ which relates to
the discussion of professionalism, must acknowledge this variety of definitions. Despite
this variety of definitions, most people around the world speaking a variety of languages
recognize a professional when they see one at work, although the particular culture
might define the totality of that concept in a significantly different way.
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For the purposes of this discussion, I will define ‘professional’ and ‘professionalism’ as
competence and expertise in an activity or particular field combined with a certain ethic
involving values and standards recognized by relevant others in a work group and
evident within a specific context.  I will use my life story as a basis for examining the
elements within this definition, and the following concepts will be discussed in greater
depth: competence and expertise, how these two qualities can be learned, acquired or
cultivated, the values and standards involved in professionalism, the significance of the
work and/or peer group, and the major importance of the context in which
professionalism is cultivated or manifest.
Eraut, M. (1994 p.1) states that assessment of one’s competence is largely determined
by whether your performance meets the expectations of the important ‘others’ in your
work environment.   This assessment involves understanding the general context and
specific situation one is dealing with, understanding what needs to be done and being
able to carry out what you and/or the group that you are working with need to do.  In
terms of my career, the important impact and relevance of (Eraut, 1994) ‘situational
understanding’ cannot be underestimated. I was part of a group of capable men who
were highly motivated to excellence by the challenge of being part of the early days of
building their nation. The motivation to excellence and strong commitment to the task
were important shared values. I, as an individual and as part of this group, was propelled
to achieve a high degree of professionalism as I went along my career path, gaining the
technical competence needed along the way and manifesting the management skill
necessary to envision and manage the implementation of a large national project, the
multi-agency telecommunications system.
I gained a high level of competence in telecommunications and management through
both formal and informal education as discussed earlier. My commitment to mastering
the knowledge and skills needed for my work and to achieve a high level of excellence
was undoubtedly strengthened by the context or situational context as well as the shared
values of those that I worked with. I believe that I developed as a professional and
assimilated the value of ‘professionalism’ through a variety of alternate channels.
Formal training was essential; however, mentoring by others who were experts in the
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field and the presence of excellent role models among my peers and superiors were,
perhaps, more important to my development as a professional. In considering the
competence of the group that I was a part of, the literature defines competence and
expertise in ways that may be useful. (Fenton-O’Creevy, M., 2007, p. 2) states in
‘Building the Foundations of Professional Expertise:  Towards a Pedagogy of Practice’
that there are two lines of thinking on expertise. The first is that expertise (and
competence) is the ‘human capacity for adaptation.’ As Kolb, (1984, p.1) states in the
opening lines of Experiential Learning: Experience as the Source of Learning and
Development:
‘Human beings are unique among all living organisms in that their primary adaptive
specialization lies not in some particular physical form or skill or fit in an ecological
niche, but rather in identification with the process of adaptation itself - in the process of
learning.  We are thus a learning species, and our survival depends on our ability to
adapt not only on the reactive sense of fitting into the physical and social worlds, but in
the proactive sense of creating and shaping those worlds’. (Simons, M. 2006)
The second view of expertise is that expertise is ‘socially embedded’ and is an
‘emergent product of social systems’ (Fenton-O’Creevy, M., 2007, p. 2). Applying these
definitions of expertise to my development as a professional is useful since there was a
highly specific, unique social context.   The competence at both the technical, strategic,
and management levels was the ‘emergent product’ required by the national and social
environment.  The fact that adaptation was urgently required by the rapidly transforming
national situation meant that those involved had to learn, adapt and develop the
necessary expertise (in my case knowledge of advanced telecommunications systems)
with a great degree of urgency.  As stated by Bacon, Groundwater-Smith, Nash & Sachs
(2000,p.12), ‘Ultimately, professionals are accountable to their publics for their
performance in the execution of their duties’. We were accountable to the new Emirati
citizens, the ruling family, and the newly formed national government.  Lack of
professionalism, competence or expertise, as defined by the social and cultural context
at that time, was not an option.
The response to this demand for rapid learning and the development of professional
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competence and expertise could not wait for individuals to travel abroad to the
academies to complete their formal education in more traditional ways.   Instead, as
mentioned earlier, professional experts in a number of fields were brought into the
country and were the source of knowledge and skill transfer.  This is illustrated in my
long-term working relationship with Harry Darling, from whom I learned the technical
aspects of telecommunications as well as much about managing projects and people.
Our national leaders served as role models of dedication and hard work and approached
the numerous items on the national agenda with shrewd intuitive intelligence and vision.
If, as Murphy, (1999, p.17) says ‘Learning is the relationships between people,’ then
there was no shortage of people to learn from and no lack of people who exemplified
professionalism.
The concept of situated learning has been proposed by Murphy, (1999, p.1) who put
learning within social relationships, or situations of co-participation, rather than viewing
learning simply as the acquisition of knowledge. Murphy, (1999, p.14) asks in the
introduction of a book:
‘What kinds of social engagements provide the proper context for learning to take
place? It is not so much that learners acquire structures or models to understand the
world, but they participate in frameworks that have structure. Learning involves
participation in a community of practice. Thus, the development of professionalism and
becoming a professional with expertise and competence cannot be separated from the
context in which these learning processes occur, and one can assume, or even propose,
that this may well occur outside the academic environment’. Lave, J. & E. Wenger
(1998)
Returning to the idea that learning is the relationship between people, (in (Murphy,
1999, p. 17), he also contends that learning is measured as if it were something tangible
that could be found inside a person’s head.   However, if learning is in the relationships
between people, as he suggests, then ‘learning is in the conditions that bring people
together and organize a point of contact that allows for particular pieces of information
to take on a relevance’ (Lave, J. & E. Wenger 1998). If there is no point of contact or
context of relevance, then there is no learning. The ownership or possession of learning
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does not belong to individuals, but to the conversations in which they are participants
(Lave, J. & E. Wenger 1998).   I think that it is precisely these ‘conversations’ in the
emergent national situation in the UAE in which I participated that shaped me as a
professional and fostered my professionalism. Furthermore, if, as Tennant (1997 p.33)
proposes ‘there is an intimate connection between knowledge and activity,’ then it could
be added that knowledge, and subsequently development as a professional, is cultivated
through focused, purposeful activity such as is required in setting up a complex national
telecommunications system. Learning is, and was in my story, a part of daily living
where solving problems of both a technical and managerial nature were central activities
and this was a time of action and it was also a time of accelerated learning.
Kolb, (1984, p.88) states that one of the forces that shapes our learning style is our
career choice, which in turn exposes us to a specific learning environment.  My career
choice,  telecommunications,  and  my  subsequent  appointment  as  Director  of
Telecommunications for Abu Dhabi Police, required significant managerial skill. This
was the learning environment. I became part of a group of peers who shared a common
set of values and beliefs about how one should act as a professional and who shared a
‘professional mentality’ (Kolb, 1984, p. 88). We worked, first and foremost, for the
ruling family of the country and the country itself, as well as for our respective
organizations. This was my reference group. My career had two separate strands:
technical and managerial expertise. I needed both a solid technical foundation in
telecommunications in addition to executive management skills, which required ‘a
strong orientation to task accomplishment and decision making in uncertain emergent
circumstances’ (Pereira, 1999).
I agree with Kolb’s (1984 p.182) view that ‘the process of socialization into a profession
becomes an intense experience that in stills not only knowledge and skills but also a
fundamental reorientation of one’s identity.’ It is not only in the schools that such
professional norms are acquired. This professional mentality can also be absorbed
tacitly through the environment in which one works and in the community of practice
within which one operates (Lave, J. & E. Wenger 1998).
If we consider the concept of professionalism in a rapidly changing society, and there
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can be little doubt that the UAE was and still is such, as Whitehead noted (Kolb, 1984,
p. 182): ‘The fixed person for the fixed duties, who in older societies was such a
godsend, in the future will be a public danger’ Jarvinen, A., & Poikela, E., (2001).   The
national times then and now require extreme flexibility both in an individual’s role and
the skills needed to function competently in that role. In other words, ability to adapt
quickly to a fluid national context was essential, which as seen earlier, meant that rapid
learning was also required. Although my formal professional training was in
telecommunications, as mentioned, much was required of me in terms of executive
management skill, administration, and project management as I worked over a period of
years to implement the multi-user telecommunications system in the country, which
involved a number of stakeholders, each with their own interests. I think that tenacious
focus  on the  task,  which  required  years  to  implement  since  new infrastructure
needed to be put in place, together with the example of those working around me (my
context), helped foster a strong sense of professionalism.
There was little time for formal, structured reflection or reflexivity in my career;
however, both were surely required on an ongoing intuitive basis in order to function
effectively. In his discussion of the art of managing, Donald Schön (Schön, 1991, p.
241) points out that the ‘art’ involved in management is two-fold. The first is good
intuitive judgment and ‘knowing-in-practice’ and the second is reflection in action.
Numerous decisions and judgments of significance had to be made in my career, and
these could not have made without sound intuition and the ability to reflect on situations
and challenges. As stated by Kolb, (1984, p.30), knowledge, skills and attitudes are
obtained through four modes of learning experience:  concrete experience,   reflective
observation,   abstract   conceptualization,   and   active experimentation.   In my
development as a professional, there was, in fact, much observation and reflection on
my ongoing experiences and examining them from a variety of viewpoints, but this did
not take place in the context of an explicit, structured personal exercise, but rather as a
personal tendency to examine situations and contexts and consequently learn from them
(Hilsdon, 2005). Additionally, if, as Kolb states, that learning is a process filled with
tension and conflict, there is no doubt that I have learned.
The next step in my professional and personal development relates to why I completed
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my Master’s and am currently engaged in pursuing a professional doctorate -- the time
to step back and take a reflexive look at my career and the products of that career is
available to me in a way that was not possible in the earlier days of my work similar to a
discussion by (Mats Alveson & Kaj Skoldberg, 2000) and also (Hilsdon, 2005). With
the acquisition of strong research skills and a firm theoretical base gained through
academic study, I will be ready to move forward professionally.
Review of the literature on international security standardisation
Governments throughout the world are facing a wide variety of problems which pose
threats of instability, subversion, criminality and loss of control which are collectively
known as Security and include issues such as illegal immigration, terrorism, money
laundering, cross border criminality, cyber crime, people trafficking, piracy, drugs,
intellectual property theft, disease diagnosis and control etc (Williams, P. 1994). These
are global problems often having their roots in other nations and these multinational and
cross border characteristics mean that overcoming them will be heavily dependent on
collaboration between nations to effectively and efficiently exchange data and
information on the basis of an international cooperation to address common problems.
Although two things are clearly required for a successful strategy; firstly there needs to
be an international agreement to cooperate on security in implementation i.e. to work
cooperatively exchanging information and providing support to one another; and
secondly in working to similar standards and methods such that data and information
exchanged is comparable and equally reliable and understandable (Stein, A.A. 1982).
The literature on the internationalisation of security standardisation makes this point
very forcefully but recognises that there are enormous challenges to achieving a truly
international cooperation (Kokolakis et al 2002) (Aleksandar Klaic, 2005) (Seema
Degwekar et al, 2007). Some of the limitations and difficulties highlighted in the
literature detail many of the very difficult issues involved e.g. legislative change,
organisational and culture change, and not least the uptake of inter-organisational
processes and complex operating procedures (Pardo, T.A., Cresswell, A.M. ; Dawes,
S.S. ; Burke, G.B. (2004). However, not all security considerations are the product of
terrorist evil deeds or criminality, they are often issues which pose a threat to nations or
society such as health matters as in the case of the recent fear of a SARS and Influenza
pandemic, for example, which started in one country and were soon found in several
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others (Francois-Andre Allaert et al, 2002). Although, it is true that when we think of
security we tend to assume matters of terrorism, drugs and cross border crime and it is
true that we tend to think of such matters in terms of headlines and not always in terms
of the gravity of the situation. An example of this is that most people know of the
terrible loss of over 16 million lives in World War I but fewer people know of the
Spanish Flu world pandemic at the same time which is estimated to have killed between
50 and 100 million worldwide (Knobler 2005), (Oxford JS, Sefton A, Jackson R, Innes
W, Daniels RS, Johnson NP, 2002).
It is important to note in the context of how we deal with international security issues
that some are man-made such as criminal and terrorist activities whilst others are natural
disasters such as the SARS outbreak of 2003 or the Asian Tsunami of 2004. The
literature on the standardisation of security frequently makes the distinction between
security considerations is that the former involves reactive responses i.e. to crimes
which can result in arrests and recovery of property etc and the latter would benefit from
a proactive strategy; but it is clear that both would benefit from an international
cooperation which in the former example might deter the commitment of the crimes and
in the case of natural events would increase the efficiency of the responses (Harrald, J.
R. 2004). The literature illustrates that the existing international cooperation
infrastructure by which drug traffickers are caught and have their funds confiscated and
also how the international seismic warning systems alert people of the risks of
aftershocks and possible tsunamis (Levi, M. (1997). We have seen how such
international cooperation has both reduced crime by catching the criminals and making
their activities difficult and saved lives by warning people to get out of harm’s way
although much of the literature explains that the internationalisation which currently
exists is piecemeal and lacks cooperation to a full extent and also lacks geographic
coverage and international plurality (Turnbull-Henson, P. 1997).
There are other considerations highlighted by many researchers in the literature which
show how some security concerns e.g. cyber crime and identity theft (Andreas Mitrakas,
2006) can be involved in several areas of international criminality or terrorism (Forsberg
et al, 2013) (Kai Rannenberg, 1993). This dependence on an infrastructure to enable
criminals to commit crimes, avoid detection and launder the proceeds has created a kind
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of hierarchy both in criminality and in the process of detection (Wolfgang, W.E. (1963).
An example of this is that investigation into money laundering provides clues into many
different kinds of international crime given that the handling of the proceeds of crime is
common to all crimes of this nature, and given that there is an inevitable international
nature to this further illustrates the importance of international cooperation through a
common methodology embodied in the implementation of an international standard for
security and data (Wyn L Price, 1990). Money laundering and cyber activities often
being common to a variety of international crimes often provide opportunities for the
discovery and detection of international crimes given that most international crime have
either a financial component or a communications element or both and these provide
clues to investigators (Forsberg et al, 2013).
Modern international crime is by definition an activity of its time and as such it
embraces both to evade detection and also as the basis of crime (Wortley, R. & L.
Mazerolle 2008). But technology moves very fast and both the security industry and the
criminals have to stay ahead of developments; one by improving detection tools and the
other finding ways of evading them even to the extent of altering fingerprints (Soweon
Yoon et al, 2012). Modern cyber crime also enables criminals to take on an altogether
different persona in avoiding detection such that identity theft has become prevalent as
is the theft of information and data by way of hacking of emails and passwords and also
of communications by the hacking of telephone communications (Forsberg et al, 2013)
and nobody seems to be immune to this insofar as very senior politicians and even
members of the British royal family have been hacked in this way; and it must also be
said that the hackers are not always common criminal types because one of the largest
circulation newspapers in the UK, The News of the World, was found guilty of cyber
and phone hacking and eventually closed down (Keeble, R. L. & Mair, J. 2012). The
prevalence of this type of crime has led to the development of a new cellular technology
every decade (Forsberg et al, 2013) but even such fast development is soon caught up
with by criminals and we have seen the fourth generation of mobile communications
known as the Long Term Evolution (LTE) actually entitled SAE/LTE i.e. System
Architecture Evolution which includes elements of encryption and authentication to
ensure the system is properly functioning and avoid misuse. However, to achieve global
relevance the system requires worldwide interoperability which is easiest to achieve by
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means of international standardisation (Dan Forsberg et al, 2013), which further
illustrates the main thrust of this work.
It is observed in the literature that whilst the processes involved in cyber crime and
money laundering may be relatively highly technical activities, the areas to which such
activities relate may be much less sophisticated involving, for example, people
trafficking or drug smuggling (Seema Degwekar et al – 2007). All countries are
confronting security problems such as illegal immigration, terrorism, and disease
diagnosis and control. Many of them apply their own strategies but they inevitably rely
heavily on international cooperation and collaboration to effectively and efficiently
share data and knowledge and it is mentioned that an emergency often requires
organizational and inter-organizational and international processes and operations. An
example of operational procedures developed by the USDA's National Plant Diagnostics
Network (NPDN) has been used to show the knowledge definition facilities and the
distributed event-triggered knowledge sharing strategy (Seema Degwekar et al – 2007).
Although the value of knowledge sharing and cooperation is presented in a variety of
ways in the literature, for example, Francois-Andre Allaert et al (2002) focus on the
importance of security standards in the area of healthcare information. They illustrate
how common standards and methods not only improve the quality and delivery but also
the economy of healthcare and the ability to respond more rapidly in the event of an
unforeseen event with international implications and they support ISO standards. Of
course it is recognised that many sophisticated methods and systems exist in the
healthcare industry and that some cover the area of cooperation and exchange of ideas
and information (Raghupathi, W. 1997). However, there seems to remain a shortfall at
the level of cooperation in the area of healthcare security which became apparent at the
time of the recent SARS and influenza outbreaks. Whilst communications and systems
have since been improved under the auspices of the World Health Organisation (WHO)
some researchers continue to demonstrate the need for wide ranging standardisation in
healthcare security (Kokolakis et al, 2002) and this should go beyond policing from a
reactive perspective towards greater information exchange and cooperation in a
proactive manner to avoid disaster and thwart criminality before they occur.
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Some solutions it is proposed can be built into intelligent systems to discover and
highlight security breaches as in the case of information technology in multinational
security as proposed by (Kai Rannenberg, 1993) (Forsberg et al, 2013). Although it is
realised that given the varied legal situation in many countries Andreas Mitrakas, (2006)
observes that even in Europe there would need to be some change to nation laws which
might be most easily covered by an EU wide legal framework to codify the legal
position. This need for ever improving systems and new laws comes as a result of the
complexity of IT and cyber-crime technology which moves as fast as the technology
(Kai Rannenberg, 1993) (Wyn L. Price, 1990). Whilst (Francois-Andre Allaert et al
2002) (Andreas Mitrakas, 2006) and (Kokolakis et al, 2002) all agree that international
standardisation in security is essential; whilst others like (Kai Rannenberg, 1993)
observe that there already exists a large number of standards and that what is also
required is the development of evaluation criteria for multinational security a part of
which would be achieved by the set up of ENISA European Agency for Information
Security (Andreas Mitrakas, 2006).
A variety of standards has been proposed for international security cooperation e.g.
(Francois-Andre Allaert et al 2002) have proposed an ISO standard specifically for
security in healthcare whereas others like (Forsberg et al, 2013) have concentrated on
issues of cryptography and the privacy and security implications especially as related to
hacking and theft of data and identity. This latter effort has proposed security standards
higher in the hierarchy to frustrate access and thereby limit the ability of criminals and
others wishing to breach security. (Wyn L Price, 1990) showed at an early stage that the
planned ISO TC97 which became to be known as JTC1 ISO joined with IEC
International Electrotechnical Commission and the title of the work changed from
Information processing to information technology which nominally illustrates that the
focus changed from a view of the handling of data to the understanding and
management of the technology which drives the environment.
Information Security in Business and Government Sectors including in the interaction
and relationship between these sectors has increased in prominence in recent years as
increased regulation e.g. requiring the banks and other financial institutions to comply
with increasingly tougher standards of regulation (Seymour, B. 2007). The outcome has
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been twofold firstly in creating on the one hand a process of information security and
also a framework of mutual interaction and compliance as between the public and the
private sectors. The first of which is best shown as the process view of information
security at the national level as proposed by (Aleksandar Klaic 2005) which illustrates
the flow of the Information Security Lifecycle Process through the logical process of
Plan → Do → Check → Act through the critical elements of policy, evaluation,
investigation and resulting in action at the legislative level in policy or the law.
Aleksandar Klaic 2005
Figure 3.7 Process View of Information Security on National Level in Comparison with
PDCA Cycles
This example provides a perspective of information security in a technological field
indicating that economic performance alone is not enough for establishing a successful
process of building an information society. This requires a clear framework of mutual
interaction and compliance as between the public and private sectors so that there would
be policies, decrees, rules and procedures and legislation on the government side
whereas on the business side there would be compliance by way of company,
organisational and functional policies and procedures in compliance (Aleksandar Klaic
2005). A similar situation would be applied in relation to national security infrastructure
and regulation and management boards in the business sector and also in the case of
data owners and so on. Klaic’s PDCA cycle model illustrates how a vulnerability
assessment enables threat and impact analyses which in turn enable the proponent to
evaluate security and risk management processes. In the Check segment of the cycle a
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review of responses to incidents can indicate required policy and law, which in turn
indicates the related positions of the government and business sectors as indicated in the
following table from the same research: -
Aleksandar Klaic 2005
Table 3.8 Security Legislation / Regulation
Klaic illustrates how security regulation and legislation impacts on both the government
and business sectors insofar as some legislation applies to both, but the roles and
responsibilities are different when it comes to regulation in that government decrees and
business complies as, for example, in the promulgation of rules and procedures which
result in company organisation and policies. Similarly with ICT and security standards
the government has departmental bodies to police the processes and business has
departments and officers having functional and legal responsibilities for compliance.
As with the usual structure of society information technology and security sits as a
foundation upon which a modern information infrastructure is built. Klaic explains the
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contemporary information technology approach as well as the juxtapositions of the
government and business sectors the main thrust of which is the development of a
modern information society in which preventative and containment regulations are
connected and sympathetically developed.
Aleksandar Klaic 2005
Figure 3.9 Information Security Development
At the national level it can be seen in the above figure that development of an
information society and international standardisation in information security have
progressed in similar ways i.e. from government either to a multinational body like
NATO or within the business environment by way of common criteria and then in all
cases through various standards and methodologies to formulate foundations for
information society development and also towards international ICT security
standardisation (Aleksandar Klaic, 2005). The benefits of creating an international
standard for information security are clear and widely reported by researchers in the
field of security (Andreas Mitrakas, 2006) but the difficulties in achieving such
commonality among many nations have wide reaching implications. An example of
some of the difficulties can be seen in the research (Jaap-Henk Hoepman et al, 2006)
which has illustrated the benefits of international acceptance of a common format of e-
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passport from the perspective of crossing borders and also privacy issues. This research
has shown that whilst the benefits are clear the difficulties go beyond the simple
introduction of an electronic chip into the fabric of a common format of passport.
The issues raised by many researchers have related to the information made available on
the passport chip and there have been public objections in several countries about the
availability of private information to foreign countries which may not have been
available to the passport holders (Jaap-Henk Hoepman et al, 2006). In the UK this
resulted in the installation of chip reading machines in all main passport offices so that
any passport holders can swipe his or her passport and view all the data contained on the
chip, which is quite wide ranging and includes all the statutory information of age, place
of birth and validity dates etc but also other information which could be used to
positively identify the person carrying the passport as the true owner (C Evans-Pughe,
2005). Jaap-Henk Hoepman et al, (2006) also point out that the issue of the storage of
data on the passport is only the tip of the iceberg because many of the concerns went
beyond the inclusion of wide ranging information with additional concerns being as to
the use of such information once it had been made available to any foreign government
upon presentation of a passport; with the argument of it being a quid pro quo not being
sufficient. The researchers also showed that whilst the information contained on the
passport was encrypted onto the chip the methodology of doing so and the codes were
of necessity disseminated to all countries to which any passport holder might travel such
that the encoding is bound to fall into the wrong hands and thereby release private
information into the criminal community, which is precisely what the overall strategy of
ICT security standardisation is intended to avoid.
RFID passports (e-Passports) were first issued by Malaysia in 1998 (Lehtonen, M.,
Michahelles, F., Staake, F., & Fleisch, F. 2006). In addition to information also
contained on the visual data page of the passport, Malaysian e-passports record the
travel history (time, date, and place) of entries and exits from the country. Other
countries that insert RFID in passports include Norway (2005), Japan (March 1, 2006),
most EU countries (around 2006), Australia, Hong Kong, the United States (2007),
India (June 2008), Serbia (July 2008), Republic of Korea (August 2008), Taiwan
(December 2008), Albania (January 2009), The Philippines (August 2009), Republic of
Macedonia (2010), and Canada (2013) (A. Baith Mohamed Ayman Abdel-Hamid
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Kareem Youssri Mohamed 2009). Standards for RFID passports are determined by the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and are contained in ICAO
Document 9303, Part 1, Volumes 1 and 2 (6th edition, 2006). ICAO refers to the
ISO/IEC 14443 RFID chips in e-passports as "contactless integrated circuits". ICAO
standards provide for e-passports to be identifiable by a standard e-passport logo on the
front cover (Hancke, Gerhard P 2011). So many countries have undertaken the inclusion
of electronic chips into their passports but the security of the process came into sharp
contract when the encryption on UK chips was decoded in under 48 hours (Sterling,
Bruce 2006) (Iain Thomson 2007).
The United States has since 2006, included RFID tags in new passports which will store
the same information that is printed within the passport and also include a digital picture
of the owner (Xiaowei Zhu, Samar K. Mukhopadhyay & Hisashi Kurata (2012). The US
State Department had initially said the memory chips would only be readable from a
distance of 10 centimetres (3.9 in), but after widespread criticism and a clear
demonstration that special equipment can read the test passports from 10 metres (33 ft)
away caused much controversy such that the passports were designed to incorporate a
thin metal shielding to make it more difficult for unauthorized readers to "skim"
information (Jaap- Henk Hoepman et al, 2006). The USA will also implement Basic
Access Control (BAC), which functions as a Personal Identification Number (PIN) in
the form of characters printed on the passport data page. Before a passport's tag can be
read, this PIN must be entered into an RFID reader to decode the access security. The
BAC also enables the encryption and decryption and entry/deletion of any
communication between the chip and interrogator (John Lettice 2006).
Therefore, the incorporation of information into ID documents such as passports can be
an important part of the security apparatus often by way of encryption strategies and
RFID, however, the security of the process itself frequently comes into question (Klaus
Finkzeller, 2009). The development of countermeasures has increased the pressure for
international standardisation. ISO standards for RFID have also been developed and
such tags can be attached to clothing, possessions, or even implanted subcutaneously
within the body with the possibility of reading personally-linked information without
consent having raised privacy concerns (Klaus Finkzeller, 2009).
The purpose is to be able to enable a perfect identification of a person and the USA
Food and Drug Administration FDA has approved the use of chips within the body
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(Greene, Thomas C, 2004). This has raised concerns into privacy issues as people could
potentially be tracked wherever they go by an identifier unique to them (Jaap-Henk
Hoepman et al, 2006). There are further concerns that this could lead to abuse by
government leading to issues of privacy and liberty (Monahan, Torin and Tyler Wall.
2007) and there have been known hacks of RFID systems which have caused further
concern in the population (Klaus Finkzeller, 2009) and such concerns came in July 2006
when Reuters reported that 2 ICT expert hackers, Newitz and Westhues, showed the
audience at a conference in New York that they could clone the RFID signal from a
human implanted RFID chip demonstrating that it was not hack proof as had previously
been claimed as the basis for uniform application (Sirotich, M. 2007).
The practicality of international standardisation of RFID technology has also come into
question from a technical perspective insofar as the system is dependent on radio
frequencies and each nation can set its own and that not all same bands are available in
all countries (Klaus Finkzeller, 2009). The technology has seen widespread business
applications e.g. in supermarkets and companies like WALMART being the world’s
largest retailer have widespread application of RFID technology and even the US
military has taken to widespread usage of RFID systems for keeping track of inventory
and the location of assets ("What's New" Radio Frequency Identification (RFID). 4
April 2007) . The weaknesses in the RFID system have been addressed by technologists
by way of cryptography, package tracking and complex encoding all traffic from RFID
systems (Ilyas, Mohammad 2008) with the possibility of legislation and some 700
scientific papers published since 2002 ("RFID Security and Privacy Lounge".
Avoine.net. Retrieved 2013-09-22).
The fact that there is considerable research ongoing (Katherine Albrecht, Liz McIntyre
2005) and that some progress is being made may give a false sense of security because
the indications are we are not completely secure as indicated by Katherine Albrecht and
Liz McIntyre in their book ‘SpyChips: How Major Corporations and Government Plan
to Track Your Every Move’ in which we are told to ‘imagine a world of no privacy.
Where your every purchase is monitored and recorded in a database and your every
belonging is numbered. Where someone many states away or perhaps in another country
has a record of everything you have ever bought and what's more, they can be tracked
and monitored remotely" (Katherine Albrecht, Liz McIntyre 2005). As a result of the
level of uncertainty with smart passports Evans-Pughe, (2005) has pressed for
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universally readable biometric passports explained the need to agree standards for
biometric algorithms to enable their security (Iain Thomson 2007).
Whilst it is widely reported that the difficulties in creating and maintaining the integrity
of e-passports are both managerially and technically challenging, it is proposed that
harmonising ID documents to a stringent level of security internationally would act
against fraud and other cross border crime and security violations (Ulrich Stutenbaumer
& Gisela Meister, 2003). The underlying theory of the security benefits of
standardisation of identification documents is well established and widely accepted
internationally. The key challenge is not just to standardise an ID document format but
also to get international agreement to a system architecture for managing such a process.
The CEN/ISSS Technical Committee TC224 is charged with specifying a standard to
harmonise ID documents in European countries to a stringent level of security against
fraud and cross border crime and the researchers make the point that achieving
consensus and implementation are key to success of the proposition (Ulrich
Stutenbaumer & Gisela Meister 2003) (Forsberg et al, 2013). Some researchers point to
the effectiveness of targeting the infrastructure upon which cross border crime and
security violations depend e.g. transport, financial institutions, identity documentation
as being key to international security and there have been many international bodies
created to thwart the activities of criminals (Jaap-Henk Hoepman et al, 2006), (Brian
Seymour 2007). Not least in this process has been the relationship between the
governments and the business community who may unwittingly be providing enabling
services e.g. travel, banking, communications etc services to enable criminals and
terrorists to commit crimes. Leonard Yong (2009) reviewed such activities at the time of
the financial crisis in a paper entitled ‘Lessons in Corporate Governance from the
Global Financial Crisis’ which dealt with money laundering among other things and
outlined the juxtapositions of the government and its agencies and the business
community and how their activities are related and governed. His research looked at
three main contributors to a system of security i.e. COBIT a system for IT governance;
the ISO which provides standards in many areas; and anti money laundering and counter
terrorism financing AML/CTF: -
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Leonard Yong (2009)
Table 3.10 Security Standardisation Money Laundering
In this work Yong shows how the Control Objectives for information and Related
Technology (COBIT) provides a framework for IT governance which can be aligned
with standards developed by e.g. the International Standards Organisation (ISO) which
has developed over 17,500 in relevant areas; and in some jurisdictions there have been
initiatives like the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Finance (AML/CTF)
initiative which puts in checks and balances in the process of using financial services
and thereby thwarts the ability of criminals and terrorists to operate. Other research in
this area has shown that ML has been classified as a crime for less than 30 years in the
USA but is now a worldwide problem in the world of gangsters, drug dealers, corrupt
officials, terrorists etc. Money laundering classified as a crime for less than 30 years in
the USA is now widespread in the world of gangsters, drug dealers, corrupt officials,
terrorists. Brian Seymour (2007) says that a game of hide and seek is now on with
criminals and terrorists trying to get illegal gains into legitimate businesses both to hide
the origin of the money and also frequently as an investment in an effort to legitimise
the wealth. The research shows that this is an increasing problem and money once
laundered becomes increasing harder to detect in the banking and financial system
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around the world. The main proposition in research in this area is that many of the
methods used by criminals and terrorists are legitimate legal services which are
increasingly being regulated to control and detect criminal activity and confiscate illegal
gains whenever possible (Brian Seymour 2007). The problem in such international
regulation is that law around the world as related to ownership, possessions, illegality,
international activity etc differs so much between nations that it makes a common
standard very difficult to prescribe and agree and also to implement (C Evans-Pughe,
2005) (Katherine Albrecht, Liz McIntyre, 2005) (Andreas Mitrakas, 2006)
Research published in the International Journal of Logistics Systems and Management
in 2009 took as similar approach although through from a Supply Chain Security
Management perspective (SCSM) (Juha Hintsa, J., Ximena Gutierrez, Philip Wieser,
Ari-Pekka Hameri 2009). Their focus is that recent concerns on security are driving the
introduction of many new initiatives which are becoming an integral part of supply
chain management, insofar as supply chain management on some form appears in all
legal and often otherwise transactions. The authors discuss the current SCSM
developments and review the business to government interactions as well as the
management implications and complexities involved. The authors conclude that there is
a shortfall between SCSM research i.e. the identification of key drivers and problems;
the development of standards and most especially as these translate into practical
managerial actions. Whether these findings form part of a solution or merely a
description of the problem is at the heart of the research with the likely indication being
that the identification of the security problem is key to prescribing a solution to it
(Hintsa, Gutierrez, Wieser, Hameri, 2009).
Whilst great emphasis has been rightly placed on the value of ICT to the security
infrastructure it has also been shown that cooperation i.e. knowledge sharing enhances
the value of all activities and this further indicates the value of internationalisation of the
security apparatus (Brian Seymour, 2007). This logic has been focused on in research to
identify the most effective areas for cooperation as being the implementation
management of an agreed strategy, common design documentation strategy e.g.
passports etc, standards of performance, equal standards of reliability of information and
data, and standardisation of all structural factors of the security apparatus (Seema
Degwekar et al, 2007). It has further been indicated by the same research that
cooperation between government agencies holds the key for solving complex problems
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such as illegal immigration, cross border criminality, terrorism and disease. Although
other researchers have claimed that many of the illegal and terrorist activities are
opportunistic having situational and circumstantial origins e.g. the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) (2009) showed that after the September 11th World
Trade Centre attacks, attention shifted from aviation to maritime security as it became
evident that the vulnerabilities of maritime environments could potentially be targeted
by organised terrorist groups. This refocusing of effort was justified because we have
seen a significant increase in terrorist piracy in the horn of Africa and in South East
Asia and much of the identification of the impending threat was discovered by
monitoring of communications INTERPOL(2013)(Crime-areas/Maritime-
piracy/Maritime-piracy) (http://www.interpol.int).
The use of ICT specialisms in detection and investigation of international crimes and
terrorism has produced significant benefits although it has also been shown that the
integrity of security systems is not itself secure and an example was provided earlier
where the encoding on UK passports chips was decoded within 48 hours of issue
(Sterling, Bruce 2006) (Iain Thomson 2007). There has been significant effort on the
development of encryption methods with higher security because it is believed that the
ability to investigate data and maintain secrecy in security operations is essential to the
ability to internationalise security standards. One researcher into this complex area
Nicholas (2012) discusses these issues in his 2012 paper on new more reliable and more
economical ciphers such as GOST 28147-89 which is a block cipher that is a plausible
alternative for current ones but has a much lower implementation cost. Implemented in
crypto libraries OpenSSL and Crypto++ it is proving very popular and is widely used on
the Internet. This latest development was proposed to the ISO in 2010 as a candidate
worldwide industrial encryption standard. If this and other so called unbreakable
encryptions and other similar developments are standardised internationally the
researcher suggests that international criminality will have lost its ability to hack and
operate through the ICT systems of the world and detection would be faster and more
efficient (Nicholas T, 2012).
Government legislation and control and the activities of business come together in Van
Den Berghe, & De Ridder’s (1999) work on the internationalisation of corporate
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governance in which the authors propose that international standardisation and a
multidisciplinary approach would improve transparency in the governance of a
company. The business world needs to change the environment in which companies
work by conducting applied scientific research, creating a large pool of professional
experience and networking. However other research (Juanals and Minel 2011) has
suggested that a new global regulatory mechanism is required to promote a linkage
between the WTO and the ISO because both these international bodies have important
roles and responsibilities in the management and control apparatus of a truly
international standard for security. Juanals and Minel (2011) argue that too many
organizations are in charge of global security management. They argue for the
establishment of a theoretical and methodological framework in order to critically assess
the new technopolitics currently being developed in the field of global security and
which must be encapsulated in standards. They propose the development of text mining
tools to implement these standards. These tools will be applied in a platform designed to
provide cartographic representations of standards and to assist the navigation of an end-
user through a corpus of standards.
An example of such standardised application is provided in further research by Ashford
P (2006) who uses the example of a blood transfusion service being essentially a global
activity both in terms of it being a widespread need and also because of the difficulties
in crossing national boundaries quickly in its journey from donor to patient. The
complexities involved have been explained by Basie von Solms (2000) who proposed
that there are 3 waves in the development of international information security; the
technical wave, the management wave, and the institutional wave. Although the author
has suggested that there is also a Fourth Wave dealing with Information Security
Governance. Related research by Wang Jinyu (2006) discusses international security
standardisation and counter measures as applicable in developed countries and analyses
the impact of security international standards on developing country trade and
international competitiveness. This takes the discussion on international security
standardisation into the international trade arena where some countries guard their
ability to compete within the status quo very jealously as they have a developing nation
price advantage. As a counterpoint to which the research (Wang Jinyu 2006) indicates
that early standardisation should be limited to security at the level of crime and
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terrorism which are current threats to all nations.
There are currently numerous important international initiatives which may ultimately
provide some guidance on the format of an international standard for security. The
ANSI-HSSP Plenary Report on Homeland Security has provided an important insight
which focused on setting a path for U.S.–European collaboration on global security
issues. These key priorities identified by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre as potential areas for
collaboration (Erik Puskar, 2012). The European Commission’s Joint Research Centre
(JRC) initiated a process of U.S - EU collaboration on security standards which in 2010
along with the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) hosted the Ninth Plenary
Session of the HSSP (Homeland Security Standards Panel): U.S.-European
Collaboration on Security Standardization Systems (U.S. Department of Commerce,
2012). On 26 October 2012, CEN organized in collaboration with CENELEC a first
event on Horizons for European Security standardization. The event aimed to outline the
Comite Europeen de Normalisation (CEN) and CENELEC standardization activities on
security research and standardization, to provide a better understanding on what
standardization opportunities for the research communities of FP7 calls are and how
European standardization can respond to the general policy objectives of enhancing
competitiveness of the security industry (Euro Commission’s Joint Research Centre
(JRC) 2010).
Conclusion to Literature Review
In this chapter we have seen the whole picture laid out. I can reflect from my experience
that the issues brought out have occurred many times in my working life. For example,
the relationship between false documentation, complex cross-border activities and
money laundering and the difficulties in tracking and tracing criminals and gathering
evidence when some of it lies in another jurisdiction with which we may not have a
cooperative agreement in place.
I have also seen at first hand the three waves that Basie von Solms (2000) outlines as the
ideal way that security information should be managed. However, I have also
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recognised that whilst these ideals were achieved by the Abu Dhabi Police owing to our
high level of development, they might be much more difficult for less developed nation
police forces to achieve. It is also important that the Emirates Identity Authority, has
joined STORK 2.0, a consortium in charge of the EU's Secure Identity Across Borders
Linked 2.0 project, as a ‘Special Adviser'. The authority, having the world's largest civil
integrated biometrics database within its population register, is the first government
entity to join STORK 2.0 which is aimed at setting up a European eID Interoperability
Platform that allows EU citizens and legal entities to make electronic transactions across
borders EIDA (Emirates Identification Authority) (2013). See also STORK 2.0, a
consortium at https://www.eid-stork2.eu/index.php?/Option
=com_content&view=article&id=15&Itemid=29. This standardised security model will
help the UAE to integrated efficiently to boost the economy and in preparation for
hosting EXPO 2020 in Dubai.
This chapter has also shown the complexity in international standardisation in having to
address so many variables in an ever increasingly technically sophisticated criminal
community. The challenges for the world community are huge, expensive, time
consuming, resources intensive and increasingly important and urgent. Chapter 4 takes
all this highly integrated information and discusses and analyses the influences and the
effect on the challenge of the internationalisation of security.
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Chapter 4: Discussion of Results
A. The Information Basis
The proposition for the international standardisation of security has been established in the
previous chapters in which the benefits accruing from such cooperation have been explained.
However, it has also been discussed that arriving at a far reaching international agreement is
typically fraught with difficulties given the frequent differences of opinion between nations
which are often based upon socio-economic-political considerations or national self-interest.
We are used to seeing these pressures and postures from nations dominating negotiations at
the United Nations and other international forums (Neack, L. 1995), but it is often not
apparent as to why some nations act and vote in certain ways. In some cases it may be
cultural as with the Myanmar debates regarding human rights within their Muslim minority
(Fattah, M. A. 2006) and in other cases it may be to maintain the political status quo, for
example, in a totalitarian state. There are also many existing multinational agreements some
of which may be regional or defensive or even ideological as in the past relationship between
Cuba and the former Soviet Union (Morgenthau, H. J. 1967).
This research addresses the ideal of the establishment of an international standard for security
within a proposed whole world community of nations who often fail to agree on many issues
and especially dealing with issues which bind them together; whereas many nations have
entrenched opposing positions with other nations, and it must be said that these form quite a
large bloc in international bodies like the UN (Schachter, O. 1991). For example, North and
South Korea (Lake, A. 1994), Israel and all its Arab neighbours, Greece and Turkey, India
and Pakistan (Lake, A. 1994) and so on, and many of these are long lived disputes between
neighbouring nations which have been woven into the culture of both sides. We have seen
that some of these nations are prepared to cooperate on some things of mutual benefit but
rarely on issues which allow the other into their space; and this was once described by former
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan as being like neighbours who are prepared to have a
discussion over the garden fence but only over the garden fence (Edwards, J.A. 2008). This
example is important in this case because security is often perceived by nations, especially
those in less democratic situations, as a matter of self determination and a tool of retaining
power any change of which might diminish their hold on power. So this research is conducted
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in an environment of vested interests, various accommodation agreements and conditionality
such that agreement would unlikely be inclusive of all nations and even less likely to be all
encompassing in extent.
However, whilst the subject proposition has been mooted for a long time there is light at the
end of the tunnel in that international agreement might be possible in areas which provide a
clear benefit to most member countries e.g. chemical weapons, drug trafficking etc (Bush,
G.W. 2002). Whilst it might be that agreement may start slowly as it has with various ICT
initiatives it may develop over time to cover the main serious security considerations which
affect the majority of countries. The basis of these arguments is derived from past
experiences of attempts to create all inclusive agreements in other fields some of which have
been successful as with the ICC, OPCW, GATT, WHO and others with the importance of
these examples being that they all have some enforcement powers as would be the case with
the international standardisation of security (Gill, 2009). The methodology for evaluating the
viability and likelihood of being able to establish an international standard for security and
also for cooperative operations between signatories relies heavily on information gathered
both at the infrastructural level but perhaps even more importantly at the grass roots level of
implementation because such information would reveal the practicality of implementing such
a project. The main justification for this latter point being that there would be a reduced
efficiency in any international cooperation which cannot be implemented on the ground; and
so the analysis in this thesis is a melange of the infrastructure and situational information in
each area together with the data and information derived from the questionnaire responses of
officer / operatives based upon reflection of their hands-on experience.
A logical process was developed in designing the questionnaire which defined the key
unknown factors which were formulated into the 49 questions which make up the
questionnaire. The questionnaire was also formulated with an event series logic such that
each successive question builds on the previous and enables a respondent to reflect on his/her
experience (Oppenheim, A. N., 1992); all of which is also designed to overlay the target
information sought for the testing of the 3 hypotheses key to this work. So it is logical,
therefore, to present the scenario developed from the data gathered along the same series
logic in following the format of the questionnaire and in doing so enrich the findings with the
basic infrastructure and situational information gathered. The detailed analysis of each
147
question and a selection of cross-tabulations is analysed, presented and explained in
Appendix B.
B. The Status Quo and Hypothesis Testing
The status quo is largely revealed by the analysis of the data in Appendix B but this needs to
be considered in the context of the infrastructural situation and used to test the three critical
hypotheses at the heart of this research:
H1) The establishment of an international standard for security would not be supported by
the majority of nations owing to internal socio-economic, legal and political considerations.
H2) The likelihood of failure or decay over time would be very high owing to a lack of
dedication of staff and management to compliance owing to an inability to maintain quality,
cooperation, skills and organisational culture.
H3) The establishment of the international standardisation of security data, information and
operations would succeed at establishing standardised levels of compliance but would likely
fail in the area of cooperation in the exchange of information and in providing data access to
other members.
Appendix B discusssd the responses to the questionnaire along the lines of a logical series of
highly correlated questions, which seek to explain all the relevant factors and target the key
components of the hypotheses. We now take these results to construct a rigorous case to be
applied in the testing of the hypotheses.
Market researchers spend as much of their time in ensuring that they are questioning the right
person as they do in formulating the question itself (Sinkovics, Penz, & Ghauri 2008)). This
research has applied equal rigour to the selection of the sample basis although has allowed
some independence and self- determination on the research process by allowing the ultimate
sample to be random by using whatever response comes from a large pool of potential
respondents. As statistical probability methods dictate the sample received and utilised for the
analysis hereto must be a fair reflection by type and also by distribution within the wider
population in the security industry. This of course was a proportionally probabilistic
distribution by the number of each discipline which was included in the questionnaire sent
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out but the actual sample included is entirely random within that wider population. The
respondents by type were an over two-thirds (71%) majority of participants who would be
described as hands-on field operatives being either police officers or security officers with the
rest of the sample (29%) being support or back office support personnel (Table 4.1). This
roughly reflects the population by type within the industry and also provides a spread of
experiential information which is important given that much of the information sought is to
be based upon reflection across a broad front of issues. This depth of hands-on knowledge
would be very important in the testing of H2 which considers how failure might result from
quality, skills and staff issues; although it is known from infrastructural information that all
major security organisations e.g. INTERPOL have rigorous processes for training and staff
development to ensure efficient operations (Haberfeld, 2002).
We have also seen from the data provided by the sample that an 80% majority do not manage
their security to any form of international or other standard e.g. ISO 31000; although an even
greater number 87% agree that if they did then ISO 31000 would be an acceptable format.
This situation leads us to assume that there is a willingness to cooperate in the standardisation
of security but the problem may be in either making the decision or finding a reason as to
why to do it. This lack of motivation towards an international standardisation seems to be a
problem and is not helped by the fact that several other international cooperative initiatives
e.g. INTERPOL’s MIND/FIND and also their 24/7 and the Schengen arrangements and
others have all largely failed to attract even a workable quorum of participants. This is a very
important consideration in relation to the testing of H1 which asked if such an initiative
would be supported by the majority of nations. Although the nations represented by the
sample responses hereto do observe that in many respects opinion can be self-serving in that
the responses have also shown that participants would participate of they could see that doing
so would benefit them as, for example, in the case of forged passports and in this respect this
indication of a willingness in certain circumstances goes against the position of H1.
So given that countries are prepared to cooperate on the basis of benefit we must ask
ourselves what do countries need from standardisation? The perception is that a standardised
security system would comprise of a lot of computers and databases and, of course, there
would be much of that but it would go beyond that into cooperation and this is where we test
the proposition in H3 that the process would likely fail in the area of cooperation and the
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exchange of information. The analysis of the data as specifically related to the proposition in
H3 is that what countries most need are the things they either don’t have or what they fear
most i.e. IT and Infrastructure and organised crime and counter terrorism solutions. The main
priorities in the analysis are interrelated insofar as IT discovers and alerts to infrastructure
and other risks, which sometimes acts as a tool in counter-terrorism to protect the status quo
and infrastructure and would also, therefore, act to alleviate the suggestion in H2 that there
would be an inability to maintain quality, cooperation, and skills.
However, not all is known about the mix of needs of all nation members but the sample has
reported that 80% of them believe that security standardisation methodology is the most
important consideration which goes part way to supporting H2 in that as the sample has
responded that a structured methodology would maintain the dedication and compliance of
staff to a standard. Although we must recognise that there must also be checks and balances
in the levels of achievement and quality in order to satisfy the details of H2 which posits that
there would be a likelihood of failure owing to a lack of dedication and compliance to
maintain quality. Whereas the findings of the samples responses confirms that there would be
sufficient levels of quality and achievement thereby refuting H2 and 85% of the sample
responses confirmed that they have sufficient internal levels of quality and achievement. It is
also clearly indicated that 92% of those who have internal levels of quality and achievement
also have a role for developing integrated government security strategies in respect of
achieving global security further refuting H2. Overall the indications are that the failure
predictions of H2, based on the lack of dedication of staff, would be overcome by the
standardisation of security insofar as such an arrangement would require and systemise such
compliance. However, the automatic success of the subject initiative is not guaranteed by the
process and is not so indicated by the sample responses.
It is clear that some countries believe that their arrangements are as good as they could be and
90% have said that they don’t benchmark against any standard. This may be just because
there isn’t really a common standard level of achievement against which they could do so and
it is important that those who do not benchmark support the same areas of Information
Technology, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter Terrorism, which again indicates the
areas the majority view as being the most challenging, which goes part way to recognising
the issue raised in H3. Although there is also support for H3 in the same analysis in that it is
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found that standardisation would likely succeed in establishing standard levels of compliance,
and that the majority of respondents strive for higher standards and implement checks and
balances. It is further found that the majority of respondents strive for higher standards and
implement checks and balances which further support the levels of compliance issue in H3.
There is strong agreement with the proposition that there is a role for developing an
integrated government strategy to achieve global security which contradicts the position of
H1 which states that this would not be supported for among other things legal and political
considerations. The specific point is clearly derived from the responses to the questionnaire
that those who support security strategies to achieve global security also support the concept
that if governments coordinate their efforts it would lead to the standardisation of security.
Furthermore, those who strongly agree with the development of security strategies for
achieving global security also accept the value of cooperation in security which again refutes
the hypothesis H1 to the contrary.
It is clear from the analyses herein that there is a high degree of variability in the way that
countries view the quality of their security operations. Some make great efforts to maintain
standards in a military way by rigid ranking authority whereas others have a civil service
attitude of a steady constant function which doesn’t improve and doesn’t deteriorate (Al
Darmaki 2009). However, things change very quickly in the security sector and countries
have come to realise that they have to move as fast as the criminals and terrorists do
(Raymond, Hickman, Miller, & Wong 2005). One way of checking standards is to
benchmark against a set level of achievement but as discussed above there is no common
standard to which security is being benchmarked on a global scale. Although some countries
do quality check against a peer country with which they have an arrangement on security e.g.
the USA and the UK (Table B12), (Ahmed & Vrbsky 2002) frequently cross check
efficiencies because their security apparatus is closely related and cross fertilizes information.
The drive to maintain standards in some countries whether or not it is just for reasons of
cooperation with others has the effect of setting a level of compliance albeit only perhaps
with the standards of the other party and assists in the maintaining of quality levels and
enhance staff skills and cooperation in which respect the findings in this area contradict the
proposition in H2 (Table B8).
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The obvious question, however, is that if countries are at all driven to maintain standards in
their security apparatus then why don’t they subscribe to the major international standard ISO
31000 en-mass which has been designed for the purpose of security? The responses to the
questionnaire provided an interesting insight into the activities of countries in this regard and
it is clear that very few of the sample standardise their security operations etc to any standard
and most specifically only about 20% of the sample standardise at all although most of them
do maintain standards within their organisations to a set of Key Performance Indicators
(KPIs). This indication also flies in the face of H2 which states that failure or decay over time
would occur owing to an inability to maintain quality, cooperation, skills and organisational
culture. The same area of investigation also finds that there are clear results in line with
previous findings in that those who agree that government action would drive towards
standardisation are also those (69%) who responded that they do measure levels of quality
and achievement to some standard which again further refutes H2.
The acid test of course as to whether there is free access to information including the concept
that the accessing of information is an acceptable practice and that it is known that the
authorities would be doing so. The sample responses in this regard and as it pertains to H1
insofar as legal and political considerations could impact on information strategy and also H3
in the details of standardisation of ‘security data, information and operations’ and ‘providing
data access to other members’. The results of the data provided by the respondents indicates
that there is a majority low freedom of access to information in the sample and it is worrying
that only 10% of sample countries say they have a high level of free access to information.
Whilst these findings could be said that H1 may be correct in that it may be legal or political
considerations which result in the low level of free access to information and also that H3
could also be correct insofar as the lack of access to information may preclude the free
provision of data and access to other members thereby supporting H1 and H3. However, there
is no evidence to support either of these hypotheses that the availability free or otherwise of
information would stifle the establishment of an international standard as suggested by H1 or
indeed that H3 would be correct in that the process would fail owing to an inability to provide
data access to other members. Also relevant to this issue is the further analysis of data which
indicates the challenge involved in international cooperation where as in this analysis the
high level of access to information is only 10% and less than 14% of countries have a
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Freedom of Information Act (FOI) which would tend to support H3 in that if there is no
access to data or restriction on gathering and managing it then the project might fail in the
provision of data to other members.
Cultural issues do not feature in the hypotheses because the early research of infrastructural
information (Table B27) gave no statistically significant indication that there were issues of
cultural constraints on information except in some closed societies (Bloch, 2004). However,
the question was asked in the data gathering process through the questionnaire to be sure of
not missing an important indicator, and the findings have revealed that whilst not a
significant restriction, as the early infrastructural research had indicated, the findings do show
a 60:40 split to indicate that cultural issues do impact on the usage, collection etc of
information, which does not specifically point to the substance of H1 but it could be thought
part of the socio-economic portion of the hypothesis in that such cultural constraints might
contra indicate support for the establishment of an international standard. A similar case can
be made for the issue of privacy as also presented in the questionnaire but in the case of
privacy the responses were also inconclusive and provided no insight which indicates that the
infrastructural information which indicated that privacy should not be hypothetically
proposed was correct.
Almost 80% of sample identified the development of security standardisation methods as
being most in need of research (Table B30) suggesting that the sample may need to
understand better how a standardised system would work which is evidenced by the fact that
>68% of the sample suggests that such research is needed is in the area of management and
this same observation was made in both the literature review and also in the interviews. These
observations would go some way to support H2 in that a detailed understanding of security
standardisation would be needed to maintain quality etc and a majority of research subjects to
this work had said that they want to know more about how i.e. the method by which such
standardisation would be managed and implemented. This indicates that training would have
a very important role to play and would enable the subjects to maintain skills and quality,
which again supports H2.
There would be no point in having any kind of international arrangement in any field without
there also being some coordination of effort (Stein, 1982). Over 80% of the sample agreed
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and the infrastructural research revealed that this issue has been shown to greatly improve the
efficiency of the UN Food program (Brown, 2011) and the Red Cross (International
Committee of the Red Cross) and it is believed would be equally valuable in the area of
security. These findings refute H3 which posits that the proposition would likely fail in the
area of cooperation in the exchange of information and in providing data access to other
members, which of course would be facilitated by a coordinated approach. It is also found
that >83% of the sample which have stated that they value cooperation also strongly agree
that coordination would be enhanced by cooperation and convince others of the need to
standardise.
H3 suggests that international standardisation of security would succeed at establishing levels
of compliance but would likely fail in the area of cooperation, which the infrastructural
research findings indicated could be understood by whether a nation has a free press i.e. a
free availability of information and the ability to publish and criticise. The questionnaire also
investigated this issue and found that the sample responses suggested that a >75% of the
subject nations have a free press although a minority said they had free access to information.
Further analysis indicates that privacy of information is a major issue in a significant majority
of the sample responses such that this may be assumed to be an issue in convincing countries
to share and exchange data and information in an international standardised security
agreement and the fact that they are not may suggest support for the likely outcome to the
proposition in H3.
Surely, however, countries likely to participate would already perhaps have some
involvement in standardisation or at least benchmarking their performance in search of
improvements etc and a largely proportion of the sample agrees that e.g. ISO 31000 would be
a suitable standard. However, the evidence is that the >69% of respondents who strongly
agreed that ISO 31000 could be the basis for an international standardisation of security do
not themselves implement it, which indicates that the key component to success would be
convincing the potential members to join. H1 said that it would not be supported for socio-
economic and legal and political considerations although when tested on the value of the use
of a standard in the area of passports almost 90% supported working to a standard as it would
be beneficial thereby refuting H1 and also in some respects H3.
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H1 suggests that the proposition would not be supported for socio-economic and legal
considerations which would include issues of privacy. We have already discussed the free
access to information but whether issues of privacy refute the hypothesis depends on whether
they hinder the gathering and use of information which a majority of respondents says is not
the case thereby refuting H1. However, 85% of the responses that the law does not
distinguish between information covered covertly and overtly indicating that the security
system could freely gather information covertly, and given that we have already seen that
there are no legal impediments then this would further refute H1.
But who would gather and use data? well it would likely be the police or a branch of the
security apparatus of member countries; which leads to the question as to whether those are
themselves free to act as they wish and if they are not then that would clearly support H1 in
that there would be a legal basis i.e. the police are by definition a legal authority. However,
the police are governed by legislation and the executive of government (Davis, 1973) which
indicates that they are not free to act with self determination and herein lays another very
important indicator insofar as about half the security apparatus around the world may think it
is free-to-act but in actual fact they are controlled in ways which may at the extremes infringe
the rule of law, which would oppose the earlier suggestion of support and refute H1.
In the final analysis, however, the success of such a proposition would be in the hands of the
officers / operatives / police etc who would implement it. H2 suggests that the project would
be increasingly likely to fail over time owing to the dedication of staff and management etc
because of their inability to maintain quality etc. Some of the infrastructural information
gathered suggested that there could possibly be some resistance within the police or security
apparatus which was confronted by the questionnaire in question 34 (Table B75). An analysis
of whether there is a free to act police force and whether that police force would resist to the
sharing and exchange of information found that the sample reported significantly in the
affirmative to having a free to act police force and also the majority said that there was no
resistance within their police thereby refuting H2. However, as we have already discussed the
police may appear to be free-to-act but in the end they are governed by their masters in
government although the sample when asked this question was divided equally in its reply in
that some were and some not; but the analysis to the questionnaire returns to question 19
which when asked whether there is influence on the security infrastructure then the answer
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must be that there is.
H1 posits that standardisation would not be supported owing to legal restrictions although
90% of the sample denies that there is any legal restriction to the sharing of information
which would be part of any structured standardisation, although this is not just about the
sharing of information the issues of privacy and cultural issues were also identified in the
infrastructural research as key elements. There is little restriction to the exchange of
information with other countries and few reports of any distinction made regarding the
methods of gathering information whether covertly or overtly. So it would seem that there is
very little negative indication in these areas thereby refuting this element of H1.
It is almost inevitable that there would be a use of software in such a system and H3 suggests
that the system would likely fail owing to various reasons including the provision of data
access to members. However, over 93% of the sample report that they use software in the
management of security operations and databases (Table B58). The problem beyond this
would be how easily would the sample be able to apply software and analysis earlier has
shown that 80% of those who use software would easily apply the system software which in
turn would be used in the provision .of data access to others and therefore refute the
proposition in H3.
Only a minority of countries has cooperation agreements with others and they report only
marginally good experiences (Table B64). This should not be read as indicative of the main
proposition of this project because this analysis only shows that only some have cooperation
agreements and their experience is not good; we could deduce from this that things might be
better if more countries were involved. Nevertheless, the majority of responses as to the
quality of experiences are in favour of good ones which finding supports H3. Furthermore, as
an important indicator for cooperation as in H3 it is found that whilst the experience of
cooperation may be closely reported the value obtained and placed upon cooperation is
significantly high with >86% of the sample reporting that they value cooperation in the
exchange of information and in providing data access to other members thereby further
supporting H3.
H1 suggests that standardisation would not be supported for various reasons including
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economic considerations and this would be assumed to impact poorer / developing nations
most and indeed a majority of 90% confirm that they would not be able to finance this
initiative. This is an important consideration because it could mean that the project would
likely fail as H1 suggests for want of finance. However, >86% of the wealthier sample
countries said that they would pay the costs of the proposed international standardisation i.e.
support poorer countries (Table B67). It is equally important that 10% of the poorer
developing countries have also said they would pay their way which indicates the importance
placed on this project both by richer countries in supporting it and by poorer countries that
are prepared to spend precious resources on this which further refutes H1. Over 2/3rds of the
sample said there were no socio-cultural politico-structural issues to impede progress as
posited in H1 and the findings indicate that there is a low incidence of impediments and a
similar response for police resistance to standardisation of security (Table B82). Both these
findings refute the suggestion in H1
H2 is a difficult hypothesis to test because it involves many needs issues which are hard to
measure and even the reports by reflection in this area could be biased by widely varied
opinion based upon individual circumstances. Analysis of the questionnaire returns shows
that over two-thirds of the sample had said that their needs were greater in the area of
management which could be read to indicate a shortfall in that area and, therefore, lend
credence to the suggestion in H2 that the project could fail because of management related
issues (Table B72). The infrastructural research undertaken and evidence from several of the
questionnaires also confirms that even those who said to a significant extent that they value
cooperation have also said that they most need support in the area of management which
overall supports the H2 hypothesis.
Clearly standardisation and cooperation are required to make the proposition work and whilst
it is found that cooperation in operations produces an evenly divided opinion as to whether it
would be an impediment to the project or not; whereas the feasibility of the project is found
to receive more than 75% support which suggests refusal of H3 in that whilst there may be
divided opinion in the area of cooperation as impacting success the overall measure of
feasibility is significantly favourable indicating that whilst there may be problems the project
would work whereas H3 suggested that the project would fail on grounds of cooperation
(Tables B77 and B86).
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H1 suggests that there would be insufficient support from nations for the proposition for a
variety of reasons including legal ones and indeed over 60% of the sample say that their
country would need some new legislation to implement standardisation of security (Table
B86). This indication of the recognised need for legislation and the willingness to enact it
indicates that the project would be supported by the majority in spite of the legislative
position and thereby refute H1.
Analysis of the Hypotheses Testing
Hypotheses Support Refute
H1)
The establishment of an
international standard for
security would not be
supported by the majority of
nations owing to internal
socio-economic, legal and
political considerations.
(a) H1 may be correct in that
it may be legal or political
considerations which result
in the low level of free access
to information and also that
H3 could also be correct
insofar as the lack of access
to information may preclude
the free provision of data and
access to other members
thereby supporting H1 and
H3.
(b) Those are themselves free
to act as they wish and if they
are not then that would
clearly support H1 in that
there would be a legal basis
i.e. the police are by
definition a legal authority.
(c) A majority of 90% of
(a)Do not manage their
security to any form of
international or other
standard a willingness to
cooperate in the
standardisation of security
which is not helped by the
fact that several other
international cooperative
initiatives e.g. INTERPOL’s
MIND/FIND and also their
24/7 and the Schengen
arrangements and others have
all largely failed to attract
(b) There is strong agreement
with the proposition that
there is a role for developing
an integrated government




that they would not be able to
finance this initiative (Table
B68). This is an important
consideration because it
could mean that the project
would likely fail as H1
suggests for want of finance.
the position of H1 - the
development of security
strategies for achieving
global security also accept
the value of cooperation in
security which again refutes
the hypothesis H1 to the
contrary.
(c) There is no evidence to
support either of these
hypotheses that the
availability free or otherwise
of information would stifle
the establishment of an
international standard as
suggested by H1 or indeed
that H3 would be correct in
that the process would fail
owing to an inability to
provide data access to other
members.
(d) Have some involvement
in standardisation or at least
benchmarking their
performance in search of
improvements etc and a
largely proportion of the
sample agrees that e.g. ISO
31000 would be a suitable
standard. >69% of
respondents (Table B39) who
strongly agreed that ISO
31000 could be the basis for
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an international
standardisation of security do
not themselves implement it,
90% supported working to a
standard (Table B39) as it
would be beneficial thereby
refuting H1 and also in some
respects H3.
(e) Issues of privacy refute
the hypothesis depends on
whether they hinder the
gathering and use of
information which a majority
of respondents says is not the
case thereby refuting H1.
85% (Table B89) of the
responses that the law does
not distinguish between
information covered covertly
and overtly indicating that
the security system could
freely gather information
covertly, and given that we
have already seen that there
are no legal impediments
then this would further refute
H1.
(f) About half the security
apparatus around the world
may think it is free-to-act but
in actual fact they are
controlled in ways which
may at the extremes infringe
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the rule of law, which would
oppose the earlier suggestion
of support and refute H1.
(g) There is little restriction
to the exchange of
information with other
countries and few reports of
any distinction made
regarding the methods of
gathering information
whether covertly or overtly.
So it would seem that there is
very little negative indication
in these areas thereby
refuting this element of H1.
(h) >86% of the wealthier
sample countries said that
they would pay the costs of
the proposed international
standardisation i.e. support
poorer countries (Table B67).
It is equally important that
10% of the poorer
developing countries have
also said they would pay
their way (Table B68) which
indicates the importance
placed on this project both by
richer countries in supporting
it and by poorer countries
that are prepared to spend
precious resources on this
which further refutes H1.
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(i) Over 2/3rds of the sample
said there were no socio-
cultural politico-structural
issues to impede progress
(Table B69) as posited in H1
and the findings indicate that
there is a low incidence of
impediments and a similar
response for police resistance
to standardisation of security.
Both these findings refute the
suggestion in H1
(j) Recognised need for
legislation and the
willingness to enact it
indicates that the project
would be supported by the




The likelihood of failure or
decay over time would be
very high owing to a lack of
dedication of staff and
management to compliance




(a) 80% of sample identified
the development of security
standardisation methods as
being most in need of
research suggesting (table
B30) that the sample may
need to understand better
how a standardised system
would work which is
evidenced by the fact that
>68% of the sample (Table
B31) suggests that such
(a) The sample confirms that
there would be sufficient
levels of quality and
achievement thereby refuting
H2 and 85% of the responses
(Table B8) confirmed that
they have sufficient internal
levels of quality and
achievement. It is also clearly
indicated that 92% of those
who have internal levels of
quality and achievement
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research is needed is in the
area of management - a
detailed understanding of
security standardisation
would be needed to maintain
quality etc and would enable
the subjects to maintain skills




evidence from several of the
questionnaires also confirms
that even those who said to a
significant extent that they
value cooperation have also
said that they most need
support in the area of
management which overall
supports the H2 hypothesis.
(Table B10) also have a role
for developing integrated
government security
strategies in respect of
achieving global security
thereby further refuting H2.
(b) The maintaining of
quality levels and
enhancement of staff skills
and cooperation in which
respect the findings in this
area contradict the
proposition in H2.
(c) Few of the sample
standardise their security
operations etc to any
standard and most
specifically only about 20%
of the sample (Table B2)
standardise at all although
most of them do maintain
standards within their
organisations to a set of Key
Performance Indicators
(KPIs). This indication also
flies in the face of H2 which
states that failure or decay
over time would occur.
Government action would
drive towards standardisation
are also those (69%) who
responded (Table B18) that
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they do measure levels of
quality and achievement to
KPIs which again further
refutes H2.
(d) To having a free to act
police force and also the
majority said that there was
no resistance within their
police thereby refuting H2.
H3)
The establishment of the
international standardisation




compliance but would likely
fail in the area of
cooperation in the exchange
of information and in
providing data access to
other members.
(a) 90% have said (Table
B11) that they don’t
benchmark against any
standard and this maybe just
because there isn’t really a
common standard of levels of
achievement against which
they could do so and it is
important that those who do
not benchmark support the




the areas the majority view as
being the most challenging,
which goes part way to
recognising the issue raised
in H3. Although there is also
support for H3 in the same
analysis in that it is found
that standardisation would
(a) There is no evidence to
support either of these
hypotheses that the
availability free or otherwise
of information would stifle
the establishment of an
international standard as
suggested by H1 or indeed
that H3 would be correct in
that the process would fail
owing to an inability to
provide data access to other
members.
(b) Some coordination of
effort. Over 80% of the
sample agreed (Table B15)
and the infrastructural
research revealed - These
findings refute H3 which
posits that the proposition
would likely fail in the area
of cooperation in the
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likely succeed in establishing
standard levels of compliance
respondents strive for higher
standards and implement
checks and balances which
further support the levels of
compliance issue in H3.
(b) H1 may be correct in that
it may be legal or political
considerations which result
in the low level of free access
to information and also that
H3 could also be correct
insofar as the lack of access
to information may preclude
the free provision of data and
access to other members
thereby supporting H1 and
H3.
(c) the challenge involved in
international cooperation
where as in this analysis the
high level of access to
information is only 10%
(Table B20) and less than
14% of countries have a
Freedom of Information Act
(FOI) (Table B23) which
would tend to support H3 in
that if there is no access to
data or restriction on
gathering and managing it
then the project might fail in
exchange of information and
in providing data access to
other members, which of
course would be facilitated
by a coordinated approach. It
is also found that >86% of
the sample (Table B34)




enhanced by cooperation and
convince others of the need
to standardise.
(c) 90% supported working
to a standard (Table B34) as
it would be beneficial
thereby refuting H1 and also
in some respects H3.
(d) Over 93% of the sample
report (Table B58) that they
use software in the
management of security
operations and databases.
The problem beyond this
would be how easily would
the sample be able to apply
software and analysis earlier
has shown that 80% of those
who use cooperation in
operations (Table B64)
produces an evenly divided
opinion as to whether it
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the provision of data to other
members.
(d) Free availability of
information - >75% of the
subject nations have a free
press (Table B35) although a
minority said they had free
access to information.
privacy of information is a
major issue in a significant
majority of the sample
responses such that this may
be assumed to be an issue in
convincing countries to share
and exchange data and
information in an
international standardised
security agreement - support
for the likely outcome to the
proposition in H3
(e) the majority of responses
as to the quality of
experiences are in favour of
good ones which finding
supports H3. Furthermore, as
an important indicator for
cooperation as in H3 it is
found that whilst the
experience of cooperation
may be closely reported the
value obtained and placed
upon cooperation is
significantly high with >86%
would be an impediment to
the project or not; whereas
the feasibility of the project
is found to receive more than
75% support (Table B90)
which suggests refusal of H3
in that whilst there may be
divided opinion in the area of
cooperation as impacting
success the overall measure
of feasibility is significantly
favourable indicating that
whilst there may be problems
the project would work
whereas H3 suggested that
the project would fail on
grounds of cooperation etc.
(e) software would easily
apply the system software
which in turn would be used
in the provision .of data
access to others and therefore
refute the proposition in H3.
166
of the sample reporting
(Table B66) that they value
cooperation in the exchange
of information and in
providing data access to
other members thereby
further supporting H3.
Table 4.104 Analysis of the Hypotheses Testing.....
Summary of the Hypotheses Testing
Whilst some of the data and information gathered during the infrastructural information
gathering and the interviews have provided many useful insights such information and some
of the findings from the analysis of the questionnaire provide supporting and confirmatory
information in the testing of the hypotheses. For example, the project as a whole was reported
by the sample and the infrastructural information as being feasible, the analysis of languages
has also not shown any negative indications to the workability of the project; and it thought
very important that the contributors to this research have been willing to provide information
from such a variety of viewpoints e.g. whereas some of them are willing international
participants and others less so e.g. in providing peacekeepers to the UN. The responses to the
questionnaire and the information from the interviews also shows that the participants have
been serious and take the prospect of an international standard for security very seriously and
have shown that they would be willing to put significant training in place for their
staff/officers to ensure the most efficient operation of the project; and it is significant in this
respect that the most in demand improvement from the sample has been shown to be
Procedures and this is thought to be an important indication as to the perceived level of
current ability to comply. A very important indicator for the future prospect of such a project
is thought to come from the final question in the questionnaire in which the sample was asked
if they would cooperate in the event that countries they would not normally speak with were
also to join and they replied they would through a third party arrangement. This is thought to
be very important because it would overcome a major hurdle which dogs many international
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organisations at their very start. A lot of the findings in the above analysis ring very true to
the long experienced person like me because I have seen many of these very same issues
come before me time and again and decided on them in ways that I can now see to be the
most logical and practical way of handling them.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations
Conclusions
The basic proposition at the heart of this work is that there should be an international standard
for security, and if all nations subscribed to it and all security operations worked in the same
way with same systems and quality levels it would produce a holistic effect such that all
would benefit. The project would also involve the sharing and exchange of information in a
cooperative way to increase efficiency in the detection and arrest of those involved in
organised crime, terrorism, drugs, people trafficking and various other cross-border security
and criminal activity. Whilst it is found that some legal and political considerations resulting
in a low level of accessibility of information and a lack of access to information may be
hindering progress, there is no evidence to suggest that the availability of information issue
would stifle the establishment of an international standard nor would the project likely
ultimately fail owing to an inability to provide data access to members. Although it is not the
quality of policing or security which is holding back progress and it may be a legal issue such
as has been reported recently (Reuters October 2013) that the USA NSA asked the Japanese
security authorities to assist them in communications data gathering and the request was
refused because there is a law in Japan against the invasion of privacy which is in fact
enshrined in their constitution as Article 21 Japanese Constitution Invasion of Privacy -
Secrecy of Communications. The key issue on protection of privacy depends on whether it
hinders the gathering and use of information which have not been found to be restrictive
indicating that information could be gathered freely in most cases and there are often no legal
impediments. The large majority of the sample countries also said that they saw neither
significant socio-cultural / politico-structural issues, nor any major impediments coming from
the low incidence of likely resistance from the police and elsewhere in the security
infrastructure. Whilst the majority also recognise that the lack of major legal or other
impediments they do accept that there would be a need for some legislation and their
expressed  willingness to enact it further indicates that the project would be supported by the
majority in spite of a legislative position.
It is true that most countries do not manage their security to any form of international or other
standard and some of the reason may be that they have not been sold on other similar
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initiatives like INTERPOL’s MIND/FIND and also their I-24/7 and the Schengen
Information System. Whilst most agree with the proposition that there is a role for developing
an integrated government strategy for achieving global security and most countries accept the
value of cooperation in security; the majority have said they would have a problem paying for
it and we can imagine that this would be a problem for poorer countries. It is also found from
the infrastructure research and also from the interviews that some operatives and officers
have expressed concerns about acting on information provided by less rigorous colleagues in
countries where the quality of processes or the standards of legal governance are lower. All
the information shows that there is little restriction in the area of information and the methods
of gathering and managing information, so there is no real impediment to progress coming
from this area.
We might easily think that if information was not available either by law or decree or just by
lack of development then that would hinder the development of the subject project. However,
there is no evidence to indicate that the unavailability of information would retard the efforts
of the international community in developing a standard and cooperating in its
implementation, and nothing has been found that would indicate that the process would fail
owing to an inability to provide data access to other members. Of course the project would
not work without such sharing and exchanging information but the information coming from
the infrastructure research on the development of other projects such as UNICEF
(Stephenson, 2005) and the WHO (Stein, 1982) is that they start with such coordination
difficulties rapidly overcome them because the members see benefit from coordination
leading to cooperation. It was also discovered during the infrastructure information gathering
(desk research) that there is a lot of information in other country files. So, for example,
during the hunt for the Venezuelan terrorist Carlos the Jackal his own country Venezuela
could not provide much information but the French and Lebanese and other security
departments had sufficient information on him to enable him to be tracked down and arrested
(Follain, 1998). The problem with cases like this is that whilst several countries can have
pieces of the jigsaw of information the infrastructure research has shown that these are not
easily brought together nor disseminated to others where there is no system for total
international cooperation. So, the critical elements have been found to be standardisation or at
least benchmarking for commonality and improvement etc and much information has shown
that ISO 31000, and also the recent initiatives of the DHS-HSSP and CEN/CENELEC, are
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proposed as a basis upon which to build international cooperation. Few could explain why
they do not implement it and the majority of countries said that whilst they supported
working to a standard and valued cooperation between them they also said that the area in
which they most needed support was management. This indicates that the majority of security
specialists realise that there is a need for working together which would require a
methodology and a standard but they can do little about it because the proposition has not
been made in a coordinated way designed to address the special circumstances of many
countries i.e. some cannot afford it, others have conflicts, many have a culture of secrecy and
need to know what would change etc. An almost unanimous majority have said that they
don’t benchmark against any standard perhaps because there isn’t a basis for doing so but
those same people believe that the main challenges to the project would be IT, Infrastructure
Protection, and Counter Terrorism and they want improvements and common standards to
work to.
It is clear that whilst about half the security apparatus around the world may think they have
self-determination and are free-to-act they are in fact controlled by their masters in
government who are both legislators, and thereby provide them with the rules by which they
work, and also their paymasters such that governments ultimately control them. The research
found that officers and operatives often believe that they have self-determination because
they act according to repeatable rules which they naturally see as reasonable and right.
Sometimes, as was found in some instances in the interviews, standards of policing and
security operations in some developing countries are at levels dictated by the economic
pressures of the country although no resistance to the subject proposition within their police
was found. So concern has been expressed that some countries may wish to participate and
would benefit but may not be able to fund such an initiative, thereby making the finer points
of self-determination and being free to act somewhat academic. However, many wealthier
countries realise that much of international terrorist activity, drug trafficking, people
trafficking etc have their origins in less well off developing countries, and that if they could
enable these countries to join such an initiative then the poorer countries would benefit and so
would the wealthier ones. As an example a large majority of wealthier countries said that they
would support poorer countries and bear the costs. It is very important as a further example of
the value that even some poorer countries place upon the project that 10% of them said they
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would pay their own costs (Table B69). So we can see that both poorer and richer countries
both value the subject proposition positively albeit often for different reasons.
There are bound to be many differences in many areas when we bring so many disparate
nations together having different languages and cultures and these differences are often most
easily seen in the quality of systems, standards and operations. This study has found that the
large majority of nations claim to have sufficient internal levels of quality and achievement,
which may be a subjective position to be viewed as such unless there is a comparison being
made. It has also been found that those who have such quality and achievement standards
also have the wherewithal to drive the development of integrated government security
standards towards achieving global security. Although it is also true that few standardise their
security operations at all but some say they have some checks and balances in that they have
some KPIs in place (Table B17). However, it was also found that the majority believe that
government action would drive towards standardisation and that they do measure levels of
quality and achievement. Some uncertainty also exists in the international community
regarding the methods of such a project and this discussion reverts back to the earlier point
made regarding the various and previous alternative initiatives i.e. INTERPOL, Schengen etc
not having been sufficiently well promulgated. Nevertheless, a large majority of those studied
focused on the development of security standardisation methods as being most in need of
research which refers back to the amount of knowledge of the subject project which exists
and over two-thirds of the contributors to this project want a more detailed understanding of
security standardisation and the wider quality implications.
As this discussion progresses we see the focus of key principles begin to repeat themselves
i.e. cooperation, impediments, standardisation etc and a logical structure of possible
arrangements starts to appear and it is clear that all of these principles, whilst being very
important, success actually depend upon coordination. The concept of coordinating the
management and operation of such a standardisation process is critical to it ever working in
fact, but it is also an important consideration in the design of the proposition as a whole. If
the system cannot be coordinated then there can be no cooperation and the majority of the
information gathered indicates that cooperation would be essential to success although what
is required of the parties in terms of cooperation may be one of the issues which hindered
progress in other similar past international security propositions. The sample data shows that
the linkage between cooperation and coordination is appreciated by the majority who value
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cooperation and say that this would drive all participants to the need to standardise (Table
B34). It is probably because most countries report that they use some software in the
management and operation of security that they believe that the project would be dominated
by software systems. The worry of many is that the limited ability of some members to use
the software effectively would be an impediment to - or at least retard - the project. Overall
the major challenge perceived by most is in the area of access to information. Only a small
proportion have free access to information and others need a new Freedom of Information
Law. This would add credence to the argument that with no access to - or restrictions on -
information then the project might fail in the provision of data to other members. This
indicates that convincing potential members to lift or weaken slightly the restriction on the
containment of information to make it available for sharing would be the strongest indicator
to success. Many nations indicated they would be willing to make changes.
If we measure the prospects by the experiences of countries in other international agreements,
and in the light of the findings of this research, then the balance is in favour of a positive
outcome. This is largely because the experience of countries is that the greater the
cooperation the higher the rate of success. Information gathered in this research indicated that
the vast majority of countries felt that coordinated cooperation, including free sharing of
information within a structured organisation of standardisation, would undoubtedly succeed.
Recommendations
All the indications from this work are that success of the project would be significantly
enhanced if there was international unanimity in membership. This may not be easy to
achieve. Some reasons could be addressed from within the project design and structure.
Others would require action by individual country members to their own structures. The
majority of intra-project protocols would be design situational and structural. They would
address issues like the rules of cooperation, the contributions to be made by members,
quality, methodology, costs and mutual responsibilities. The member compliance issues
would be equally as complex but much more varied given the number of countries involved
and the differences between them. The project should at the outset promulgate a set of rules
and standards to which all would be expected to comply. These should be designed to address
the variability of the members recognising the many cultures and politico-legal structures
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involved. Such structural requirements should be designed and built by polling all nations.
This would lead to a constitution being built around the findings by a team of international
lawyers working from within the organisation, The resulting structure should be ‘sold’ to the
community of nations through an existing world body like the United Nations.
Countries would need to distinguish between co-operation and co-ordination. This research
defines co-operation as the willingness of countries to share information from their databases
with other countries: in some cases this could mean that countries could collect information
on people that they do not need for their own use but which others express a significant need.
The research defines coordination as the technical ability to share information, in a timely
and efficient way, usually using common software and secure communications technology.
Co-operation is essentially a political choice, but is useless without resources being made
available to ensure the common platforms and the ability to use them are available within a
particular country. In the case of developing countered with few resources to move towards
co-ordination, some form of assistance from more developed states or international
organisations could be essential.
The constitution should be built upon the recognised foundations of a successful structure as
identified herein and founded upon several solid concepts. These would include:
 the relationship between coordination and cooperation;
 the need to cooperate in the exchange of information
 the need to cooperate in the implementation of security at the hands-on level;
 the free availability of information and the unfettered sharing and exchange;
 the working to common standards and in common ways;
 the using of systems accessible by fellow members;
 the establishment of common documentation;
Such a high level of cooperation should ensure a high level of efficiency in operations and
produce a holistic effect such that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts and benefit
all members.
It is probably not surprising that there would be some difficulties in the development of a
landmark proposition such as the international standardisation of security. There are so many
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influences and vested interests to take into consideration when trying to homogenise
something as close to social order as security. Some of these important considerations are
common to many countries. There are legal and political considerations which can by virtue
of enactment in one jurisdiction impact all others resulting in a low level of accessibility of
information. Whilst such an impediment would be a major stumbling block, the reduced
availability of information would only occur at the outset and would be overcome by the
declared willingness of the international community to make the project work.
So given the declared uncertainty of what such a proposition would look like it would be
highly recommended to explain the project in terms of its evolution and how it would
eventually lead to beneficial improvements. The legal issue would still need to be overcome
internally by nations. It is not found that the quality of policing or security would retard
progress and it may be legal issues would prove the stickiest to resolve. The protection of
privacy laws could also be very difficult. The gathering and use of information was not found
to be restricted in most cases which indicates that information management would not be an
impediment. However, there is clearly a need to explain this to potential members. It is
recommended that a marketing campaign to create awareness of the simplicity of the
proposition and the significant benefits to be had should be established. An important part of
this should be a polling element to seek suggestions from members of what should be
included. It is important to remember that where a need for legislation has been posited the
response of the majority was a willingness to change the law. It would thus be important to
identify such changes and to detail them in a prospectus of member responsibilities.
Many international initiatives fail at the point of implementation in the hands of practitioners.
In this case it could be the police or security officials who could be worried about
maintaining quality. However, this would be manageable provided that checks and balances
are built in to ensure uniformity of methods (Shehu, 2005). It is likely there would be greater
commitment and not less resistance from such operatives provided some Key Performance
Indicators were included. Whilst this research found that most countries did not manage their
security to any form of international or other standard the majority view is that it would be a
supported initiative (Table B14). The problem of maintaining quality and standards might be
in trying to remain sensitive to the interaction between members. However, no indication was
found to suggest that any socio-cultural or politico-structural issues might impact
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significantly. As a result, it is recommended that the results of the polling of all potential
members should be crossed referred to all other countries. This is because many socio-
cultural, politico-structural or relationship issues involve other countries: examples are
Catholic and Protestant populations in Ireland, Jewish and Muslim populations in the Middle
East, Indian and Pakistani populations in Kashmir. Such sensitivities would need to be
accounted for in the cooperation methodologies and systemic interactions forming part of the
constitution and operating manual.
Conclusion
Put simply this research has shown that key components to success would be a system of
coordination managed by an organisational management regime which would ensure
cooperation of the members and the working of the processes. This in turn would overcome
the many perceived impediments and lead to the international standardisation of security in
an efficient and plural organisation working for the benefit of all.
This research has shown that wide agreement that:
 There is a role for developing an integrated government strategy for achieving
global security and the value of cooperating in security is widely accepted.
 The majority of respondents said that they would have a problem paying for it.
 The paradox is that the richer countries need the system perhaps more so than the
poorer ones. Some poorer countries even profit from the cross border trade in
illicit goods and even drugs and people trafficking.
 The legal infrastructure of some poorer countries has lower levels of governance
and lower standards of procedure and process. Some of this refers back to the
issue of the availability of information and the levels of evidence required in law
and this is most common in less developed countries.
 It is, of course, very important to avoid such practices and this issue could be
addressed in the process of checks and balances and KPIs.
 As discussed earlier they would need to be written into the constitution of the
standard. This would be beneficial both from a perspective of maintaining
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standards but also, and perhaps most importantly, in engendering a culture of
higher standards and of fairness and equality before the law.
 This issue would likely be highly contentious among the members and would best
be addressed in the process of polling for situational and circumstantial
information as discussed earlier and written into the methodology and
constitution.
 A general opinion largely based upon the views of operatives in the security
apparatus of many countries is that such standardisation of security would likely
fail over time owing to an inability to provide data access to other members.
 It is recognized that the project would not work without the free sharing and
exchanging of information between member nations. A key component of the
process is that management must come from the organisation to ensure there is
continuing impetus in the project.
 This implies the need for a strong machinery of control.
 This would be a body to police the process beyond just a simple documentary
standard of compliance and operations.
 It could be decided to place the process under the auspices of an existing
international body such as the UN or perhaps more likely within INTERPOL,
which already has most of the apparatus available to take on such a responsibility
 Linking to an existing body would benefit from an existing infrastructure of
information and communications. This is unlikely to be objected to by potential
members because a large majority of them expressed the view that management
should be an essential part of the process and that there should be a controlling
mechanism within the agreement.
 If the project is to succeed it will need a clear methodology enshrined in a
constitution governed by a system embodied in an operating manual operated to a
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Appendix A Questionnaire used in The Research




I am engaged in an academic research project investigating the feasibility of the
standardization and implementation of an international standard for security and
the related possibility of the implementation of a system of cooperation in the
exchange of information and data between nations. The following is a
questionnaire of questions targeting data and information critical to this study and I
hope that you will agree to contribute by responding to this questionnaire with
information about the security apparatus and operations in your country. As you
can see the questions are easily understood requiring just either a Yes/No or tick
box answers which I think you could complete in a short time from your wide
knowledge and especially by reflection of your experience.
I assure you that your confidentiality will be respected at all times and it is not
necessary for you to enter your name on this questionnaire and that your identity
will not appear anywhere in the report resulting from this research. You need not
answer any questions you either don’t know the answer to or do not wish to
answer, but it would be helpful if you would answer as many as possible – the
golden rule is if in doubt about a question don’t answer it
This is an international questionnaire being sent to respondents in many countries
and great care has been taken to address a variety of cultural sensitivities and I
hope that nothing in it offends you but if it does I would appreciate it if you would let
me know and I apologize in advance.
Mohamed Juma Al Darmaki
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Abu Dhabi, UAE
1. Are you a…..?
 Police Officer 26 (1)
 Security Officer 16 (2)
 Intelligence Office 9 (3)
 Computer Crime Investigator 4 (4)
 Security System Engineer 2 (5)
 Security Researcher 2 (6)
Other (please specify)
2. Do you standardise your security system to ISO 31000? – (Yes/No) 12/47 (1/0)
3. Which of the following areas of security are most in need of standardization?
Information Technology  16 (1)
Infrastructure Protection  15 (2)
Financial  1 (3)
Border Protection  5 (4)
Illegal Migration  1 (5)
Transnational Organized  8 (6)
Crime
CounterTerrorism  13 (7)
4. Do you have internal levels of quality and achievement? - (Yes/No) 50/9
(1/0)
5. If so do you benchmark these against other nations? - (Yes/No) 6/53
(1/0)
6. There is a role for developing integrated government security strategies in respect of
achieving global security.
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 Strongly Agree 47 (1)
 Agree 8 (2)
 Neutral 1 (3)
 Disagree 2 (4)
 Strongly Disagree 1 (5)
7. Do you measure levels of quality and achievement as Key Performance
Indicators (KPIs) as compliance to any standard internal or external? -
(Yes/No) 42/17 (1/0)
8. What degree of free access to information is there in your country? Low
 Medium High 33/20/6 (1/2/3)
9. Is there a Freedom of Information Act in your country? - (Yes/No) 8/51
(1/0)
10.Are there cultural restrictions on the gathering and use of information in
your country? - (Yes/No) 35/24 (1/0)
11. Research is needed to develop
Security standardization  47 (1)
methods
New methods to minimize  5 (2)
risk
New approaches for  7 (3)
mitigating security
difficulties
12. If governments coordinate their efforts, it would lead to convincing the international
community of the need to standardise security solutions.
 Strongly Agree 47 (1)
 Agree 8 (2)
 Neutral 2 (3)
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 Disagree 1 (4)
 Strongly Disagree (5)
13.Is there a free press in your country? - (Yes/No) 44/14 (1/0)
14. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 31000 risk management
standards can be used in the development of international security standards.
 Strongly Agree 48 (1)
 Agree 8 (2)
 Neutral 2 (3)
 Disagree (4)
 Strongly Disagree 1 (5)
15. I favour and support internationally recognised integrated security standards to
protect against forged passports
 Strongly Agree 53 (1)
 Agree 5 (2)
 Neutral 1 (3)
 Disagree (4)
 Strongly Disagree (5)
16. Do you think that reflective learning can form a good understanding for
standardization in security, human trafficking, and human rights?
 Strongly Agree 57 (1)
 Agree 1 (2)
 Neutral 1 (3)
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 Disagree (4)
 Strongly Disagree. (5)
17.Aside from cultural considerations is there an issue of privacy involved in
the gathering of information whether covertly or overtly? - (Yes/No)
38/21 (1/0)
18.Do you have a free-to-act police force? - (Yes/No) 50/9 (1/0)
19.Does the government, politicians or judiciary have influence over the
activities of the police and security apparatus in your country? - (Yes/No)
29/30 (1/0)
20.Is there a legal restriction in your country to the sharing or exchanging of
information with other countries? - (Yes/No) 6/53 (1/0)
21.Do you use software to manage security operations and databases? -
(Yes/No) 55/4 (1/0)
22.Is the application of software products easily implemented in your
organisation? - (Yes/No) 45/14 (1/0)
23.Do you have cooperation agreements with other countries in the area of
security involving the exchange of information and cooperation on
operations? - (Yes/No) 15/44 (1/0)
24.Is the experience of such arrangements good  or bad? 33/26 (1/0)
25.Does your country willingly cooperate with others in other areas? -
(Yes/No) 58/1 (1/0)
26.Is there an acceptance of the value of cooperation in security? - (Yes/No)
51/8 (1/0)
27.If you are a relatively wealthy developed nation would you be likely to
support the cost of international standardisation of security? - (Yes/No)
51/8 (1/0)
28.If you are a developing country would you be able to finance such an
initiative? - (Yes/No) 6/53 (1/0)
29.Are there socio-cultural, politico-structural issues which would impede
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progress in this initiative in your country? - (Yes/No) 19/40 (1/0)
30.What in your experience would be the difficulties in this project at the
grass roots level of the officer/staff? – Management  Systems 
Resources 39/8/12 (1/2/3)
31.Is the police and security force in your country a professional
organisation with ranking officers and reporting lines? - (Yes/No) 59/0
(1/0)
32.In your experience would standardisation and operating such a system
especially in the area of cooperation with others be an impediment to this
project? - (Yes/No) 30/29 (1/0)
33.Is policing in your country based on reacting to events  or is it based on
acting on intelligence in avoiding events ? 47/12
34.In your experience would there be resistance in the police and security in
your country to the sharing of information with other countries? - (Yes/No)
20/39 (1/0)
35.Does your country have existing cooperation agreements in the area of
security which would preclude participation in standardisation and
cooperation? - (Yes/No) 2/57 (1/0)
36.In your experience would participation in this project require new
legislation? - (Yes/No) 36/23 (1/0)
37.Aside from the legislative position what is the culture in your country to
people’s human rights? – Support Not caring 53/6 (1/0)
38.In your experience would standardisation be feasible and workable in
practical terms? - (Yes/No) 45/14 (1/0)
39.Does the law in your country distinguish between data and information
which is gathered covertly and that obtained overtly? - (Yes/No) 9/50
(1/0)
40.Is a major foreign language commonly spoken and taught in schools? If
so which?
English  French Spanish Other 43/3/5/8 (1/2/3/4)
41.Does your country have a successful track record in complying with
international agreements / cooperation / organisations and standards? -
(Yes/No) 49/10 (1/0)
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42.Does your country provide peacekeepers to the United Nations? -
(Yes/No) 18/41 (1/0)
43.Is the use of international standards of units, weights and measures
common in your country? - (Yes/No) 57/2 (1/0)
44.Is training liberally provided in your organisation? - (Yes/No) 56/3 (1/0)
45.Is the value of training appreciated in your organisation? - (Yes/No)
31/28 (1/0)
46. The following aspects of security provision are most in need of standardization
Procedures  51 (1)
Information Technology  6 (2)(e.g. databases)
Equipment  2 (3)
47.Does your country have friction with another country with which it would
not cooperate in such a project? - (Yes/No) 52/7 (1/0)
48.Would this still be the case if we exclude e.g. Iran and North Korea and
other frequently non-compliant states? - (Yes/No) 4/55 (1/0)
49.If so would your country be happy to cooperate instead with a third party





Appendix B Detailed Statistical Analysis of Questionnaire Results
1) The Sample Participants
There were 59 respondents to the questionnaire from a variety of disciplines within the
security apparatus of numerous countries. The sample to which the questionnaire was sent
varied widely to enable a spread in respondents to satisfy the statistical rigour of the
sampling process having been random. However, it is known that they are all in positions
of some responsibility with sufficient experience to be able to make a valuable
contribution to this work. They also come from a variety of specialities which is thought
important to spread information risk and also range in rank and have an average age of 35














1. Are you a…..?
Figure B.1 Are you a....?
Table B.1 Q 1(Rows) Are you a…..?
Police Officer 26 44%
Security Officer 16 27%
Intelligence Officer 9 15%
Computer Crime Investigator 4 7%
Security System Engineer 2 3.5%
Security Researcher 2 3.5%
Over two-thirds (71%) of the sample participants might be distinguished as hands-on field
operatives being either police officers or security officers with the rest of the sample
(29%) being support or back office support personnel engaged in intelligence gathering or
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research etc. The contributions of this smaller group is no less important because not all
there is to know is available on the street otherwise there would be no need for them in
their important functions. Whilst it might be intuitively thought that as we are researching
the likelihood of being able to implement such an internationalised agreement on security
that the answers might be best found in the proportion of police to people. This might
have been the case if we were studying the application of a standard in a discrete area, but
the breadth and international nature of this work indicates that we need to support the
findings with detailed background input. The proportion of police to people in a major
USA city also mirrors the proportion in the industry (Bayley, D.H. 1994) i.e. about 320 per
100,000 across all disciplines. This proportion is also a positive indicator insofar as the
reflective contributions of these officers would be mainly at the level of interaction with
the policing process where it is thought the greatest value could be found. However, the
support group is a sufficient proportion such that its contribution would have a significant
impact on the findings.
I had wondered if the mix of participants and the fact that 86% of them are practitioners
i.e. officers of one kind or another has provided a balanced wide ranging base of opinion
and experience given that the questions are structured to draw out answers based upon
their reflection. I looked back on my experience and the extent and basis of knowledge
of colleagues and others and can see that there is a sound basis for the spread of
discipline within the sample in that those which are most represented are also those with
the most information and experience upon which to reflect. There is also, of course, the
statistical requirement of any such research in that the sample should be a random
sample i.e. without bias or prejudice and the sample hereto is exactly that.
2) Do you standardise your security system to ISO 31000?
Whilst there is no all encompassing international standard for security there are
standards for process, quality and content which have been established, for example, by
the ISO which have been implemented in some countries (ISO 31000-2009). The
benefits of embracing standards in this sector have been promoted by various
international bodies including the UN and the EU (Security Research: Security
Research Projects under the 7th Framework Programme for Research towards a more
Secure Society and Increased Industrial Competitiveness, 2009), although they are, of
course, not mandatory and have been variously successful e.g. through INTERPOL
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which whilst it has wide support and membership internationally has little hands-on
control over the standards and operations of member states’ security apparatus.
Table B.2 Q 2(Rows) . Do you standardise..?
No      47    79.66%
Yes     12    20.34%
It may appear disappointing that 80% of the sample reports that they do not standardise
their security to ISO 31000 which is currently thought to be the benchmark standard for
this purpose (ISO 31000-2009). However this can also be viewed in a positive light in
that compliance to ISO would be a voluntary action on the part of nations and indicates
that at least 80% of the nations represented by the sample to the questionnaire evidently
show willingness to cooperate and improve the standards of their security systems. This
is an important indication because as can be seen from the following analysis that of
those respondents saying that they do not standardise their security to ISO 31000 >87%
answered to question 14 saying that they strongly agree that ISO 31000 could be used in
the development of internationals security standards.
Table B.3 Q2 (Rows) Do you standardise..? X Q 14(Cols) ...ISO 31000..?
1      2     3     5     All
No        41      3     2     1      47
87.23 6.38 4.26  2.13  100.0%
Yes        8      4     0     0      12
66.67  33.33  0.00  0.00  100.0%
All       49      7     2     1      59
83.05  11.86  3.39  1.69  100.0%
[Chi-Square statistic = 7.1049 P-Value = 0.068627 significant at p<0.10 indicating dependent
variables]
Whilst this may not indicate a willingness to subscribe to an international standard for
security it does indicate that there is an awareness of standardisation and that ISO 31000
could provide a basis upon which to build such an international agreement. But there are
other considerations insofar as some countries may not have standardised their security
operations but they would be in favour of doing so and would, for example, favour and
support internationally recognised integrated security standards to protect against forged
passports as shown in the following analysis of those respondents who did not standardise >87%
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were in favour of doing so to protect against forged passports.
Table B.4 Q 2(Rows) Do you standardise..? X Q 15(Cols) ...passports..?
1      2     3     All
No         41      5     1      47
87.23 10.64  2.13  100.0%
Yes        12      0     0      12
100.00   0.00  0.00  100.0%
All 53      5     1      59
89.83   8.47  1.69  100.0%
On balance, therefore we can see that whilst many nations have not standardised their
security apparatus and systems the majority do believe that ISO 31000 could be the
basis of an internationalised standard and an equal number strongly agree that it would
benefit them in protecting against forged passports.
As an example of this I recall numerous occasions when the proposition of an
international standard had been mentioned in international gatherings as being an ideal
to improve worldwide security. However, I do not recall an occasion involving me when
there was any heavyweight international initiative i.e. perhaps government to
government or from the UN or other body that led to high level negotiations on
feasibility or planning with any view to going forward with any proposition to develop
such a plan; so perhaps the answer to this may have been a marketing shortfall in that
nobody set out to sell the proposition to the wider international community.
3) Which areas of security are most in need of standardization?
Information in this area is bound to be influenced by the level of development and focus
on security in the subject countries. Rich countries able to afford to install complex and
expensive systems generally do so liberally in this age of cross border crime and
increasing security worries of terrorism. Although the prioritisation of functions within
the complex model of a modern security operation must be a consideration even to those
countries more able to implement whatever facilities they wish. An associated indication
coming from this work might be the different focus on where countries concentrate their
development of security which could be based upon their country specific circumstances
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and level of need or indeed according to their ability to afford to do so. The responses to
the questionnaire show that 75% of respondents identified the greatest need for
standardisation in their organisations was focused in 3 main areas i.e. Information
Technology, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter Terrorism. We could describe these
findings as a sign of the times because these are the areas most prevalent in the media reports
of security problems (Aleksandar Klaic 2005). Whilst these responses might appear at first
glance to be typical of less developed nations in that perhaps they need to improve their IT
e.g. in poorer countries, or protect their infrastructure, or fend off the scourge of terrorism.
However, the reality may be altogether different because these same priorities could equally
apply to the wealthiest and most developed nations e.g. the USA has a huge budget for IT; it
has a very large department of homeland security to protect against another 9/11 attack; and it



















...most in need of standardisation..?
Figure B.2 Segments most in need....?
Table B5 Q 3(Rows) . ...segments most in need..?
Information Technology 16    27.12%
Infrastructure Protection 15    25.42%
Financial 1     1.69%
Border Protection 5     8.47%
Illegal Immigration 1     1.69%
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Transnational organised Crime 8    13.56%
Counter Terrorism 13    22.03%
The 3 main priorities above are interrelated in that IT discovers and alerts to
infrastructure and other risks and provides a tool in counter terrorism to protect the
status quo and infrastructure. It is also indicative of the level of development
internationally that the 3 least supported of the options are those which are perhaps the
most technically developed and also served by other parts of the system. For example,
Financial is very low in the estimation of the participants to the study perhaps because it
is not a high risk of exposure for poorer countries and also because the financial system
has very well advanced processes and systems to deal with money laundering and
financial crime. Similarly Illegal Immigration receives a very low score perhaps also
because it is well served with new chip passports, visas and INTERPOL notifications of
wanted persons (C Evans-Pughe, 2005). This latter point, of course, does not address the
large number of illegal migrants from, for example, North Africa travelling to Italy in
unseaworthy vessels (Baldwin-Edwards & Schain 2013) because that problem is mainly a
military issue as they have the facilities to deal with it as a Border Protection issue
which also received a relatively low score. So we might assume the items which are
believed by the sample to be those most requiring standardisation are those ephemeral
issues which provide the most clues to terrorism and crimes and appear in the media.
As a test of this we could consider the responses to the question ‘.....which areas need
standardisation?’ in relation to the responses to the question ‘..... developing integrated
government security strategies in respect of achieving global security?’ the value of the analysis
of which would be to indicate whether those who believe there is a need to develop government
security strategies also believe that those which need developing are also those which the
majority believe need standardisation. The extent of any such agreement would confirm a
majority opinion that standardisation and integrating government security strategies would
increase global security.
Table B6 Q 3(Rows) …segments most in need..? X Q 6(Cols) ...govt strategy..?
St.AG      Agree     Neut     Disag     Sr.Dis     All
IT 11 4 1 0 0        16
68.75     25.00 6.25 0.00       0.00    100.0%
Inf 14 0 0 0 1        15
93.33 0.00 0.00       0.00       6.67    100.0%
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Fin 1 0 0 0 0         1
100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00    100.0%
Bord 5 0 0 0 0         5
100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00    100.0%
Migr 1 0 0 0 0         1
100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00       0.00 100.0%
Crim 6 1 0 1 0         8
75.00 12.50 0.00 12.50 0.00    100.0%
CTerr 9 3 0 1          0        13
69.23 23.08 0.00 7.69 0.00    100.0%
All 47 8 1 2          1        59
79.66 13.56 1.69 3.39 1.69    100.0%
The results of this analysis are very interesting in that over 69% either strongly agree or
agree that the 3 areas highlighted previously are most in need of standardisation which
is a high correlation with the responses of 75% to the question of which areas needed
standardisation (Table B5). Most interesting though is that the response to which areas
are most in need of standardisation fits very closely to the profile of responses to the
application of government strategy. However this begs the question as to whether the
participants believe that the methods and systems available are what they need and this
can be analysed by analysis of ‘.....which areas need standardisation?’ in relation to the
responses to the question ‘Research is needed to develop.....’ (Table B7) the value of which
would be to identify whether the sample believes that the areas in need are also those which need
further research.
Table B7 Q 3(Rows) . ...most in need..? X Q 11(Cols) ...research needed..?
SecStd      MinRisk       Mitig     All
IT 11 3 2 16
68.75 18.75 12.50    100.0%
Inf 13 0 2 15
86.67 0.00 13.33    100.0%
Fin 0 0 1 1
0.00 0.00 100.00    100.0%
Bord 4 1 0 5
80.00 20.00 0.00    100.0%
Migr 1 0 0 1
100.00 0.00 0.00 100.0%
Crim 7 0 1 8
87.50 0.00 12.50    100.0%
CTerr 11 1 1        13
84.62 7.69 7.69    100.0%
All 47 5 7        59
79.66 8.47 11.86    100.0%
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Once again we can see the same emphasis applied by the respondents in the same areas
in that 80% believe that Security standardisation methods is the most important
consideration and again we can see the same emphasis in the areas of Information
Technology, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter Terrorism.
The responses of the sample describe exactly the situation as I had seen in my position
as a senior officer in the Abu Dhabi Police in that 75% of the headline concerns (Abu
Dhabi Police., 2007) fell into just a few categories i.e. Information Technology,
Infrastructure Protection and Counter-terrorism and the inferences arrived at in the
analysis above confirm what many of us have always known.
4) Are there sufficient internal levels of quality and achievement?
One would not expect a negative statement to this question from a sample of
professional security officers as there should be internal checks and balances and not
having them would indicate that they are not doing their job.
Table B8 Q 4(Rows) ...quality and achievement..
NO       9    15.25%
YES    50    84.75%
85% of the sample responses confirmed that they have sufficient internal levels of
quality and achievement, but the test must be as to how this information relates to the
data gathered in response to question 3 which enquires as to which areas need
standardisation. The value of this analysis being that whilst each may say they have
checks and balances in place the question must be as to their perception of the quality
and whether they see any improvement would come from standardisation i.e. on the one
hand what is their opinion of their level of quality and achievement? and on the other
hand would it be improved by standardisation and if so then wouldn’t that indicate the
true confidence they have in their levels of quality and achievement?
Table B9  Q 3(Rows) ...most in need..? X Q 4(Cols) ...quality and achievement..
NO     YES    All
IT            2     14     16
12.5   87.5  100.0%
InfP          3     12 15
20.0   80.0  100.0%
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Fin           0      1      1
0.0  100.0  100.0%
Bord          0      5      5
0.0  100.0  100.0%
Migr          0      1      1
0.0  100.0  100.0%
Crim          1      7      8
12.5   87.5  100.0%
CTerr         3     10     13
23.1   76.9  100.0%
All           9     50     59
15.3   84.7  100.0%
This confirms that the respondents place emphasis on the same 3 main areas as in the
previous analyses i.e. Information Technology, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter
Terrorism as being the areas where they have levels of quality and achievement as being
the same as those which need standardisation. The implication being that they either
believe that their internal levels would improve as a result and perhaps that they lack
confidence in them. Or perhaps they are just supporters of standardisation and would
welcome working at a level of the state of the art and this can be analysed as follows: -
Table B10  Q 4(Rows) ...quality and achievement.. X Q 6(Cols) ...govt strategy..?
St.AG      Agree     Neut     Disag     Str.Dis     All
NO            7 2 0 0 0 9
77.78      22.22      0.00 0.00 0.00    100.0%
YES          40 6 1 2 1 50
80.00      12.00      2.00 4.00      2.00    100.0%
All 47          8 1           2 1 59
79.66      13.56      1.69 3.39      1.69    100.0%
This clearly indicates that 92% of those who have internal levels of quality and
achievement strongly agree or agree that there is a role for developing integrated
government security strategies in respect of achieving global security. It might be
possible to assume that in this respect those who have internal standards for quality and
achievement implicitly believe in the benefits of having them and would support the
establishment of an international standard for security. Although, it is important to note
that all of the sample who do not have internal levels of quality and achievement
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strongly agree or agree that there is a role for developing security strategies in achieving
global security.
5) Do countries benchmark their internal quality and achievement levels against
other nations?
It is interesting that the number of respondents to this question report almost exactly the
reverse of those who said that they have internal levels of quality and achievement i.e.
6:53 as compared to 50:9. The reason for this may be the same for both cases because
on the one hand the majority of countries may have their own levels of quality and
achievements because there is no international standard for them to use for this purpose
and by the same token the majority of countries may say that they do not benchmark
against other nations because there is no international standard for them to follow.
Table B11 Q 5(Rows) ...do you benchmark..?
NO     53    89.83%
YES     6    10.17%
So whilst these findings may be virtuous insofar as they confirm one another and the
central proposition to this work, the most valuable test would be whether those which do
not benchmark do not do so because there is no system for it and do they support
internationalisation as a result?
Table B12 Q5 (Rows)  ...do you benchmark..? X Q 6(Cols) ...govt strategy..?
St.AG      Agree     Neut     Disag Sr.Dis     All
NO            41 8 1 2 1        53
77.36     15.09      1.89     3.77       1.89    100.0%
YES            6 0 0 0 0         6
100.00      0.00      0.00     0.00       0.00    100.0%
All 47 8 1 2 1        59
79.66     13.56      1.69     3.39       1.69    100.0%
The findings are clear in that those who do not benchmark, probably because there is no
mechanism available to them, do support the development of integrated government
security strategies to achieve global security. Furthermore, an analysis of which areas of
security would most benefit from standardisation those who responded to the question
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regarding benchmarking confirm as in the following analysis that those who do not
benchmark support the same areas of Information Technology, Infrastructure
Protection, and Counter Terrorism again indicating the areas the majority view as being
the most challenging.
Table B13 Q 5(Rows) ...do you benchmark..? X Q 3(Cols) . ...most in need..?
IT      Inf     Fin     Bord     Mig      Crim      CT    All
NO 15 13 1 5 1 7 11     53
28.30   24.53    1.89     9.43    1.89     13.21    20.75 100.0%
YES 1 2 0 0 0 1 2      6
16.67   33.33    0.00     0.00    0.00     16.67    33.33 100.0%
All 16       15       1 5 1 8 13     59
27.12   25.42    1.69     8.47    1.69     13.56    22.03 100.0%
The overall indication being that the majority of respondents strive for higher standards
and implement checks and balances to attain them and they would welcome an
international standard to which to work and that they have a clear focus on certain issues
in the mix. Table B13 makes an important point in identifying the areas most in need of
standardisation which is important coming from them because without benchmarking
they can have no idea of the comparable quality of their work. Their responses indicate
the value they place in the areas they highlight as being in need perhaps indicating the
comparable value they place upon them.
It is understandable in this analysis that only the minority of countries benchmark
against other countries and I recall that we began to benchmark against other countries
when we had achieved a level of development and had the relationships with other
countries against whom to benchmark (Abu Dhabi Police., 2007). So I anticipate that
the low level of benchmarking may have much to do with a low level of development of
some countries and also some unwillingness of others.
6) Is there a role for developing integrated government security strategies in
respect of achieving global security?
The overwhelming majority, over 93% of the sample respondents either strongly agree
or agree that developing government security strategies would enhance global security.
Table B14  Q 6(Rows) ...govt strategy..?
St.Agree 47    79.66%
Agree 8    13.56%
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Neutral 1     1.69%
Disagree 2     3.39%
St.Disagree     1     1.69%
This may seem obvious and it is understandable that the majority of respondents agree
but perhaps it is not as clear cut as it first appears because there remains the question of
what would an international standard contain and require countries to do. A second
issue is the ability of some countries to comply either in terms of cost or skills, and all
this aside from the issue of the need for unanimity among all nations. So, accepting that
the vast majority have responded in the affirmative as to the value of developing an
international security strategy, the question which must be answered is whether the
same people also believe that a coordination of government effort would convince the
international community of the need to standardise?
Table B15 Q 6(Rows) ...govt strategy..? X Q 12(Cols) ...govts coordinate..?
St.Agr  Agree  Neutral Dis All
St.Agr           39          5 2          1       47
82.98 10.64      4.26       2.13    100.0%
Agree             6          2          0          0        8
75.00      25.00       0.00       0.00   100.0%
Neutral           1          0          0          0        1
100.00       0.00       0.00       0.00   100.0%
Disagree          1          1          0          0        2
50.00      50.00       0.00       0.00   100.0%
St.Disag          1          0          0          0        1
100.00       0.00 0.00       0.00   100.0%
All              48          8          2          1       59
81.36      13.56       3.39       1.69   100.0%
Once again the indications are clear that those who support security strategies to achieve
global security also support the concept that if governments coordinate their efforts it
would lead to the standardisation of security. The above analysis shows that the
majority of the same respondents supported both propositions. As a corollary to the
above finding it would be interesting to know, however, if there is an acceptance of the
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value of cooperation in security in the respondent’s country because their responses may
otherwise be simply academic and the following analysis illustrates the situation:
Table B16 Q 6(Rows) ...govt strategy..? X Q 26(Cols) ...value cooperation..?
NO YES          All
St.Agr        6 41         47
12.8     87.2      100.0%
Agree         2 6          8
25.0     75.0      100.0%
Neutral       0 1          1
0.0 100.0      100.0%
Disagr        0 2          2
0.0 100.0      100.0%
St.Disag      0 1          1
0.0 100.0      100.0%
All 8 51         59
13.6 86.4      100.0%
The above compares the responses in respect to achieving global security against those
related to the acceptance of the value of cooperation. The analysis shows that those who
strongly agree with the development of security strategies for achieving global security
also accept the value of cooperation in security. So we can see that the same proportions
and same characters are responding in the affirmative on the key issues involved and
this is a very important indication for the subject proposition.
7) Do countries measure levels of quality and achievement as Key Performance
Indicators (KPIs) as compliance to any standard internal or external?
We have seen in Tables B10 and B12 above that respondents have declared that many
do have internal levels of quality and achievement and the following analysis shows that
over 70% do have internal compliance targets. Whether these are tested as KPIs to any
external standard is unlikely because the majority have advised that they do not
standardise their security to e.g. ISO 31000, although they may do so pursuant to some
other code standard.
Table B17 Q 7(Rows) ...(KPIs) as compliance..?
NO      17    28.81%
YES    42    71.19%
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To investigate further what security practitioners are actually doing in this regard the
following analysis asks whether those who have said that they measure levels of quality
and achievement also responded in the affirmative when asked if they embrace ISO
31000.
Table B18 Q 2(Rows) Do you standardise..? X Q 7(Cols) ...(KPIs) as compliance..?
NO      YES     All
NO         14       33 47
29.79    70.21  100.0%
YES         3        9      12
25.00    75.00  100.0%
All        17       42      59
28.81    71.19  100.0%
[Chi-Square statistic = 0.1068 P-Value = 0.743808 significant at p<0.26 indicating
dependent variables to this extent]
The frequency of the responses to the questionnaire were opposed in that in answer to
question 2 (Table B2) 80% said that they did not standardise to ISO 31000 and in
answer to question 7 71% said that they do measure levels of quality and achievement to
some standard (Table B17). However, in the above analysis it is evident that many of
those who had said they do comply to a standard clearly do not comply to ISO 31000
because 33 (56% of the sample) who confirmed that they did pursue some standard had
previously said that they did not standardise to ISO 31000. This can also be viewed as a
positive indicator insofar as 80% do see a value of standardisation, 56% to pursue some
standard albeit perhaps an internal one; and 15% do standardise to ISO 31000.
To delve further into the standards activities of the respondents the following analysis
makes a comparison between the declared compliance levels of quality and achievement
to any standard, and also whether the same respondents agree that coordinated
government action would promote standardisation.
Table B19 Q7(Rows) ...(KPIs) as compliance..? X Q 12(Cols) ...govts coordinate..?
St.Agr      Agree    Neutral  Dis   All
NO           12          3           2          0        17
70.59      17.65 11.76       0.00    100.0%
YES          36          5           0          1        42
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85.71      11.90 0.00       2.38    100.0%
All          48          8           2          1        59
81.36      13.56 3.39       1.69    100.0%
The results are clear and in line with all previous findings in that those who strongly
agree and agree that government action would drive towards standardisation are also
those (69%) who responded that they do measure levels of quality and achievement to
some standard. This is an important indicator as it clearly indicates that on the one hand
countries wish to standardise and also that a majority believe that an international
standard could be enacted with coordinated action.
This is also in line with the development of processes in the Abu Dhabi Police in that
we had some form of checks and balances in processes and discipline from an early
stage but we embraced a wider view with international benchmarking (Abu Dhabi
Police., 2007) as we developed in size and sophistication and this I believe from my
experience may be a limiting factor for some poorer less developed countries.
8) Is there free access to information?
The free availability of data and information is important to many of the compliance,
operation and management issues discussed (Kai Rannenberg, 1993) and we know that
some nations have open societies and others restrict the availability of information
(Halstuk & Chamberlin 2006). It would be important to understand what proportion of
countries have restrictions which would preclude any standardisation because exchange
of information would be an essential part of any international cooperation i.e. it would
not work if some nations provide and others do not and it is assumed that a country
which has free access to information at home is more likely to exchange with others.
The following analysis provides information on the respondent’s country: -
Table B20   Q8 ...free access..? (N=59)
LOW 33    55.93%
MEDIUM    20    33.90%
HIGH            6    10.17%
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Whilst it is agreed that one man’s definition of low or high may be different to that of
another, it is worrying that only 10% of sample countries say they have a high level of
free access to information. Whereas more than half of the sample consider their free
access to be low and one-third only rate their access to be medium free. So to
understand the situation better we need to investigate the underlying causes for these
results which can be done by overlaying the above findings with those to question 9
(Table B24) as to whether the subject country has a freedom of information act and also
question 10 as to whether there are cultural restrictions involved in the exchange of
information as follows: -
Table B21 Q8 (Rows) ...free access..? x Q9. (Cols) ….Freedom Act..?
NO    YES     All
LOW              28      5      33
84.85  15.15  100.00
MEDIUM 18      2      20
90.00  10.00  100.00
HIGH 5      1       6
83.33  16.67  100.00
All 51      8      59
86.44  13.56  100.00
The above analysis indicates the challenge involved in international cooperation where
as in this analysis the high level of access to information is only 10% and less than 14%
of countries have a Freedom of Information Act (FOI). Most worrying is that even of
those countries having a Freedom of Information Act over 62% declare that they have a
low level of access, whereas it would have been expected that those having an FOI
would have shown greater free access. The following analysis aims at identifying
reasons for such lack of access by plotting free access against cultural restrictions
because it is known that many countries have a variety of restrictions on the availability
of information: -
Table B22  Q8 (Row) ...free access..? X Q10...cultural restrictions..?
NO    YES     All
LOW 8     25      33
24.24  75.76  100.00
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33.33  71.40
MEDIUM    13      7      20
65.00  35.00  100.00
54.17  20.00
HIGH 3      3       6
50.00  50.00  100.00
12.50   8.60
All 24     35      59
40.68  59.32  100.00
100.00 100.00
[Chi-Square statistic = 8.8131 P-Value = 0.012197 significant at p<0.05 indicating
dependent variables]
The above analysis provides a revealing insight into the causes of restrictions to
information as compared to the earlier analysis which assumed that those having an FOI
would logically have increased levels of access. Whereas in the earlier case the analysis
showed a highly negatively skewed level of Yes = 8 No = 51 as regards the existence of
a FOI Act (Halstuk & Chamberlin 2006); whereas the above analysis of cultural
restrictions is more balanced situation in that Yes = 35 No = 24 and this analysis shows
a shift towards the causes being cultural insofar as there is a significant shift even in the
area of low levels of access to No = 25% and Yes = 75%. There is also a shift to the
affirmative as regards cultural reasons in the Medium access range and also at the high
level. The overall indication from this analysis being that irrespective of the levels of
access as in question 8, cultural issues account for almost 60% (Table B22) of the
reasons for limitations to free access.
9) Is there a Freedom of Information Act in your country?
As is evident below, over 86% of countries do not have a formalised freedom of
information which begs the question as to whether they are closed societies which could
be seen by analysis of question 13 data which deals with a free press.
Table B23  Q9 (Rows) ...Freedom Act..?
NO      51    86.4%
YES      8 13.6%
This analysis reveals a paradox in that whereas >86% had reported not having a
freedom of information >78% of them report that they do have a free press in their
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country. The reality is that the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive and many
countries claim to have a free press but few have a formal Freedom of Information Act.
Table B24 Q9 (Rows) ...Freedom Act..? X Q13 (Cols) ..free press..?
NO     YES      All
NO 11      40        51
21.57   78.43    100.0%
YES 3       5         8
37.50   62.50 100.0%
All 14      45        59
23.73   76.27    100.0%
The reverse might be difficult to explain if it was the case in that it would be
inconsistent for a country to have a formal Freedom of Information Act and not have a
free press because the press would lean upon the free availability of information to
ensure their freedom (Halstuk & Chamberlin 2006). An answer to this might be legal in
that there may be a restriction in law to the sharing or exchanging of information and
this may be the underlying reason for their not being a Freedom of Information Act. In
which case an analysis of the responses to question 9 (Table B25) regarding an FOI Act
and Question 20 regarding a legal restriction regarding information sharing: -
Table B25  Q 9(Rows) ...Freedom Act..? x Q 20(Cols) ...sharing information..?
NO      YES     All
NO         49       2       51
96.08    3.92   100.0%
YES         4       4 8
50.00   50.00   100.0%
All 53       6       59
89.83   10.17   100.0%
[Chi-Square statistic = 16.0724 P-Value = 6.1E-05 significant at p<0.05 indicating
dependent variables]
The responses to both these questions were about equally negative i.e. 8:51 and 6:53 so
it is interesting that the majority of countries which do not have a FOI Act are also those
which do not have a legal restriction to the sharing of information so the absence of an
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FOI Act is not because of a legal restriction. So perhaps the cause could be cultural
impediments to making information freely available and we can test for this by
comparing the data for question 9 (Table B23) regarding the FOI and question 10 (Table
B26) cultural issues as follows: -
Table B26 Q 9(Rows) ...Freedom Act..? X Q 10 (Cols) ...cultural restrictions..?
NO      YES     All
NO         21      30      51
41.18   58.82  100.0%
YES 3       5       8
37.50   62.50  100.0%
All 24       35      59















Chart of 9...FreedomAct..?, 10...cultural restrictions..?
Figure B3 Freedom to act / Cultural restrictions interaction
This analysis illustrates the situation in that whereas the existence of FOI and the data
for both the sharing of information and a free press did not provide any clear
indications, the issue of cultural restrictions has divided the position in that whereas
>86% of the sample had said that they do not have FOI, >58% of them have revealed in
this analysis that they have cultural restrictions to the gathering and use of information.
This is clear in the following Table B27 which illustrates the scale of the finding so we
can say that cultural issues do have an impact on the gathering and use of information
and this data coincides with the prevalence of FOI in the subject countries.
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10)Cultural restrictions on the gathering and use of information.....
This question was included in the questionnaire to allow the search for cause to be
spread wider in the event that the seemingly obvious causes were not conclusive, which
has been the outcome. The responses to this question, however, were also not
conclusive in that the data was more evenly balanced as follows: -
Table B27 Q10 (Rows) ...cultural restrictions..?
NO 24    40.68%
YES     35    59.32%
Whilst the responses are that a majority advises that there are cultural restrictions on the
gathering and use of information and the 60:40 balance requires further investigation.
The following analysis correlates the responses to question 10 and question 17 which
asked if there was an issue of privacy involved in the gathering of information whether
covertly or overtly: -
Table B28  Q 10(Rows) ...cultural restrictions..? X Q 17(Cols) ...privacy..?
NO     YES     All
NO         10      14      24
41.67   58.33  100.0%
YES        11      24      35
31.43   68.57  100.0%
All        21 38      59
35.59   64.41  100.0%
The indications from this analysis are as inconclusive as the input data which was 38:21
for cultural and 35:24 for privacy considerations. Although a modest indication that
privacy considerations do influence cultural factors is evident. This is interesting but
again is not a conclusive indicator so a further analysis along the same lines by
analysing the correlation between question 10 responses and question 29 which
addresses the issue from a socio-cultural, politico-structural basis asking if this would
impede progress: -
Table B29 Q 10(Row) ...cultural restrictions..?X Q 29(Cols) ...impediments..?
NO      YES     All
NO         17      7      24
70.83  29.17  100.0%
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YES       23     12 35
65.71  34.29  100.0%
All 40     19      59
67.80  32.20  100.0%
The indications from the above analysis are that there is a roughly 2/3:1/3 balance
towards socio-cultural and politico-structural issues not impeding the gathering and use
of information. Whilst we had many cultural issues to consider as we planned the
development of our country we realised that the gathering of information of some sort
was critical to security and so we have progressed with one eye on what is socially
acceptable although not having put socio-cultural and politico-structural issues above
the important issues of security.
11) Research is needed to develop methods, minimise risk and mitigate difficulties
This question was included to identify which areas were felt to be least well understood
by the sample inasmuch as these would likely be the areas they would suggest for
further research.
Table B30 Q11 (Rows) ...research needed..?
Methods 47    79.66%
Risk 5     8.47%
Difficulties 7    11.86%
Almost 80% of respondents identified the development of security standardisation
methods as being most in need of research suggesting that the sample may need to
understand better how such a proposition would be created and implemented given the
complexities involved. It is important to note that only a little over 3% of the sample
was identified in question 1 (Table B1) as being a security researcher. So, further
analysis is needed to identify more specifically the declared need for further research
and the correlation between the responses to question 11 (Table B31) and question 30
which investigates whether the development of methods would be in the areas of
Management, Systems, or Resources. This is intended to explain the finding in the
analysis of the responses to question 11 (Table B31) within the confines of these most
commonly occurring options in this study: -
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Table B31  Q11(Rows) ...research needed..? X Q 30 (Cols) ...difficulties..?
Mgmnt Systems Resources All
Methods         32 7 8 47
68.09 14.89 17.02 100.0%
Risk 2 0 3 5
40.00 0.00 60.00 100.0%
Difficulties 5 1 1 7
71.43 14.29 14.29 100.0%
All 39 8 12 59
66.10 13.56 20.34 100.0%
[Chi-Square statistic = 5.5632 P-Value = 0.0234232 significant at P<0.25 indicating
dependent variables to this extent]
The findings from this analysis are clear that whilst the focus for development by
research is suggested in the area of methods, the specific area in which >68% of the
sample suggests that such research is needed is in the area of management. This
suggests, given that the sample is mainly made up of hands-on security practitioners that
they want to know more about the method by which such standardisation would be
managed and implemented.
This issue is very close to my experience in that I had been in charge for much of the
development of methods in my working life and it was always clear that as we
overcame one challenge there was a need for research in another, and it is clear that the
challenge of how with regard to international standardisation will be the greatest
challenge.
12) Coordination of efforts would convince the need to standardise.....
This question was included in the questionnaire to investigate the opinion of the hands-
on security practitioners who make up the sample regarding the value of coordination of
effort in convincing the security community to standardise.
Table B32   Q12 (Rows) ...govts coordinate..?
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Strongly Agree 48    81.36%
Agree 8    13.56%
Neutral 2     3.39%
Disagree 1     1.69%
Strongly Disagree 0        0%
A very clear result comes from this analysis in that >81% of responses strongly agree
that international coordination of effort would succeed in convincing the world
community to standardise security, and of course it is important that <2% disagree.
However, it is also important to understand which areas the respondents have in mind as
being key to the process and analysis of these findings with the responses to question 46
to see which of the areas of Procedures, IT or Equipment the sample perceive as being
most in need of standardisation and by this analysis most benefiting from a coordinated
effort to convince.
Table B33 Q12(Rows) ...govts coordinate..? X Q 46(Cols) ...aspects needed..?
Proced      IT      Eqt      All
Strongly Agree 41 6         1            48
85.42  12.50 2.08        100.0%
Agree 7 0 1             8
87.50 0   12.50        100.0%
Neutral 2         0         0             2
100.00 0 0 100.0%
Disagree 1         0         0             1
100.00 0 0 100.0%
Strongly Dis 51        6         2            59
86.44  10.17   3.39        100.0%








Pie Chart of 12...govts coordinate..?
Figure B4 Pie Chart – Governments coordinate
The above analysis provides a clear indication that there is strong agreement that the
area most needing standardisation is in the procedures involved. This can be related to
the earlier analysis in 11 (Table B31) above which identified that research was needed
in the area of methods which is closely related to procedures and therefore we have
some confirmation. An important indicator as to the feasibility of the proposition is
whether the suggestion that coordination would convince nations to standardise security
would be whether the sample’s country accepts the value of cooperation with other
nations and an analysis of question 12 (Table B33) i.e. whether the sample country
believes that coordination would be important and also question 26 which requests
information on whether there is acceptance of the value of cooperation in security.
Table B34    Q 12(Rows) ...govts coordinate..? X Q 26(cols) ...value cooperation..?
NO YES All
Strongly Ag 7          41        48
14.6 85.4     100.0%
Agree 0 8         8
0.0 100.0 100.0%
Neutral 0 2 2
0.0 100.0 100.0%
Disagree 1 0 1
100.0     0 100.0%
All 8 51 59
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13.6 86.4 100.0%
[Chi-Square statistic = 7.9866 P-Value = 0.04629 significant at p<0.05 indicating
dependent variables ]
The result of the above is that >83% of the sample which have stated that they value
cooperation strongly agree or agree that coordination would convince others of the need
to standardise. These findings provide an insight into the methods which this research
identifies as recommended procedural during the process of making such a proposition
to the world community and that achieving coordinated action would be a strong
indicator of success.
There is absolutely no doubt on reflection of my experience that coordination would be
a key to success of any international initiative in security. I have seen so many projects
fall by the wayside owing to a lack of a coordinated approach as defined by parties not
working together, a lack of clarity, a lack of willingness, a lack of unanimity etc.
13) A free press?
Two of the key components of this project are implementation and the availability of
information the latter of which depends on there being a free press in the sample
country. The majority of the sample, over 76% reports that they have a free press,
although the remaining almost one-quarter of the sample reports the negative: -
Table B35  Q 13(Rows) ...free press..?
NO      14    23.73%
YES     45    76.27%
An important indicator in this issue would be the level of free access there is to
information which can be seen in the following analysis: -
Table B36  Q13 (Rows) ...free press..? X Q 8(Cols) ...free access..?
LOW      MEDIUM      HIGH     All
NO          10 3 1       14
71.43 21.43 7.14 100.0%
YES         23 17 5       45
51.11 37.78      11.11 100.0%
All 33 20 6       59
55.93 33.90      10.17   100.0%
The findings of this analysis is very interesting because >75% proclaim having a free
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press when almost 90% of the same sample say that they have only low and medium
free access to information and only ~10% claim a high level of free access. So even in
countries claiming to have a free press it appears that information still has to be obtained
rather than being freely available. This distinction may seem somewhat academic but it
is important and will be remembered from an earlier analysis that whereas >86% had
reported not having a freedom of information >78% of them reported that they do have
a free press in their country (Table B4). The reality being that the two are not
necessarily mutually exclusive and many countries claim to have a free press but few
have a formal Freedom of Information Act. However, the key issue may not revolve
around the issue of a free press alone it may be in the way that information is treated i.e.
is everything a secret or is information gathered by investigation fair? This is important
in this study because if a country heavily restricts information internally I suggest that it
may be less likely to be willing to cooperate with others in sharing information. So the
following analysis compares the responses of the sample to the issue of a free press with
those to question 39 which asks if the law distinguishes between information gathered
covertly and overtly: -
Table B37  Q 13(Rows) ...free press..? X Q 39 (Cols) ...covertly/overtly..?
NO      YES     All
NO         13       1       14
92.86    7.14   100.0%
YES        37       8       45
82.22   17.78 100.0%
All 50       9       59
84.75   15.25 100.0%
Once again this analysis is very revealing in that whereas a high proportion of
participants report having a free press an even higher proportion report that the law in
their country does not distinguish between information gathered covertly and that
obtained overtly. So the key question must be if there is a restrictive issue e.g. privacy in
the gathering of information and whether the law distinguishes between that gathered
covertly and overtly. There being 2 points in this one involving the nature of restrictions
if any and the other being the method of gathering which is explained in the following
analysis: -
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Table B38  Q 17(Rows) ...privacy..? X Q 39(Cols) ...covertly/overtly..?
NO      YES     All
NO         20       1      21
95.24  4.76  100.0%
YES        30       8      38
78.95 21.05 100.0%
All 50       9      59
84.75 15.25  100.0%
[Chi-Square statistic = 2.7767 P-Value = 0.095647 significant at p<0.10 indicating
dependent variables.]
The above analysis makes an important distinction in that whilst almost two-thirds
>64% of the sample explain that privacy is an issue in the gathering of information; an
even greater proportion >84% find that the law in their country does not distinguish as
to how such private information is obtained, whereas there is much less effect on
privacy considerations where there is a distinction made as to how information is
obtained. This indicates that privacy of information is a major issue in a significant
majority of the sample responses although not in the way it is collected and this lack of
legal restriction may be assumed to be an issue in convincing countries to share and
exchange data and information more liberally in an international standardised security
agreement.
The effect of the issue of privacy discussed earlier displays the details of Table B38
related to the comparison of responses to questions 17 and 39 in that privacy is
important but that the distinction between information gathered covertly or overtly has
less impact owing to the lack of legal constraint.
14) The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 31000 standard.
As has been shown in the above analyses there is a lack of conformance to any common
practice in the status quo which it is proposed would be resolved by the international
standardisation of security. The question is whether there already exists a form of
standard that could be used for the purpose and ISO 31000 (ISO 31000–2009) could be
one possible option. The following analysis of the sample responses to this possibility as
follows: -
Table B39 Q14(Rows) ...ISO 31000..?
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Strongly Agree 49    83.05%
Agree 7 11.86%
Neutral 2     3.39%
Disagree 0 0%
Strongly Disagree 1     1.69%
Over 83% of the sample strongly agrees that the ISO 31000 (ISO 31000–2009) could be
a basis for an international standard but this may be a response to the absence of any
alternative. So we must test the dedication of the sample to ISO 31000 to whether those
who have expressed this opinion have also implemented this standard into their security
operations (Table B3).
However, the evidence is that the >69% of respondents who strongly agree that ISO
31000 could be the basis for an international standardisation of security do not
themselves follow this standard. So this response may be both a response to the absence
of an alternative and also not necessarily an indication of the lack of dedication of the
sample to the concept of standardisation. To test this latter point we must correlate the
responses to ISO 31000 with the responses to question 15 (Table B41) which asks if the
sample would favour an agreement on e.g. passports as follows: -
Table B40 Q 14(Rows) ...ISO 31000..? X Q 15 (Cols) ...passports..?
Strong Agree.      Agree.     Neutral.     All
St.Ag. 43 5 1 49
87.76                  10.20      2.04      100.0%
Agree 7 0 0 7
100.00 0.00 0.00 100.0%
Neutral 2 0 0 2
100.00 0.00 0.00 100.0%
Strong.Dis.    1 0 0 1
100.00 0.00 0.00 100.0%
All 53 5 1 59
89.83 8.47 1.69 100.0%
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This analysis shows the willingness of the sample to embrace an international standard
for security in that on the one hand a large majority strongly agrees that ISO 31000
could be the basis and an equal large majority of the same sample would favour the
adoption of an international security standard to protect e.g. against forged passports.
This indication may be based upon a willingness of countries to cooperate
internationally on an issue which would clearly benefit them such as an agreement on
forged passports, but that is an acceptable basis to assume that they would agree to
cooperate on other agreements which would also benefit them and that indicates that the
basis for a proposition for an international standard for security should focus on
explaining the benefits accruing to members.
Various institutions industrial and otherwise have embraced ISO standards and there has
always been a willingness within us, the practitioners, to work to a standard to ensure
that we were doing our job as well as it could be done and in the same way as other
international partners (Calabrese, S.V. & Mark Sullivan 2011). However, I have met
many colleagues who agree and also some who have expressed some reservations and
some of these have been related to costs and the loss of self-determination and I recall
many discussions in the international security community as to how this might be
funded.
15. Support for international security standards to protect against e.g. forged
passports.
The specific issue in this question sought to gain information related to forged passports
which was a chosen example because it is a common problem frequently affecting all
nations both from outside and within i.e. from their own nationals and also from
foreigners. This matter was also discussed in the literature review hereto as having been
described as a crime common to other crimes and a growing problem (Jaap-Henk
Hoepman et al, 2006) and (C Evans-Pughe, 2005).
Table B41 Q15 (Rows) ...passports..?
Strongly Agree     53    89.83%
Agree 5 8.47%
Neutral 1 1.69%
The question asked if the sample supports international security standards to protect
against common problems and used the example of forged passports because the
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problem is known by all and equally affects all countries so there would be no case
specificity in the responses. The results are clear in that >98% of the sample replied in
the affirmative in supporting the establishment of an international standard to address
the problem of forged passports, with only one sample member providing a neutral
response and none disagreed. Correlating the data from question 6 (Tables B14 and
B15) that developing security strategies in respect of achieving global security with data
from question 15 (Table B41) from the perspective of the majority of the sample
supporting security standards for protection as follows: -
Table B42  Q15 (Rows) ...passports..? X Q 6(Cols) ...govt strategy..?
Strongly Agree Agree     Neutral     Disag.     Str.Dis.   All
Str.Ag. 41            8 1 2 1 53
77.36 15.09 1.89 3.77 1.89 100.0%
Agree 5 0 0 0 0 5
100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.0%
Neutral 1            0 0 0 0 1
100.00        0.00       0.00 0.00        0.00 100.0%
All 47            8 1 2 1       59
79.66       13.56      1.69 3.39        1.69 100.0%
The above analysis provides a clear indication that whilst a large majority favour
standardisation a considerable proportion of the same sample members also say there
would be a role for developing security strategies to achieve global security. These two
findings are closely related and confirm one another with clear indications pointing to
support for international standardisation of security and the following chart reveals a
high degree of conformity integral to the findings. The reason behind this finding should
not be surprising because any strategy in the area of passports is the decision of
individual governments and this finding is important in showing both that the same
respondents replied in the affirmative in both areas and also that a small minority were
either neutral or disagreed. The majority agreement to this relationship can also be seen

















Area Graph of 15...passports..?, 6...govt strategy..?
Figure B5 Area Graph of Passports / Government Strategy
The issue of detecting and protecting against false passports has been a major concern in
my professional life. My experience has shown that there is a major benefit to be
derived from international standardisation in this area and an important example of
international agreement as many countries have enacted common passports and can see
the benefits to be derived from cooperation.
16) Reflective learning can form a good understanding for standardization?
The intricacies of reflection and reflective learning have been previously discussed at
length herein but the practical application of reflection in the process of this research is
based upon the findings of other research (Atkins, S. & K. Murphy 1993) which has
been discussed at length in the literature review hereto. The following is the frequency
analysis of the returns to the questionnaire: -
Table B43 Q 16(Rows) ...reflection..?
Strongly Agree 57    96.61%
Agree 1     1.69%
Neutral 1     1.69%
Disagree 0     0%
Strongly Disagree 0     0%
The indication of which is that >96% of the sample strongly agrees that reflective
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learning can be an important part of the process towards standardisation and we could
describe these findings as unanimous because there were no detractors to the main
proposition. The important issue related to analysis of data in the area of reflective
learning is that it is seeking experiential information. An analysis of responses to
question 16 (Table B43) which enquired about the place of reflective learning in the
development of standardisation and the responses to question 34 which asks about
perceived resistance to the sharing of information with other countries i.e. the
limitations to international standardisation of security is analysed as follows: -
Table B44 Q 34(Rows) ...police resistance..? X Q16(Cols) ...reflection..?
Str.Agr     Agree    Neutral   Disagree   Str.Dis      All
NO           37         1 1 0 0 39
94.87      2.56       2.56 0.00 0.00 100.0%
YES          20        0 0 0 0 20
100.00      0.00       0.00 0.00 0.00 100.0%
All 57         1 1 0 0 59
96.61      1.69       1.69 0.00 0.00 100.0%
The majority report no resistance to the sharing of information and a larger majority
reports strong agreement that there is a place for reflection in standardisation. So overall
there is support for the place of reflective learning in the development of standardisation
and there is also a strong indication for the sharing of information. A further indication
as to the contribution of reflection as an important part of this research can be seen from
the following analysis of this data and of the responses to question 36 which enquires
about the sample’s participation requiring new legislation.
Table B45 Q 36 (Rows)...new legislation..? x Q 16(Cols) ...reflection..?
Str.Agr     Agree     Neutral     All
NO 23 0 0 23
100.00 0.00 0.00 100.0%
YES 34 1 1 36
94.44 2.78 2.78 100.0%
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All 57 1 1 59
96.61 1.69 1.69 100.0%
The indications from the above analysis are that whilst the responses on reflective
learning clearly indicated the importance of the methodology, the responses on the issue
of new legislation being required were not so clear cut at YES = 36 NO = 23. However,
when compared it is found that of those who had strongly agreed that reflection was
important, 58% declared based upon their experience that new legislation would be
required to enable their participation.
17) Privacy in the gathering of information covertly or overtly.
The two issues of privacy and the gathering methods of information are important
because we have seen that many countries will have issues with the loss of privacy in
any process of sharing information and data, and the nature and method of gathering
certain data may also be important to some countries. At first glance it may be thought
that countries wishing to continue to gather data covertly may be authoritarian and
autocratic and similarly those concerned about privacy maybe thought to be closed
societies or having something to hide (Gibney 1988). The reality may indeed be the
complete antithesis in that in both circumstances the reality may be that the same
countries may just be protective of their citizen’s rights in privacy and security. The
following analysis shows how the sample has viewed this complex relationship between
privacy and the gathering of information: -
Table B46 Q 17(Rows) ...privacy..?
NO 21    35.59%
YES 38    64.41%
The above analysis is unsurprisingly inconclusive probably owing to the variability in
the sample in these complex issues. However, privacy is an important consideration on a
variety of fronts as it would be in closed societies e.g. Saudi Arabia; and as it may also
be in open societies such as the USA (Gibney 1988) where there are laws protecting
peoples’ privacy. So further analysis is required to investigate the reasons for the
inconclusive responses as follows: -
Table B47 Q17(Rows) ...privacy..? X Q 29(Cols)...impediments..?
NO     YES    All
NO         14      7      21
66.67  33.33  100.0%
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YES 26     12      38
68.42  31.58  100.0%
All 40     19      59
67.80  32.20  100.0%
Whilst almost twice as many respondents had said that there are issues of privacy
involved in the gathering of information, a similar profile of respondents had also said
that socio-cultural and politico-structural issues would not impede progress. On balance
the above analysis shows that privacy is an important consideration although it is not a
significant impediment to progress and this inconclusive result requires further
investigation on a different front. Question 17 (Table B46) and Question 39 address
these issues one from a legal perspective and the other from a privacy standpoint and the
results of analysis provides an interesting insight. The following analysis shows that
whilst a 60:40 indication from the sample suggests that privacy influences the gathering
of information the cross correlation suggests in almost 85% of the responses that the law
does not distinguish between information obtained covertly and overtly. The suggestion,
therefore, from both the above analyses taken from different standpoints is that privacy
must be an important consideration when proposing the exchange of information and
data in the formulation of a standardised system for security and in the implementation
of such internationally.
Table B48 Q 17(Rows) ...privacy..?  X Q 39(cols) ...covertly/overtly..?
NO     YES    All
NO        20      1      21
95.24   4.76  100.0%
YES       30      8      38
78.95  21.05  100.0%
All       50      9      59
84.75  15.25  100.0%
[Chi-Square statistic = 2.7767 P-Value = 0.095647 significant at p<0.10 indicating
dependent variables]
Whilst the sample returns on privacy whether covertly or overtly are inconclusive, the
reality is that in some societies such as ours in the Arab world, for example, the issue of
privacy especially as related to the family and personal matters is extremely important.
So whilst the data seems to be almost evenly balanced the reality is that those who value
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privacy do so very highly and there is no distinction made as to how information has
been gathered. Many cases of accessing private information are referred to the Police to
investigate in our society and these can be very sensitive given that to investigate one
person’s claim to an invasion of privacy might require the invasion of another person’s
similar rights; thereby illustrating the importance and difficulty of this subject.
18) A free-to-act police force.
This question has been formulated in this way to make the distinction between there
being a legal framework in the law of the land in the various countries and also a police
force which has to implement it and would ultimately have to adopt any form of
standardised international system and to cooperate with colleagues from other nations.
This distinction is important because the police are often thought of as the law in many
countries (Goldstein 1977) whereas in fact they are only the guardians and implementers
of its requirements.
Table B49 Q 18(Rows) ...free police..?
NO       9    15.25%
YES   50    84.75%
The question posed here was ‘do you have a free-to-act police force?’ and so this is not
surprisingly in the affirmative because all the sample respondents are security,
intelligence and police professionals who would likely view that they have self
determination in their jobs. The question should be whether such a view is confirmed by
other information provided to the questionnaire such as for example question 19
(Bradburn, Sudman, Wansink 2004) dealing with whether the government, politicians or
judiciary have influence over the activities of the police and security apparatus the
implication being that if such analysis were to show this was the case then the earlier
responses as to the free-to-act characteristics of the police given by this sample would
have been self serving.
Table B50 Q 18(Rows) ...free police..?X Q 19(Cols) ...influence police..?
NO      YES     All
NO          5       4 9
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55.56   44.44  100.0%
YES       25      25      50
50.00 50.00  100.0%
All 30      29      59
50.85 49.15  100.0%
The above analysis may at first glance seem inconclusive but it actually harbours a very
important indicator to the proposition for the establishment of an international standard
for security. This analysis takes the responses to the question that the police are free-to-
act and shows that this is inconsistent because the same participants who are equally
divided 30:29 in answering question 19 (Table B52) regarding whether the police are
influenced by the legislature and the executive of government; are the same people who
were equally divided 25:25 in having answered in the affirmative as to whether the
police are free-to-act. Herein lays another very important indicator to the formulation of
an international standard for security insofar as some of the security apparatus around
the world may think it is free-to-act but in actual fact they are controlled in ways which
may at the extremes infringe the rule of law (Skolnick & Fyfe 1993).
As a measure of perceived self determination in the police and security community
question 34 asks if there would be resistance to sharing of information etc with the point
being whether the responses would mirror the earlier analysis regarding the incidence of
influence on the police from the government.
Table B51 Q 18(Rows) ...free police..? X Q34(Cols) ...police resistance..?
NO      YES     All
NO          6       3       9
66.67 33.33  100.0%
YES        33      17      50
66.00 34.00  100.0%
All        39      20      59
66.10 33.90  100.0%
It is clear that the majority indications are that the majority of police are free to act and
the majority have no resistance to the sharing of information. The above analysis is also
very important because here we can see that whereas 85% say they have a free-to-act
police, 2/3rds of those in agreement in answering question 34 regarding resistance to the
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sharing of information within the police have said there would not be any resistance.
This would indicate some self-determination in the police and willingness within the
security apparatus for an international standard and their willingness to cooperate in its
implementation including in the area of the sharing and exchange of information.
19) Government etc influence on the activities of the security apparatus.
This is an extremely complex question with a likely intrusion of case specific data into
the outputs from the questionnaire and so would likely tend to divide the sample. It is
inevitable in many respects that the government has some control over the security
apparatus in its country and this would, of course, be more pronounced in some
countries than others. An analysis of the returns to question 19 is as follows: -
Table B52 Q 19(Rows) ..influence police..?
NO 30    50.85%
YES 29    49.15%
As expected the results are equally divided between those who say that the police and
security apparatus is influenced by the government etc and those who say it is not. We
have already seen an inconclusive outcome to an earlier analysis of the returns to
question 18 (Table B49) free police and question 19 (Table B52) influence over the
police so the following analysis aims to identify the professional structure of the
security apparatus: -
Table B53 Q 19(Rows) ...influence police..? X Q 31(Cols)...professional police..?
YES   All
NO        30   30
100  100%
YES       29   29
100  100%
All 59   59
100  100%
Unsurprisingly perhaps the sample respondents who are all security and police etc
professionals replied to question 31 that they are a professional organisation, but it is
interesting that the same people replied equally divided to question 19 (Table B52)
regarding being influenced by government etc. So in an effort to identify the true level
of self determination in the security apparatus of the sample countries the following
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analysis seeks out the question that if the security apparatus is controlled in many cases
and not at all in as many others then where do they see the difficulties, if any, at the
grass roots level: -
Table B54 Q 19(Rows) ...influence police..? X Q 30(Cols) ...difficulties..?
Mgmnt     Systems      Resources     All
NO 21 3 6 30
70.00 10.00         20.00     100.0%
YES         18 5 6 29
62.07 17.24 20.69     100.0%
All 39 8 12 59
66.10 13.56         20.34     100.0%
We can see that the difficulties are mainly in the area of management but the issue of
whether influence is placed on the police is almost evenly balanced. The majority of the
returns which had been equally divided regarding the influence on the police when
asked what would be the difficulties the same respondents have focused their comments
on the issue of management as opposed to systems and resources although once again
they are about equally divided. Whilst this may also seem somewhat inconclusive it is
nonetheless clear that the sample does not see the issue of influence from government as
being an issue of where the difficulties might be, neither do they consider that practical
matters like systems and resources would be an issue. Their opinion on where
difficulties may lay is focused on the management issues involved and it is important at
this point to remember that this information is provided by reflection upon their
experience and therefore has the credibility of hands-on knowledge.
We can say, therefore, that the police and the security apparatus consider themselves to
be a professional body (Champion & Rush 1997) which must be being influenced to
some extent by government or other central authority to some measure which may be as
high as 50% of cases but the police etc see their challenges as not being those of being
controlled but rather ones related to management in broader terms which may be the
same as being controlled from the centre.
20) Legal restriction to the sharing of information.
Many issues come into play in analysing the issue of the restrictions involved in the
exchanging and sharing of information and not least if there are any legal constraints: -
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Table B55 Q 20(Rows) ...sharing information..?
NO 53    89.83%
YES 6    10.17%
It is found that 90% of the sample denies that there is any legal restriction to the sharing
of information because it would suggest that there would be almost no objection from
the vast majority of the sample countries to cooperating in the implementation of an
international standard for security. The reality, however, is more complex than being
based only on the absence of any contra legislation restricting the exchange of
information, which is a function at the heart of any implementation and cooperation in a
standardised security arrangement. It has been seen earlier above that the issue of
privacy is very important to some sample countries and clearly some of the responses
may be culturally driven; the following analysis aims at defining whether cultural and
privacy issues dominate the gathering and exchange of information
Table B56 Q 17(Rows) ...privacy..? X Q 20(Cols) ...sharing information..?
NO      YES     All
NO         19       2      21
90.48 9.52  100.0%
YES        34       4      38
89.47 10.53 100.0%
All        53       6      59
89.83 10.17 100.0%
As we can see the indications are that privacy issues are important in the gathering of
information but there appear to be a very few reports of legal restrictions to the sharing
of information. This analysis is predicated upon the question having been phrased that
‘aside from cultural issues’ so we must assume that there are other considerations
perhaps legal or societal to any restrictions e.g. for reasons of privacy. A further effort
to find impediments to internationalisation of a standard for security has been
highlighted in the literature review as perhaps being in the area of confidentiality
including privacy in the work of Kokolakis et al, (2002) and Wyn L Price, 1990) so a
further analysis as follows aims at reviewing any legal restrictions impacting this
proposition: -
251
Table B57 Q 20(Rows) ...sharing information..? X Q 39(Cols) ...covertly/overtly..?
NO      YES     All
NO         46       7       53
86.79   13.21 100.0%
YES          4      2        6
66.67  33.33 100.0%
All         50      9       59
84.75  15.25 100.0%
It is clear from the above that there is very little restriction to the sharing and
exchanging of information with other countries whilst at the same time there being very
few reports of any distinction made regarding the methods of gathering data and
information i.e. either covertly or overtly. So it would seem that there is very little
negative indication in these areas.
21) The use of software to manage security operations.
The use of software is commonplace in the modern world and this question is important
because a critical part of any internationalised standard would be commonality on the
implementation and processes, and one way of ensuring that every country is operating
in the same way to same standards of quality etc is to have a standard form of process
by the use of common software (Kai Rannenberg, 1993). There are other benefits
accruing to the process driven from a common software package aside from working to
the same processes e.g. having interchangeable databases, common training, a common
technical language and terminology etc. So whilst the responses to this question are
bound to be highly affirmative there may be some countries who may not wish to
provide unfettered access to others which partly explains the lack of unanimity in the
following analysis of the frequency of replies to the questionnaire: -
Table B58 Q 21(Rows) ...use software..?
NO 4     6.78%
YES     55    93.22%
The result is very positive in that proposing software as part of a standardised process
would not of itself pose a problem to most countries as the majority confirm that they
are already using software to manage security operations and databases. However, and
especially in some less developed countries, the application of modern systems may not
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be easy owing to the lack of skills and expertise etc. The following analysis aims to
correlate the affirmative responses from those who say that they do use software with
the responses to question 22 which asked if software products were easily implemented:
Table B59  Q 21(Rows) ...use software..? X Q 22 (Cols) ...software easy..?
NO      YES     All
NO          3 1       4
75.00 25.00  100.0%
YES        11      44      55
20.00   80.00 100.0%
All 14      45      59
23.73   76.27 100.0%
This analysis strongly indicates the suitability of proposing a software solution within
an international standard for security as a significant majority of the sample indicates
that they have experience and easily apply software. Although it must be recognised that
some problems could come at the hands-on staff operational level and such problems
might typically be in the areas of management, systems or resources. The following
analysis aims to understand the likelihood: -
Table B60   Q 21(Rows) ...use software..? X Q 30(Cols) ...difficulties..?
Mgmnt      Systems      Resources     All
NO           2 1 1 4
50.00 25.00         25.00 100.0%
YES         37 7 11 55
67.27 12.73         20.00 100.0%
All 39 8 12 59
66.10 13.56         20.34 100.0%
The above analysis shows that those using software i.e. assumed to be more attuned to
technology and modern methods are a ~2/3 majority who highlight the area of
management as being where difficulties could most likely occur. Some lesser concerns
are expressed in the areas of systems and resources and these might be explained by the
fact that some of the sample countries are less wealthy nations who might either have a
shortage of skilled resources to drive complex software or indeed they may as poorer
nations have difficulty in affording the high cost of resource provision. On balance,
however, the evidence is that the majority of nations have the knowledge and expertise
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to use complex software systems and the majority see the challenges as being in the area
of management.
I know from my personal experience that the training and uptake of software systems in
the Abu Dhabi Police involved a significant investment in money and hard work.
However, the added value was that once we were using first world IT tools we were
able to cooperate and exchange ideas and technologies with other countries and our
expertise and professionalism greatly increased.
22) Software products easily implemented.
We have seen above that a majority of the sample is accustomed to using software in
security management and also explained that the significant consensus is that software
could be easily implemented. However, it is well known that successful implementation
of any software or systems product is dependent on staff training (Atherton 1999) and
whilst the majority have said that software could be easily implemented the following
analysis plots those returns with those for question 44 which enquired about the
provision of training, which is proposed as key to the successful implementation of a
software component, which is key to the success of the whole project: -
Table B61 Q 22( Rows) ...software easy..? X Q 44(Cols) ...training..?
NO      YES     All
NO         1      13      14
7.14 92.86  100.0%
YES        2      43      45
4.44 95.56 100.0%
All 3      56      59
5.08 94.92  100.0%
The above shows the scale and extent of the data on two closely related variables as in
this case the ease of implementation of software and the provision of training, which
have an important relationship as it would be no use implementing the software without
the local knowledge in how to use it. The above analysis confirms the earlier findings
that 73% of the sample is used to using software in security and that a similar number of
the same sample confirms that training is liberally provided. So given that
implementation would likely be easy and training would be provided to facilitate it the
remaining question must be whether operating such a system in cooperation with others
would be an impediment and the following operationalises data from question 32: -
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Table B62 Q 22(Rows) ...software easy..? X Q 32(Cols) ...operating..?
NO      YES     All
NO          8       6      14
57.14 42.86  100.0%
YES        21      24 45
46.67   53.33 100.0%
All        29      30      59
49.15 50.85  100.0%
Whilst the implementation of software has been said to be easy the operating and
cooperation issues would seem to be less clear in the equally divided responses to
question 32, which suggests that irrespective of the ease of implementation the issues of
operating and cooperation may be an impediment and this will be addressed in greater
depth in further analyses hereafter.
This is a very important consideration because in my experience the ease of
implementation of software products depends on the stage of development of the
country in question. I recall that in the early days of the development of technologies in
the Abu Dhabi Police the installation of technology was slow and difficult to do,
whereas later in our development we became experts on the implementation of software
and we became developers of some of our own systems.
23) Cooperation with other countries in security - exchange of information /
cooperation on operations.
Clearly there are some existing cooperation agreements between nations on security and
we know of many close relationships, for example, that the USA has with the UK and
many EU countries, and similarly the close ties that the UK has with many of its former
colonies (Jervis 1985). Russia continues to have close ties with its affiliates in the
former Soviet Union and China is building bridges with many Asian nations towards
establishing a local power base in its own backyard (Shambaugh 2004). These examples
are mainly built on common interests, proximity and trading relationships and enlarge
into security and eventually sometimes into defence relationships. In the context of this
study the relationships between nations on security are developing to encompass many
new technologies the advancement and far reaching implications of which require closer
cooperation between the world community to fight common enemies of cross border
crime, terrorism, people trafficking etc. The exchange of information and close
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cooperation on operations which would ultimately require working to common
standards is at the heart of future developments in security operations and thereby
indicates the need for international standardisation of security. The willingness of
nations to cooperate and exchange information is key and the following analysis
enquires if the sample countries have existing cooperation agreements: -
Table B63 Q 23(Rows) ...cooperation with others..?
NO 44    74.58%
YES 15    25.42%
75% of the sample responses confirm that their country has cooperation agreements
with other countries in the area of security, and it is important that they have replied in
the affirmative with the specifics in the question including the exchange of information
and cooperation on operations. Equally importantly, however, is whether such
arrangements are productive and efficient and question 24 in the questionnaire enquired
whether the experience of such was good or bad: -
Table B64 Q 23(Rows) ...cooperation with others..? X Q 24(Cols) ...experience..?
BAD      GOOD     All
NO         18 26 44
40.91     59.09 100.0%
YES         8 7 15
53.33     46.67 100.0%
All 26 33 59
44.07     55.93 100.0%
The data in the above analysis is for two related variables and provides a mixed picture
with the minority of countries having cooperation agreements with other countries on
security and those which do report only marginally good experiences over bad. There is
a danger in reading this output to assume that this would be indicative of the
performance of the main proposition of this project in that it might produce similar
results. The actual indication we should receive from this analysis is that only a minority
of nations have cooperation agreements with other countries on security and that this
might explain why their experience is not good; with the implication being that
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performance would be better if more countries were involved in pooling more
information and resources.
There have been many occasions in my career when I wish that the international
community cooperating on security was larger and that we could be sure of obtaining
necessary information from all countries. There are current examples of fugitives from
justice who have committed crimes in stealing information and escaping to countries
where they are beyond reach, for example, Edward Snowden the former USA NSA
analyst who leaked a lot of secret documents who found refuge in Russia, and Glen
Greenwald the journalist to whom he gave the leaked documents who in turn found a
safe haven in Brazil (Greenwald, MacAskill & Poitras 2013), with which the United
States does not have an extradition agreement. There have been situations in my career
when closer cooperation with other countries would have been a great advantage.
24).....the experience of such arrangements.....
25).....willingly cooperate in other areas.....
26)..... acceptance of the value of cooperation in security.....
Having discussed the merits of cooperation and standardisation at length this question
enquired of those having agreements with other countries on security whether the
experience of such arrangements was good or bad. The majority of the responses were
favourable but there was a minority of bad reports which suggests that perhaps the pool
of countries cooperating was too small to get the best results. So a further closely related
question was also posed as to whether the subject countries have a culture and
experience of cooperation and they were asked if they cooperate with others in other
areas. This is suggested as an important indicator because close cooperative agreements
on security are the exception and not the rule and the following analysis illustrates the
incidences of the experiences good or bad, and the willingness to cooperate with others
in other areas: -
Table B65 Q 24(Rows)  ...experience..? X Q 25(Cols) ...other cooperation..?
NO       YES     All
BAD 1        25      26
3.85     96.15 100.0%
GOOD 0        33      33
0.00 100.00  100.0%
All 1        58      59
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1.69 98.31  100.0%
This analysis shows that whilst an almost unanimous sample reports that they have
cooperation agreements in other areas and, therefore, we can assume that they have
experience of cooperation with other nations, their experience remains inconclusive at a
balance of Good = 33 and Bad = 26. We could say that this might be a nation specific
problem and that it might be different for other countries, but the sample responses of
bad experiences are too many for this and too close to those who reported a good
experience to make this assumption. So could there be a problem of perception of the
value of cooperation i.e. could there be some hubris in the assessment of bad
experiences of, for example, ‘we could have done it better ourselves alone’? and to this
end a further analysis of question 26 is correlated with the above analyses as follows: -
Table B66  Q 24 (Rows) ...experience..? X Q 26(Cols) ...value cooperation..?
NO      YES     All
BAD         1      25      26
3.85   96.15 100.0%
GOOD 7      26      33
21.21   78.79 100.0%
All 8      51      59
13.56 86.44  100.0%
[Chi-Square statistic = 3.7418 P-Value = 0.053068 significant at p<0.10 indicating
dependent variables]
We can see that the affirmative responses to the value of cooperation are large whereas
the experience data is more evenly balanced. Nonetheless, the above analysis makes the
picture a little clearer in that the sample continues to be stubbornly inconclusive as to
the experience of the process of cooperation but in the above we can see a clear
indication that the same sample members report that they have nonetheless an
acceptance of the value of cooperation insecurity. In which case we can deduce that
there is something else impacting the good / bad perception of the experience of
cooperation and that the general impression is an acceptance of the value of cooperation.
This finding would indicate something which the strategists would have to take on
board when designing the proposition for an international standard for security insofar
as they should explain in the proposition to all nations that unanimous uptake and
cooperation would be key to success and satisfactory performance.
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Overall my experience of international cooperation has been very positive whenever
there has been the opportunity to exchange information with other countries thereby
proving the value of cooperation, although the process has often been difficult and in
need of some organisation in the area of coordination. Despite some difficulties in this
area there is no doubt that there is great value in cooperation and some form of
standardisation would greatly increase efficiency.
27).....developed nations support cost of international standardisation of
security.....
28).....developing country able to finance.....
Many international initiatives fail to achieve their full potential or fail because of the
inevitable debate as to who would fund them. Even major institutions like the United
Nations would struggle if it was not for the fact that several rich nations, mainly the
United States, fund its infrastructure and activities (Beauregard & Pierre 2000). In the
case of the international standardisation of security it is thought that the situation might
be more complicated than some international bodies because there would accrue a
benefit to individual member states, which is different to the example of the UN where
the world community comes together to solve the kind of problems which we are all
familiar (Simma, Tomuschat, Mosler, & Randelzhofer 1994). So the question of who
will pay is bound to become an issue but it seems that a significant of wealthy nations
would be prepared to do this: -
Table B67  Q 27(Rows) ...support cost..?
NO 8    13.56%
YES     51 86.44%
From which analysis we can see a majority >86% of the sample would be prepared to
support the cost and this is understandable given that on the one hand it would likely be
a modest cost and the more developed nations would likely benefit most because it is
they who are the target markets for terrorists, illegal immigrants, cross border criminals
and drug traffickers. They would be keenly aware that the success of this project would
be to engage the whole world community thereby leaving no safe haven for criminals
and terrorists and that even if a single poor country could not participate then the
decrease in efficiency would be greater than the cost of support funding, but it is
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thought that some relatively poor countries could pay their share and the following
analysis correlates the response to question 27 (Table B67) i.e. that the rich would pay
with the responses to question 28 enquiring whether the poor could also pay as follows:
Table B68 Q 27 (Rows) ...support cost..? X Q 28(Cols) ...unable finance..?
NO      YES     All
NO          7 1       8
87.50 12.50  100.0%
YES       46 5      51
90.20 9.80  100.0%
All 53       6      59
89.83 10.17  100.0%
In this case we can see that many respondents said they would not be able to finance
whilst an also large majority of other countries have said they would pay. It is important
that a proportion as large as >86% of the wealthier sample countries said that they
would pay the costs of the proposed international standardisation but it is equally
important that whilst the majority of poorer countries said they would not be able to
afford the cost, 10% of developing countries have also said they would pay their way.
This is a positive indicator for support of the project as a whole because both sides
would be voting by bearing a common burden for a common good. Whilst it is thought
that wealthier nations would benefit most from the subject proposition, developing
nations would also gain in that their domestic situation might be more stable. Some
countries were historically unstable owing to powerful local clans who were well armed
and funded their illegal drug activities with money earned in first world markets from
the sale of drugs. But if the drugs industry was unable to sell its production overseas
then they would not have the funds to carry on their illegal acts at home, although it
must be said that there is, of course, another side to this coin in that drugs revenues also
fund corrupt politicians, do provide an eventual trickle-down into government coffers
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somewhat supporting poorer country economies.
When I first joined the Abu Dhabi Police force we were a relatively underdeveloped
country and I doubt that we could have afforded to finance such an initiative ourselves
at that time. So I understand the predicament that less developed countries find
themselves in when on the one hand they appreciate the value of standardisation of
security but wonder how they could afford to do so. Finding a solution to this problem
would be a major success factor and I recall that a solution had been proposed for richer
countries, which the UAE is today, to contribute to an international fund for the benefit
of all nations.
29).....socio-cultural, politico-structural issues impede progress.....
The socio-cultural and politico-structural issues in each individual country are bound to
produce an endless permutation of opportunities and threats to the subject proposition.
The questionnaire posed question 29 from a negative impact perspective i.e. issues
which might impede progress and the following was the result: -
Table B69 Q 29(Rows) ...impediments..?
NO 40    67.80%
YES 19    32.20%
Over two-thirds of the sample responded in the negative when asked if there would be
socio-cultural politico-structural issues to impede progress and in many other situations
we might take comfort from that but in this case there are other factors which relate
which could explain the findings to show a different outcome. This might be the case in
poorer countries with a less defined system of security and law and areas run by
regional powerful people; warlords, provincial governors as, for example, in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other places in Asia and South America which are notably
mainly developing countries (Yuval-Davis, Anthias & Kofman 2005). The police and
security authorities in such places are either entirely under the control of the ruling
regime or are the complete opposite. It is in such cases that such authorities might
provide resistance to cooperation with any external system and other countries as in the
following analysis: -
Table B70 Q 29(Rows) ...impediments..? X Q 34(Cols) ...police resistance..?
NO      YES     All
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NO         25 15     40
62.50    37.50 100.0%
YES        14        5     19
73.68    26.32 100.0%
All        39       20     59
66.10    33.90 100.0%
Both issues in this section are responded to negatively in that a proportion of 2:1 of the
respondents say there would be no impediment to progress from socio- politico-
structural issues; and an equal proportion of 2:1 of respondents also say that there would
be no resistance in the police and security to cooperation with other countries. We could
take a glass half full view of this as being a positive indicator which, of course it is, but
there are other influences which need to be taken into consideration. Just in case it is
that most of the negative responses may have come from totalitarian undemocratic
regimes etc, who may wish to retain their status quo, we might be able to explain the
reason for the one-third of respondents who provided negative responses above by
asking about human rights as follows: -
Table B71 Q 29(Rows) ...impediments..? X Q 37(Cols) ...human rights..?
Not Caring      Support     All
NO              3 37 40
7.50 92.50 100.0%
YES             3 16 19
15.79 84.21 100.0%
All 6 53 59
10.17 89.83 100.0%
It is found that there is a very strong indication of a culture of support in cases of human
rights in the sample countries; whilst at the same time there being a positive indication
in that there is a majority of the sample reporting that there are no socio-political
impediments to impede progress.
The majority of the sample had said that they do not think that socio-cultural issues
would not impede progress and that may be true overall, but I know from my reflection
of events over the many years in the Abu Dhabi Police force that some countries would
have very entrenched opinions on that. We are a very old society with very close family
and social ties within our communities and long and strict traditions, and I believe from
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my reflection on what has changed easily and what has not that there are some socio-
cultural issues in our society which would necessarily change very slowly if at all.
30) In your experience (i.e. implicitly by reflection as discussed herein) what would
be the grass roots level difficulties....?
The question in the questionnaire actually goes beyond the above title because it
provides 3 options to the sample i.e. Management, Systems and Resources and these
options have been carefully selected because they impact different sample members in
different ways. For example, wealthier countries may be challenged in the area of
management in that the subject project may have to fit in with many other initiatives
they already have in place, for example, a non-domicile tax exile in some jurisdictions
may only be allowed to be in the country for a few days a year and then not working. So
whatever the border control elements of the project would be it would have to be linked
to the tax authorities so that they could keep a check on the person’s status for tax
liability. This example would have even greater reach than merely taxation because the
legal authorities would also need to be kept involved and so the police and the courts
would also need to know and this system does not exist today in a fully internationalised
and coordinated way (Lyon, 2005). So whilst we might think that the challenges may
heavily burden the poorest most it may not be the case. Although it is clear that by the
same token that poorest countries would be challenged most in the areas of resources
and systems provision which would likely be expensive and, therefore, most challenging
for them. The following outlines the responses from the sample:-
Table B72 Q 30(Rows) ...difficulties..?
Management   39    66.10%
Systems 8    13.56%
Resources 12    20.34%
The more than 66% response is a strong indication of where the sample members
perceive that difficulties might come, for example, in the area of management, and it is
important to know this when embarking on proposing such a wide ranging project. Of
course, there would be other challenges and burdens and the cost of the project as a
whole would be very significant and probably require a pool of contributions from
richer countries but even poorer countries would have some costs to bear if only in the
provision of staff and facilities. The cost burden, of course, would depend upon which
areas need investment and some areas would be cheaper than others. The following
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analysis seeks out information on the value perception the sample might have on the 3
area in the question: -
Table B73 Q 26(Rows) ...value cooperation..? X Q 30(Cols) ...difficulties..?
Mgmnt      Systems      Resources     All
NO           5           2 1 8
62.50 25.00 12.50 100.0%
YES         34 6 11 51
66.67    11.76 21.57 100.0%
All 39          8 12 59
66.10    13.56 20.34 100.0%
The above Table B73 shows the complex relationship between the acceptance of the
value of cooperation in security and shows the relative scale of the main difficulty being
in the area of Management (twice the responses than Systems and Resources combined)
which could also, therefore, be read as an indication of which area would be most
concerning and most valued as resolved.
I recall that our experience in the development of the Abu Dhabi Police in a newly
emerging country followed a similar pattern in that we worked very hard to get the
management of security right during which process we came to realise the value of
cooperation. It is important that I have noticed in the development process that the more
we developed the more convinced we became of the importance of engaging with
international partners in the fight against crime and terrorism.  In this respect having
lived both in an emerging country and later in a developed one I can see that the issues
of the level of development of processes and economic ability are very important
precursors to participation in international standardisation of security and its
implementation.
31) Is security a professional organisation with ranking officers
Discipline and organisational structure are probably the most important things that a
professional police force brings to the public with the alternative being vigilantes and
the law of the jungle (Evetts, 1999). The measure of whether a police force is a proper
organisational structure is said to run through many criteria but two very important ones
are firstly that there should be a ranking structure such that there is authority and
incremental rank responsibility; and secondly that there should be hierarchical reporting
lines i.e. an officer reports up to his superior and receives instructions down from his
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superior with authority thereby ultimately reaching the top and the bottom (Harrald,
2004). The feasibility of the subject proposition for the creation of an international
standard for security must be implemented within a proper organisational structure and
that it should be similar in important respects to its contemporaries in other countries.
The following analysis of the questionnaire responses to question 31 (Table 4.74)
enquires about rank and reporting: -
Table B74 Q 31 (Rows) ...professional police..?
NO 0 0.0%
YES 59   100.0%
The sample unsurprisingly perhaps responded unanimously that the police force in their
country was a professional organisation. This is not unexpected but there must be good
and bad in this and in an effort to test their responses the following analysis of whether
the police are a professional organisation is compared with an examination of whether
there would resistance to cooperation coming from the police or security personnel (see
also Holgersson & Gottschalk 2008). This latter question is not posed to test as to
whether the police would resist the subject of this research but rather whether they
would be independent minded and not act on instructions given to them from a higher
level, for example, to cooperate on the subject project as follows: -
Table B75 Q 31(Rows) ...professional police..? X Q 34(Cols) ...police resistance..?
NO      YES     All
YES        39      20      59
66.10 33.90  100.0%
All 39      20      59
66.10 33.90  100.0%
The effect of this analysis is to take the unanimous responses declaring that they police
are professionals and to divide it into 2 groups of 2/3rds : 1/3rd in favour of there being
no resistance to cooperation with other countries; in other words to following orders.
Another perhaps necessary analysis because it is bound to result in subjective outcomes
is an analysis as follows plotting the professional responses against free-to-act police: -
Table B76 Q 31(Rows) ...professional police..? X Q 18(Cols) ...free police..?
NO      YES     All
YES         9       50      59
15.25    84.75 100.0%
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All 9       50      59
15.25 84.75  100.0%
This analysis may have been unnecessary because the results are almost unanimous in
that the police are professionals and 85% of the respondents say they are free-to-act.
The reality must be that a police force is as free-to-act and professional as it is allowed
to be by its political masters and their actions are those which the legislature has
enshrined in the law upon which they act. Clearly, however, there are cases of
impropriety which owing to endless variability and case specificity cannot be addressed
in this study (Skolnick & Fyfe 1993).
I have found that security can only excel if it is run on clear lines of authority and
discipline with the alternative being a disorganised mess. But as I know from experience
it is difficult to maintain professionalism in a small and newly emerging society because
issues of familial preference and vested interests come to dominate certain sectors of the
system. I have seen all variations on this theme in my time and we have shown in the
Abu Dhabi Police that a rank based organisation based upon merit, skills and dedication
is the best model to forming a truly professional organisation which can be trusted and
act for the benefit of all.
32) Standardisation, operation and cooperating with others an impediment.....
This question goes to the heart of this study in that standardisation and cooperation are
required to make the proposition work and it asks the sample to answer based upon their
experience i.e. by reflection and this is important in this study for all the reasons
explained earlier. However, it is a question almost bound to divide opinion owing to the
complex relationship between standardisation and cooperation as follows:
Table B77 Q 32 (Rows) ...operating..?
NO     29    49.15%
YES 30    50.85%
As expected the responses were equally divided but this is in itself is important
information and a further analysis of question 32 regarding standardisation and
operating is correlated with the responses to question 38 which enquired as to the
feasibility in practical terms of the project as follows: -
Table B78 Q 32(Rows)...operating..? X Q 38(Cols) ...feasible..?
NO      YES     All
NO          8       21      29
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27.59 72.41  100.0%
YES         6       24      30
20.00 80.00  100.0%
All        14       45      59
23.73 76.27  100.0%
The important findings in the above Table B78 show that whilst the issues of
standardisation and operating as possible impediments gave almost equal responses, the
responses to the question on feasibility gave a 75% affirmative response. To investigate
further we need to challenge some of the issues in the question with the most difficult
believed to be that of cooperation with other countries and it is important here to
remember that the sample has been encouraged to answer based upon reflection of the
their experiences. The following analysis correlates the responses to the current question
32 (Table B77) with those of question 23 (Table B63) which asked about any other
cooperation agreements with other countries in the area of security also involving
cooperation as follows: -
Table B79  Q 32(Rows) ...operating..? X Q 23(Cols) ...cooperation with others..?
NO      YES     All
NO         21       8      29
72.41 27.59  100.0%
YES       23       7      30
76.67 23.33  100.0%
All 44      15      59
74.58 25.42  100.0%
The above provides a valuable insight in that whilst the issues of standardisation and
cooperation provided inconclusive equal responses from the sample in answer to
question 32 (Table B79), and the responses to question 23 (Table B63) regarding the
exchange of information and cooperation gave clear indications that the 75% majority of
the sample do have cooperation agreements with other countries and we have seen
earlier that these arrangements have been reported as more good than bad. We also saw
earlier that a significant majority of the sample have said that their country willingly
cooperates with other countries in other areas and the following analysis correlates that
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data with the responses to the subject question regarding standardisation and
cooperation as follows:
Table B80  Q 25(Rows) ...other cooperation..? X Q 32(Cols) ...operating..?
NO       YES     All
NO 0 1       1
0.00 100.00  100.0%
YES        29       29      58
50.00    50.00  100.0%
All 29       30      59
49.15 50.85  100.0%
The above analysis also provides a very important insight into the underlying situation
in that whereas the responses to question 23 (Table B63) are significant in being almost
unanimous in stating that the sample countries willingly cooperate with others; the
responses to question 32 (Table B79) regarding standardisation and cooperation divide
these findings into almost equal uncertainty as to whether these would be impediments
to the subject study’s proposition.
I can very clearly refute this proposition by way of my own experience in that I have
seen how a developing security organisation can find progress difficult without some
advice and input from others and that a measure of standardisation would provide a
template upon which to build. This further extends into the practical area of making the
process work into operations and the business of cooperating with others and I can say
from my experience that learning from others is a much more efficient way than to have
to make all the mistakes oneself to learn by trial and error.
33) Policing is based on reacting to events or acting on intelligence to avoid
events.....
34) Resistance in the police and security to sharing information with other.....
Whether security should be proactive or reactive has been discussed by strategists for as
long as there have been structured security organisations (Harvey & Lusch 1997). The
arguments are familiar in that some say that acting proactively to avoid events is more
efficient and reduces losses with greater control; whereas the counter arguments are that
reacting to events after they happen is more economical and allows the police to
demonstrate to the perpetrators the futility of criminal acts. There is some truth in both
arguments; although it is far preferable to maintain a high level of intelligence and act
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proactively to avoid problems than to allow things to be broken and then fix them. The
following analysis provides the responses of the sample: -
Table B81 Q 33 (Rows) ...reacting/acting..?
Proactive 12    20.34%
Reactive 47    79.66%
As much as the ideal is to always be proactive, the reality is that the large number and
types of crimes requiring attention means that being reactive is the most likely outcome,
which probably explains the 80% of responses of the sample being reactive. An
indication of the culture of the security authorities in this regard is thought to be evident
from their willingness to be consultative in the process of detection; in other words an
organisation prepared to share information and systematically seek information from
others is more likely to favour being proactive provided that the majority of activity is
also proactive. As a counterpoint to this question 34 (Table B82) asks if there would be
resistance to sharing information the point being that if there would be then this would
support the sample responses to being reactive as there would not be a drive towards
gathering intelligence and information for crime detection given the 80% of activity
being reactive. The questionnaire responses were as follows: -
Table B82  Q 34(Rows) ...police resistance..?
NO 39    66.10%
YES     20    33.90%
Over two-thirds of the sample reports no resistance to the sharing of information which
would suggest, given the 80% of reactivity, that the information gathered by sharing and
exchange is most likely going towards detection i.e. reactive rather than proactive. A
correlation of these two groups of responses reveals: -
Table B83 Q 33(Rows) ...reacting/acting..? X Q 34(Cols) ...police resistance..?
NO      YES     All
Proactive 9 3      12
75.00 25.00  100.0%
Reactive 30 17      47
63.83 36.17  100.0%
All 39 20      59
66.10 33.90  100.0%
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The norm in this analysis is that of being reactive and not resisting the sharing and
gathering of information with other countries, which might suggest a focus on reactive
detection rather than avoidance by being proactive. To clarify the point, however, we
would need to know whether the sample view would coincide their responses to these
issues of reactive/proactive with their view of what is most in need of standardisation
e.g. if the sample were to prefer a higher level of IT e.g. databases then we might
assume that their focus might be on data mining to identify potential crimes and
criminals. Whereas if their focus is on procedures and equipment both of which are
tools thought to be more reactive than proactive then we might assume that the thrust
would be more reactive. We can see this by the correlation of the responses to question
33 (Table B83) and those to question 46 which sought such information on Procedures,
IT and Databases, and Equipment as follows: -
Tale B84  Q 33(Rows) ...reacting/acting..? X Q 46(Cols) ...aspects needed..?
Procedures      IT & dB     Equipment All
Proactive         9 3 0 12
75.00 25.00 0.00 100.0%
Reactive         42 3 2 47
89.36 6.38 4.26 100.0%
All 51 6 2 59
The above shows the coincident situation that the sample is being reactive in that >71%
of the responses state that whilst significantly being reactive they are also in favour of
advances in Procedures which most often define methods in reacting to events e.g. there
is a robbery going on so we go to the scene of the crime. The logic underlying the
foregoing being procedures are formulaic, whereas proactive responses are by definition
situational and circumstantially creative activities, which can change on a case by case
basis. It is the relative scale and size of these indications which makes this illustration
very valuable.
This issue of whether to operate a security operation in a proactive or reactive manner
must challenge all police organisations everywhere because it is the key issue of how we
do everything. I have faced this issue throughout my career and came to realise that the
most successful methodology is probably a mix of both because either of the
alternatives would be too inflexible to meet such varying needs as confront us in the
security industry and also too rigid in a social management sense placing pressure on
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people to become automatons to comply.
35) Cooperation agreements in security precluding standardisation and
cooperation.....
There are existing opportunities for countries to exchange information, manage their
security to a standard and cooperate with other countries. We have discussed herein the
MIND/FIND initiative of INTERPOL and their secure communication linkage I-24/7,
and we have also reviewed an opportunity available to EU member states and others in
the Schengen Information System which assists with the problems involved in cross
border issues. However, as discussed the uptake of these has been relatively small and
even within the declared 188 members of INTERPOL only 53 have taken up
MIND/FIND. However, whilst uptake may be relatively small some countries have
cooperation agreements with others within such structured arrangements and some have
ex officio arrangements such as the USA and the UK special relationship (Dumbrell
2008). The question here is whether such arrangements preclude participation in the
proposed international standardisation and cooperation and question 35 (Table 4.85)
received the following responses: -
Table B85 Q 35(Rows) ...existing agreements..?
NO 57    96.61%
YES 2     3.39%
The sample has responded almost unanimously that their country does not have existing
agreements which would preclude standardisation and cooperation. So we could assume
that the arrangement proposed would not be impossible for the majority of nations.
However, there may be other considerations which could impact the feasibility, for
example, whilst some nations may not be precluded from cooperating by existing
arrangements there may be other considerations e.g. border disputes, de facto state of
war as in the case of North and South Korea etc (Haggard & Noland 2011). Although it
is thought that these types of pre-existing limitations are inevitable and there are already
international bodies such as the UN to which both such disputing nations belong.
36) Participation would require new legislation.....
37) The culture in the country to people’s human rights.....
39)The law distinguishes between information gathered covertly and overtly.....
There is inevitably a large variability in the laws of so many countries such that
participation in the subject project is bound to impact some countries requiring a change
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in their domestic law. The necessary changes are likely to be in the area of freedom of
information or at least the privacy aspects of information and confidentiality. Some
countries, however, would not need to change any laws because the operation of their
security apparatus is above the law or at least having such a broad legal brief as to be
able to gather and manage data as it wishes. An analysis of the responses to this
question as analysed as follows: -
Table B86 Q 36(Rows) ...new legislation..?
NO 23    38.98%
YES    36    61.02%
The roughly 60:40 split is what we might expect insofar as some countries would have
to legislate in some regard if only to enable the process; but it begs the question as to
whether this would be a reflection of the local culture towards people’s human rights, in
other words is it implicit in society that there would be a protection of people’s human
rights which include the right to privacy and confidentiality. Analysis of the response to
question 37 (Table B87) which asked if there was a culture of support or not caring for
people’s human rights: -
Table B87  Q 37(Rows) ...human rights..?
NOT CARING       6    10.17%
SUPPORT 53    89.83%
The above shows a large support in the majority culture for peoples’ human rights and
further analysis correlates these two findings to illustrate how the support in society may
also drive the need for legislation to formalise the process: -
Table B88 Q 36(Rows) ...new legislation..? X Q 37(Cols) ...human rights..?
NOT CARING      SUPPORT     All
NO 1 22 23
4.35 95.65    100.0%
YES 5 31 36
13.89 86.11    100.0%
All 6 53 59
10.17 89.83    100.0%
Whereas the analysis of question 36 (Table B86) responses showed a 60:40 split in
requiring new legislation almost 90% of them fall into the question 37 (Table B87)
category of receiving support for people’s human rights. This is a very positive indicator
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of there being generally free societies within the sample which might also indicate
possible opposition to the gathering, dissemination and sharing of information. So the
following analysis correlates the responses to new legislation being required and the
responses to question 39 (Table B89) which asked if the law distinguished between
information gathered covertly and overtly: -
Table B89 Q 36(Rows) ...new legislation..? X Q 39 (Cols)...covertly/overtly..?
NO      YES     All
NO         18       5      23
78.26   21.74  100.0%
YES        32       4      36
88.89   11.11  100.0%
All 50       9      59
84.75   15.25 100.0%
It is clear that whilst a small majority had responded that new legislation would be
required, a large majority roughly coinciding with those responses reported that there is
no distinction made between information being gathered either covertly or overtly. This
indicates that even where new legislation would be required it would not likely be
specific to the nature of the work but rather to the process of the concept of the project
as a whole.
38) Standardisation would be feasible and workable in practical terms.....
41) Successful track record in international agreements / standards.....
Ultimately, of course, the key must be the practicality i.e. the workability of the
proposition and this information should be gathered on the basis of reflection of the
sample exactly as question 38 has positioned it: -
Table B90 Q 38(Rows) ...feasible..?
NO 14    23.73%
YES 45    76.27%
Over 75% of the sample responded in the affirmative that standardisation would be
feasible and workable in practical terms. But that information would have been provided
by reflecting upon experiences of internal activities which is what most officers /
operatives i.e. the sample would have seen in the rarity of international interactions in
their everyday work. So the valuable insight into this stage must be whether the sample
subject country has successful interactions on international agreements etc as enquired
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in question 41.
Table B91 Q 41(Rows) ...track record..?
NO 10    16.95%
YES    49    83.05%
To which over 83% of the sample, an even greater proportion, responded that they have
a successful track record on international agreements and as can be seen from the
following analysis would positively indicate success when correlated to the responses
regarding feasibility as follows: -
Table B92 Q 38(Rows) ...feasible..? X Q 41(Cols) ...track record..?
NO      YES     All
NO         3       11      14
21.43 78.57  100.0%
YES        7       38      45
15.56 84.44  100.0%
All 10       49      59
16.95 83.05  100.0%
The indications of this analysis is that we can have a very high degree of confidence that
the project is both feasible in practical terms and likely to be successful given that the
sample responses indicate a favourable track record in complying with a variety of
international agreements.
I have attended many meetings and events at which cooperation has been discussed and
I have very rarely heard anybody attempt to provide a convincing argument against the
concept of standardisation and international cooperation in security. Many people have
explained their concerns and some are credible arguments in their circumstances, but
overall it is clear both in popular agreement and on the basis of this research that
international standardisation of security is both possible and feasible and this is most
clear to those with experience in international cooperation and least so to those without.
40) Major foreign languages spoken and taught in schools.....
43) International standards of units, weights and measures common.....
There has been a great increase in the adoption of English as a common language of
international diplomacy and business and many countries have made the study of
English compulsory in their school system (Strevens, 1992). However, the dominance
of a language tends to follow economic and political supremacy and we can now see the
274
rapid growth of China and also of the Mandarin language becoming a very popular
course at first world universities (Kuo, 1984). Whilst language is not thought to be an
impediment to the implementation of the subject proposition because we have learned to
operate in international forums in a mix of languages, it is expected that members may
prefer to work in a single language. This would be very important given the exchange
protocols involved in common IT systems etc and it is thought that the language of
choice may be English. Question 40 sought to identify which languages might be
common first or second languages in member states: -
Table B93 Q 40(Rows) ...languages taught..?
English 43    72.88%
French 3     5.08%
Spanish 5     8.47%
Other 8    13.56%
A large majority indicated that English may the language most prevalent which is
convenient because it is generally the language of the internet and of IT systems. Given
that this question sought common ground in language it was thought in the design of the
questionnaire that the common usage of other factors such as e.g. SI Units for weights
and measures might indicate a general willingness, or at least a lack of resistance, to
commonality including language and the following analysis of the responses to question
43 confirms that: -
Table B94 Q 43(Rows) ...standard units..?
NO        2     3.39%
YES     57   96.61%
The above data indicates an almost unanimous willingness to take up international
standards as in this example of standard units of measurement and it us thought that we
could extrapolate a positive message from this for the subject project.
I think I can best comment on this item by way of reflection on the basis of coming
from a very low base to a first world emerged economy, in that I have seen us become
more internationally willing the more international we became. We realised early on
that our language was very difficult for foreigners to learn and so we decided to learn
their languages. Similarly, we realised that we had ,much to learn in my area of
expertise and so we set out to absorb as much knowledge experience and systems as we
could in as short a time as possible and to build our own institutions not as copies of
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others but as we wanted them to suit our own traditions and social norms. So taking on
foreign languages, standards, measures, standards etc. has been the basis upon which we
have come to equal and often surpass our developed country partners in some areas and
we have come to realise the benefits of working with others in security.
42) Provide peacekeepers to the United Nations.....
In a similar search for general willingness to cooperate the questionnaire sought
information as to which countries have been willing to contribute troops for
peacekeeping roles to the United Nations which is thought to be a clear expression of
cooperation and commitment and involvement to an international cooperative
agreement. All member states to the United Nations are expected to contribute in some
way according to their ability and circumstances and some are prepared to contribute
troops which indicates a practical willingness and commitment which could prove very
important on the subject project: -
Table B95   Q 42(Rows) ...UN..?
NO 41    69.49%
YES 18    30.51%
The almost 70% of responses not contributing troops is not thought to be an indication
of a lack of commitment because some countries contribute funds to the many costly
programs of the UN instead (Bond, 2003). The 18% of member states who confirm that
they do contribute troops is actually a very positive indication because these may well
be poorer nations who have the people but not the funds but wish to contribute to
maintain their membership, and it is this which is a very positive indication of so many
countries being prepared to get practically involved.
44)Training liberally provided.....
45)Value of training appreciated.....
We have discussed that members would inevitably be variously economically able to
participate in this project and it has been seen that some wealthier countries would be
prepared to support them for the common good. It is thought that some of the generosity
of the wealthier countries may in fact be self-serving in that many of the transnational
crimes of drugs, terrorism, people trafficking etc have their origins in the poorer nations
of the world and the paradox is that it is perhaps those who can pay least who need to
fund their activities most for the benefit of all. A particularly important component of
cooperation and also an expensive burden on members would be the training required to
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ensure that all countries are working to a common goal and in a uniform way. However,
training is an essential part of any police or security organisation (Haberfeld, 2002) and
the questionnaire asked if training was liberally provided for a measure of the ability of
participants to the subject project to meet the needs of compliance: -
Table B96  Q 44(Rows) ...training..?
NO 3     5.08%
YES 56    94.92%
An almost 95% response in the affirmative is a clear indication that the members are
well used to training their people and would likely meet their commitments in this
regard, although the issue of the associated burden of the cost of doing so is another
issue and cost sharing has been discussed elsewhere and indicated that the wealthier
countries would cover any shortfalls. However, we must not assume that a high positive
response in regard to training necessarily indicates that all will be provided to meet the
project needs. Nor indeed that what would be provided would be what the project would
need and the value that training is held in may be the key to what the respondents mean
by training being liberally provided. Question 45 asked if training was valued in the
respondents organisation the assumption being that if it is then it might be both freely
available and of good quality: -
Table B97 Q 45(Rows) ...value training..?
NO 28    47.46%
YES 31    52.54%
This data creates an interesting situation because on the one hand the responses were
that 95% reported that training was liberally provided and yet the above indicates that
training is about equally valued and presumably also almost equally not valued. The
data also shows that despite the high level of training being liberally provided there is a
relatively low level of value being placed on training.
The development of the Abu Dhabi Police in my lifetime has been a long journey of
learning and applying lessons learned to our own circumstances and this has inevitably
involved endless training and adaptation. However, there is an additional benefit derived
from wide ranging training in that we noticed a very rapid maturity in our staff as they
mixed with their peers from other countries, with whom they exchanged ideas and
opinions. This immersion in the world community of colleagues coming from
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participation in international organisations and events has an underlying process of
standardisation in that I remember starting to see terminologies and systems around the
office being clearly those of other countries. So the value of training is often not just the
‘do this’ and ‘do that’ of the subject matter, it is also the systemic processes that we all
absorb in the process of mixing with others in a professional developmental
environment.
46).....aspects of security provision most in need of standardization.....
It must be the case that potential nation members at different stages of security and
economic development would likely have varying priorities in response to this question
i.e. as to whether Procedures, IT, or Equipment are areas most in need of
standardisation. It is important to understand these needs at the development and
planning stage of such a project so that the system design and process can be
appropriately structured. The following analysis identifies the areas that the sample
believes most need standardisation: -
Table B98 Q 46(Rows) ...aspects needed..?
Procedures 51    86.44%
IT 6    10.17%
Equipment 2     3.39%
The findings are clearly indicating that the sample believe that Procedures is by far the
area most in need of standardisation. The question must be why this is so because the
project is also bound to be heavily dependent on the other 2 options in the question i.e.
IT and Equipment. We have discussed previously in reviewing the responses to
questions 11 and 12 (Tables B30 and B32 respectively) that cooperation and
coordination are very strong contributors to the selection of Procedures most likely
because having procedures without cooperation and coordination would be bound to
fail. We might assume that the high level of response in favour of the standardisation of
Procedures as opposed to IT or Equipment might be coming from the relatively wealthy
nations because surely poorer nations might be more concerned about costly
infrastructure. Wealthier countries might also have made this observation in the
knowledge that even if the project was funded by them such that poorer countries would
have first world IT and Equipment the project would fall down on procedural
inefficiencies (Simma, Tomuschat, Mosler, & Randelzhofer 1994). The following
analysis correlates the responses this question with those for question 28 (Table 4.68)
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which enquired about whether the sample country was a developing country and if it
could meet the cost of participation: -
Table B99 Q 28(Rows) ...able to finance..? X Q 46(Cols) ...aspects needed..?
Procedures      IT     Equipment     All
NO            45 6 2 53
84.91 11.32 3.77 100.0%
YES            6 0 0 6
100.00 0.00 0.00 100.0%
All 51 6 2 59
86.44 10.17 3.39 100.0%
The above indicates that a large majority of variously developing countries reported that
they would not be able to finance their participation and also say that they would favour
the standardisation of Procedures with all other options having very low responses. We
should read this as an expression of their level of need as a developing less wealthy
country in which security might be being managed on an ad hoc basis requiring order
and Procedures more than IT and Equipment.  However, all the 45 out of the total 59
respondents cannot be developing countries, so as mentioned there must be a varying
level of development within the sample from which we can assume that the issue of
Procedures impacts beyond the simple issue of wanting order and procedural methods
over anything else.
47)Friction with country with which it would not cooperate.....
48)As above excluding e.g. Iran and North Korea and non-compliant states.....
49)Cooperate with an international body if those countries also affiliated.....
Many countries have problems with others some are even in a state of undeclared or
unresolved war e.g. North & South Korea, China and Taiwan, Israel and the Arab
countries etc (Haggard & Noland 2011). Such running sores would likely discourage
them from cooperation with the enemy for fear of loss of data and access to militarily
useful information. We can see from the following analysis the extent to which the
problem actually exists: -
Table B100  Q 47(Rows) ...friction country.?
NO        7    11.86%
YES     52    88.14%
It may seem surprising that such a majority of country responses reveals that the world
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is not a completely cooperative environment and we can see this in almost daily
headlines (Haggard & Noland 2011). However, what if such non-compliant and errant
states were excluded from such an organisation (of course this would never be a
recommended practice because it would just create safe havens for criminals and
terrorists and perhaps make the problem worse) what would be the opinion of the
sample then would they still refuse to cooperate?
Table B101  Q 48(Rows) ...exclude countries..?
NO 55    93.22%
YES 4     6.78%
The sample clearly responds that NO this would be the case if we exclude such errant
state so we can safely say that countries like Iran and North Korea and other frequently
non-compliant states do impact on the willingness of countries to form international
bodies which include them (Haggard & Noland 2011). But that is no way to run any
world body i.e. at the exclusion of those who don’t agree with others; international
bodies must by definition be tolerant of differences in the world community in many
respects we could say that’s why they exist. So would the sample be happier to
cooperate instead with a third party international body if those other countries were also
affiliated. In other words would countries be happier to cooperate with a body of
minimum proximity i.e. independent of the members perhaps a hybrid of INTERPOL
whereby the members don’t have to meet one another but still cooperate once removed
from each other?
Table B102  Q 49(Rows) ...cooperate 3rd party..?
NO 14    23.73%
YES      45    76.27%
So the main reason for not wishing to cooperate appears to be the wish not to join in
activities or share information with certain other countries for reasons which may be
different from country to country. Herein lays an important consideration in the project
in that whilst it is inevitable that such problems would exist the number and
permutations of such problems would be so many that the only solution may be a body
which distances the members. An analysis of the responses on friction with another
country and cooperation with a third party body as above: -
Table B103  Q 47(Rows) ...friction country.? X Q 49(Cols) ...cooperate 3rd party..?
NO       YES     All
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NO 0 7 7
0.00 100.00  100.0%
YES 14       38      52
26.92    73.08 100.0%
All 14       45      59
23.73    76.27 100.0%
[Chi-Square statistic = 2.4709 P-Value = 0.115969 significant at P<0.15 indicating
dependent variables]
The indications in the above analysis show that there is a close correlation between the
effect of friction between countries and the willingness of countries to cooperate
through a third party body presumably such there would be distance between them. We
could assume from this indication that this might be a solution to this inevitable problem
but the question, of course, of how much efficiency might be lost owing to any reticence
which might exist in the minds of opposing parties to a full cooperation either all the
time, or perhaps just when cases come up in which their opposition might benefit.
I have realised throughout my long experience that in policing and security we
necessarily mix with all kinds of people and engage in many different situations. We
cannot refuse to be involved in a situation because we don’t like what it is about any
more than we cannot neglect a dangerous situation because we don’t like the people
involved. So it follows that whilst other walks of life may have the luxury of choosing
the people they mix with, we in the police and security industry cannot choose, we must
respond to whatever challenges come our way irrespective of who is involved. This
concept logically progresses to the international arena where it is inevitable that we like
some people better than others, but we all clearly like criminals and terrorists and drug
dealers least as they are our common enemies. So as much as we may not like some of
our partners in some international forums we inevitably have many common challenges
and goals in the policing and security industry and we must mix with whomever to
defeat the criminals who threaten our people and our countries.
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Appendix C Ethical Considerations in the Research
Consideration of the ethics in accessing data
The information and data gathered for my research have been variously obtained by way
of desk research, a structured questionnaire and by interviews intended to delve deeper
into discovered indications (Kothari, 1985). This would involve interaction with
colleagues in the security industry at all levels and in a variety of roles and
responsibilities and internationally with the ever present consideration that much of the
information sought would be confidential and often sensitive and perhaps even
classified and I have been very careful in respecting the confidence of the respondents
and the ethical considerations involved.
My primary concern has always been to ensure that the participant to an interview or the
respondent to the questionnaire clearly understood the purpose of the research and the
nature of the work in terms of motive and outcome; so that in participating and
continuing they could do so with confidentiality and unfettered involvement and provide
information freely without fear of being identified or infringing their responsibilities and
in doing so they would be making an informed decision (Bryman, 2008, p. 121). To this
end I provided all participants with an information sheet explaining the nature of the
research and the motivation and methodology behind it, so that none could feel
uninformed or perhaps even ‘misled about the true nature of the study’ (Robson, 2002,
p. 65). The information sheet contained all the information required and includes contact
details just in case any clarification or further assurance was required by the sample
members. The participants were assured of anonymity to the extent that the data used in
analysis would not even include their nationality so that they would be assured that no
identification could be made that a contribution was made from their country or
organisation. The need of confidentiality to enable participants to contribute was
mentioned during the piloting phase of the questionnaire formulation when it was said
that if the nationality and rank and area of operation were stated in the results it might
be easy to discover the participant; and participants would know this and be unlikely to
contribute.
It was a primary consideration that the participants understood their role in the work and
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that they were assured of anonymity and there was no risk of a breaking of their
confidence. Past research has found that an important feature in such a trust relationship
rests in the participant understanding the motive to the research and that no harm could
come to them by participating (Fox, M., Green, G., & Martin, P. J., 2007, pp. 104-6).
These considerations are particularly important in this research project given that some
of the items addressed and some of the positions and roles of the participants are
sensitive in various ways and it is often the case that even the identity of the participant
is itself often classified. So as a matter of formality I began by contacting each of the
participants by email and many by telephone and confirmed everything in writing and
signed the letter and clearly spelt out the dedication to confidentiality both as a matter of
form and also as an explanation that any transgression would also be damaging to the
work itself. Some of the respondents asked what would happen to their identity and their
information both during the research and after completion and I assured them, again in
writing, that their information would be anonymised and separated from their identity
by encoding throughout and even then during the research it would be kept under secure
lock and key and when electronic then password protected.
However, I have recognised throughout that there are ethical considerations on both
sides, both in protecting the security and identity of the participants but also from my
side in the way that I conducted my research activities in observing the legal
implications amid the intricacies of the special situation which exists in the security
industry. I have ensured that this work complies with the standards of the University of
Portsmouth Ethics Committee, the legal framework in the various jurisdictions and that
the participants have ensured that they are not contravening any job specific or local
laws by participating. I rigorously addressed these considerations to ensure that no harm
was done to anybody by this work and that the respondents could do so unfettered by
other commitments which would also encourage them to respond honestly and freely
and thereby enrich the work with valid and true information and that the ethical
considerations of confidentiality and anonymity were respected (Grinyer, 2002, p. 1). I
wanted to give the participants total comfort that their identity would remain
confidential which was highlighted as important in my test piloting discussions with
current and former colleagues and I even excluded the nationality of participants
because it had been mentioned by some in the piloting discussions that whilst they may
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be anonymous their statements might be construed as the opinion of status of their
nation.
At the basic level of understanding from what premise the respondents would provide
information it was essential to understand how they viewed the process of providing
information by reflection and did they all view it in the same way and was that view the
same as mine? However, to get to this level of understanding it was necessary to delve
back into the nature and extent of their training and this has been very difficult to do
individually owing the wide variability in a large international body of people. So
questions on training and their perceived importance of it and their view of reflection as
an objective and factual technique have been enquired about in the questionnaire to
provide an insight into this area. Although it is recognised that by asking a question on
the participants opinion on the technique of reflection does not necessarily reveal how
they would operationalise the process within themselves in providing information by
way of reflective recollection; but it is assumed that the mix of enquiry in the
questionnaire on the basis of information provided does reveal in the analysis of data
and information hereto as to how the respondents objectively view their role as
reflective respondents.
It is further recognised, of course, that there is an inevitable variation in the rank and
other circumstances of the participants given the international and multivariable nature
of this work that some consideration must be given to the ability of the respondents to
reply equally well. This complex consideration has been handled by structuring the
questionnaire questions in a way such that the questions could be answered as a matter
of known fact without the expectation of any special knowledge which might reside in
some people or ranks and not in others; or for that matter which might be available
knowledge in some cultures or countries and not in others. In this way this research
project design puts the subject matter at the heart of the objective data and information
search and not the particular circumstances of the respondent and in this way avoids
confusing responses and opinion and thereby bias and prejudice. This principle also
applies as regards the relative rank of the participants in that whereas several may
respond from one organisation there should not be any influence or deference at play
which could influence the responses (Brehm, J., & Gates, S., 1993, p. 556). It is also
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recognised that in such a hierarchically structured environment there could be some
response which might be derived from received or conditioned misapprehension as
discussed by (Pavlov, I. P., & Anrep, G. V., 1927) in that some respondents might
respond by paying lip service to some received wisdom rather than freely of their own
volition. A further issue was raised during the piloting phase of the questionnaire
development in that participants would be more amenable to answering tick type
multiple choice questions rather than writing script which could be construed as
deliberately expressing an opinion which in turn might be seen as critical. So the
questionnaire provided participants with a choice of common options.
As this project is mainly based upon desk research expanded upon by a questionnaire,
which is further enhanced by findings driven selected interviews with a sample of
security officers and operatives with hands on experience having the ability to reflect, it
is inevitable that some of the information will be sensitive or restricted such that ethical
considerations are bound to arise.
My main ethical consideration in inviting both a few people I knew and the vast
majority I didn’t know to complete the questionnaire and perhaps engage in an
interview was to ensure that they had no doubt of the reason and purpose of this
research. If I did not have such an ethical consideration as a high priority my work could
have been construed as deceptive and not enabled them to make an informed decision to
participate (Bryman, 2008, p. 121). I explained the basis of this research project in my
invitation to participate at the head of the questionnaire and ensured them of
confidentiality and anonymity to alleviate any concerns they might have of any
deception (Robson, 2002, p. 65) and to assure them that no harm would come from their
participation (Bryman, 2008, pp. 118-120); (Fox, M., Green, G., & Martin, P. J., 2007,
pp. 104-6). This was especially important in this project given the subject matter and the
fact that the information sought would variously appear confidential to the sample
members. I initially made contact with all potential participants to tell them of my
project and to tell them that I would soon be seeking input from various parties and to
my surprise some replied to confirm that they would like to participate, and interestingly
the vast majority of these positive responses were from strangers. I made it clear at this
first contact that I would respect their confidentiality and anonymity and I think this was
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the reason for these early positive responses (Robson, 2002, p. 67).
I come from a culture in which modesty, respect and observing the privacy of others is
very important so I am well used to maintaining confidentiality not just in my job but
also in my personal and cultural life. This respect for the confidentiality of others has
been a major consideration in every part of this work and I know that if I was to break
the confidence of those contributing to this research then I would lose more than I
would gain by completing the course. I have known several examples of breaches of
confidentiality during my long career and I have seen the negative outcome on all
concerned.
Compliance and consent
Wherever possible I have ensured and sometimes directly sought consent from
authorities or superiors of the respondents although I have relied on them to ensure that
they are allowed to participate. In the case of respondents in my own region in the
Middle East region, where I have very close and long standing relationships with senior
police and security officers, I have ensured that such senior people are aware that I may
have approached one of their subordinates to participate, and very often as well as
themselves. In all cases I have explained the motive for the work the sort of information
and data sought and provided an assurance of confidentiality and sometimes used these
relationships to facilitate introductions and permission to participate to respondents.
This methodology is in line with recommended practice as approved by the University
of Portsmouth Ethics Committee and is as used on other published research projects
(Jormfeldt, Svedberg, & Arvindson, 2003 p,610); Walsh, Dall’Alba, Bowden, Martin,
Marton, Masters et al 1993 p.1137).
To add an element of institutional formality to this process I have also provided signed
letters identifying the University of Portsmouth as being the academic institution
involved so that parties could either check on my bona fides or indeed check on the
credibility of the University as being a responsible body to which I am associated and of
course this also addresses any concerns people might have over data protection and
intellectual property and copyright issues (Robson, 2002, p. 33). At no time was it ever
suggested that any benefit would accrue to any participant either in kind or by way of
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restricted insight into the findings of the research, neither it must also be said was there
ever any such request from  participants or their superiors.
As can be seen from the questionnaire I have not in any way shown to the participants
that this research is the work of a former senior officer with the rank of Major General
so as not to imply required response or risk them paying lip service in providing
answers which they may think I want to receive. This is an important consideration
because there is a recognised deference to seniority in the police and security services in
all countries and this is a necessary quality owing to the risk of breakdown of security in
the absence of any such formalities (Graef, 1989, p. 459), (Reiner, 1992, p. 107).
However, the risk of predisposing responses by being known to participants is always
there and so I was pleased to be able to secure a high proportion of my participants from
countries and organisations where I am not known and would have no influence; and
this influence on compliance has been discussed by (Bowling, B., & Foster, J. , 2002, p.
994), (Graef, 1989, p. 313), (Chan, 1997, p. 45). Furthermore, I ensured that where
interviews were conducted to gather further information or confirm information already
received I made a special effort to be the university researcher focused solely on the
work at hand and not the former senior officer checking on how much the respondents
happen to know. My attitude was always professional and focused on the work without
any past or present influences of rank or reputation etc and the discussions and other
interactions with participants have always been aimed at the gathering and quality of the
information sought.
Broader ethical considerations
There is implicit in all research projects the overarching intention to achieve something
worthy and not at the cost of causing any harm (Baron, 1996). In the case of medical
research, for example, it might be the risk of harming a trial patient but in the case of
this research it might the risk of causing a leak of information or data which could
implicate the participant in the project or which might get into the wrong hands.
Therefore, the related issues of confidentiality of the information and anonymity of the
participant become paramount because if these principles are observed then no harm can
come from the project during its research or even after completion from its findings.
Confidentiality of data and information can be protected by coding and encrypting the
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information which can both conceal its meaning and also its source and this can be done
by attaching a value code or diluting it into a larger database without any means of
identifying where it came from; and similarly the removal of all names and country of
origin etc can conceal both the source of particular information and also whether a
particular contributor was part of the study at all (Cox, B.G. Cox, Binder, Chinnappa,
Christianson, Colledge and Kott (2011).
In addition, of course, we must always ensure that no laws are broken by the process of
data and information gathering and this is recognised in this research as a particularly
important issue given the sensitive nature of the project itself. The project as a whole
might also appear to be an imposition on participants depending upon how the
interaction with them is handled and they may be duty bound to give an answer to every
question even to questions which they know they should not be answering and this may
give rise to either an untrue response which might indicate an unethical or improper act
from them (Bachman, R., & Schutt, R. K., 2007, p. 251). So it is often that structured
interviews will allow respondents to answer questions in their own words to the extent
that they feel comfortable with even if this results in answers which are evasive or
critical because the key ethical consideration in the interaction between the research
project and the respondent is that no harm should attach as a result of the work as
discussed by (Oppenheim, 1992, p. 83).
Applying such a carefully rigorous approach to the management of a research project
can have the effect of enabling participants to respond freely e.g. the wording of a
question very carefully so as not to cause cultural offence to the sample may neuter the
question to an extent which eventually impacts on the value of the information coming
from the answers (Robson, 2002, p. 237). The key to this problem lays in a
questionnaire design which is legally and culturally inoffensive to all the sample
members and this has been very difficult to do in this case given that the questionnaire
is intended for international use involving many cultural socio-religious ethnic etc
variables (Bryman, 2008). This was further complicated by the observations of the pilot
sample of former colleagues who explained the disincentives to their participation
which included identifiable information and providing written answers which could be
construed as opinion.
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However, it is clear that the researcher and the research project cannot control all
possible outcomes in respect of confidentiality and security because of the high degree
of interaction which can happen within a single organisation or as between several. The
officers/operatives in organisations which already have cooperation agreements may see
one another as colleagues and necessarily confide in one another. Such issues involving
an unwitting breach of security can have serious personal and psychological impacts on
the participants (Bosworth, Campbell, Demby, Ferranti, & Santos, 2005, p. 258) and it
is the belief of this researcher that the well being and security of innocent participants to
this work is a paramount consideration whereas some research projects are inherently
dangerous (Gomez-Cespedes, 1999, p. 166).
It should be noted that the questionnaire in this research project does not mention the
participants name and neither does it address the person by name or in any other way
risk revealing his/her identity. In fact where it asks for information on languages spoken
in the participant’s country it is not compulsory to provide another language by name
although the option is available for those happy to do so. Similarly, the responses when
tabulated into the spreadsheet provided hereto it should be noted that the respondents
are identified only by a number in each row of questionnaire responses and this further
conceals the identity of participants (Bachman, R., & Schutt, R. K., 2007, p. 252). So
whilst it has been possible to ensure that the identity of participants remains confidential
some breaches of anonymity have been suggested by researchers from breaches of the
participants themselves by responding to expansive questions (Burns, & Walker, 2005,
p. 69).
An ethical consideration not commonly perceived as a risk has been observed in
research from Robson (1997 p. 411) in that some might view the findings from the
perspective of what is reported and how that might impact on the overall security
community. The solution to this has been suggested as designing and implementing a
research project in a way that stands apart from any security organisation or expressed
preference i.e. to be objective in all respects and robust in its pursuit of conclusions
(Brannick, & Coghlan, 2007, p. 66).
289
Appendix D List of Abbreviations and Tables in the text
Abbreviations
AML / CTF - Anti money laundering and counter terrorism financing
APEC - Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
API - American Petroleum Institute
ASEAN - Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASME - American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ANSI - American National Standards Institute
BAC - Basic Access Control
CCIR - Consultative Committee for Radio Communications
CCITT - International Consultative Committee on Telecommunications and
Telegraphy
CCTV - Closed Circuit Television
CEN - Comite Europeen de Normalisation
CENELEC - European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation
COBIT - Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology
DHS - Department of Homeland Security
DNA - Deoxyribonucleic acid is a molecule that encodes the genetic
instructions
ECHR - European Court of Human Rights
EIDA - Emirates Identification Authority
EU - European Union
EUROZONE - The part of the European Union using the EURO Currency
FDA - USA Food and Drug Administration
FOI - Freedom of Information Act
GATT - The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCHQ - United Kingdom Government Communications Headquarters
HF - High Frequency
HSSP - Homeland Security Standards Panel
I-24/7 - INTERPOL’s secure communication linkage
ICAO - International Civil Aviation Organization
ICC - International Criminal Court
ICHR - International Council of Human Rights
ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross
ICT - Information and Communications Technologies
ID Cards - Identification Cards
IEC - International Electrotechnical Committee
II - Infrastructural Information
IMF - International Monetary Fund
INTERPOL - International Police Organisation
ISO - International Standards Organisation
IT / ICT - Information Technology / ICT – information & Computer Technology
ITU - International Telecommunication Union / CIT - Infn and Comm. Tech
JRC - European Commission Joint Research Centre
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KPI - Key Performance Indicator
LAFTA - Latin America Free Trade Area
LTE - Long Term Evolution (LTE)
MIND/FIND - Mobile/Fixed INTERPOL Network Databases
ML - Money Laundering
MPS - Metropolitan Police Service
MSWord - Microsoft Word / MSExcel – Microsoft Excel
NAFTA - North America Free Trade Area
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NECMA - National Emergency and Crisis Management Authority
NPDN - USA's National Plant Diagnostics Network
NSA - United States National Security Agency
OI - Operational Information
OPCW - The Organisation for Protection and Cooperation in Europe
PDCA - Plan - Do - Check – Act
PIN - Personal Identification Number
RFID - Radio Frequency Identifier
SAE - System Architecture Evolution
SCHENGEN - EU’s Schengen Information System
SPSS - Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
SWOT - Strength, Weakness, Opportunity, Threat
TV - Television
UAE - United Arab Emirates
UHF - Ultra High Frequency
UK - United Kingdom
UN - United Nations
UNICEF - The United Nations Childrens’ Fund
USA - United States of America
USDA - United States Department of Agriculture
VHF - Very High Frequency
WHO - World Health Organisation
WTO - The World Trade Organisation
